



बौद्धभारतीयग्रन्थमाला—३०
Bauddha Bharati Series—30


स्वोपज्ञवृत्तिसहिता
विग्रहव्यावर्तनी
(आंग्ल-हिन्दीभाषानुवादयुता)



प्रधानसम्पादक :

स्वामी द्वारिकादासशास्त्री





बौद्धभारतीग्रन्थमाला-३०

Bauddha Bharati Series-30

स्वोपज्ञवृत्तिसहिता

विग्रहव्यावर्तनी

[आंग्ल-हिन्दीभाषानुवादसहिता]

प्रधानसम्पादकः

स्वामी द्वारिकादासशास्त्री

VIGRAHAVYAVARTANI

of

ACHARYA NAGARJUNA

with his own commentary

(swopajna vritti)

&

With English Translation

by

Dr. S. Mookerjee

Ex. Director of


Nalanda mahavihara, Nalanda (Bihar)

&

Hindi Translation

by

Swami Dwarika Das Shastri



BAUDDHA BHARATI

VARANASI

1994

स्वोपज्ञवृत्तिसहिना
विग्रहव्याख्यानं



आंग्लभाषयाऽनुवादकः

डॉ० सातकारिमुखर्जी

नव नालन्दा महाविहारस्य प्राक्तननिदेशकः,

नालन्दा. (बिहार)

हिन्दीभाषयाऽनुवादकश्च
स्वामी द्वारिकादासशास्त्री



वाराणसी

प्रकाशक :

© बौद्धभारती,
पो० बॉ० १०४९,
वाराणसी-१ (उ० प्र०)
पिन : २२१ ००१

Published by :

© Bauddha Bharati
Post Box. 1049
VARANASI-1 (U. P.)
Pin : 221 001

प्रथम संस्करण
१९९४

First Edition
1994



(Rupees



मुद्रक :
साधना प्रेस
जगतगंज,
वाराणसी-२

Printed at
SADHANA PRESS
Jagatganj
VARANASI-2

प्रकाशकीयम्

यः शून्यतां प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादं मध्यमां प्रतिपदं च ।

एकार्थं निजगाद प्रणमामि तमप्रतिमसम्बुद्धम् ॥

मान्या विद्वन्मूर्धन्याः !

१९६८तमे ख्रिष्टाब्देऽस्माभिरभिनवपद्धत्या बौद्धसाहित्यस्य प्रकाशनाय प्रचाराय च बौद्धभारतीपरिषदियं स्थापिता । तत आरम्भानया परिषदा बौद्धसाहित्यस्यांकरभूतानि तत्त्वसंग्रह-प्रमाणवार्तिक-अभिधर्मकोश-न्याय-विन्दु-वादन्याय-मध्यमकशास्त्र-बोधिचर्यावतार-महायानसूत्रालङ्कार-अभिधानपदीपिका-मज्झिमनिकायाद्यनेकानि (२१) सुकुलंभानि ग्रन्थरत्नानि प्राकाशयमानीतानि । सेयं बौद्धभारतीपरिषदनेन कुशलकर्मणा सर्वत्र बौद्धजगति सुप्रतिष्ठिताऽभूदिति सुविदितमेव समेषाम् ।

इदानीमस्मिन्नेव क्रमेणया पर्षदा, शून्यवादसिद्धान्तप्रवर्तकैरार्यनागाजुन-पादै रचितं स्वोपज्ञवृत्तिसहितं नाम्ना विग्रहव्यावर्तनीत्येतद् ग्रन्थरत्नं पूजनीय डॉ० सातकारिमुखजिकृतेन आंग्लभाषानुवादेन, स्वामिद्वारिकादास-शास्त्रिणा विहितेन राष्ट्रभाषया रूपान्तरेण च समायोज्य प्रकाश्यते ।

अत्र प्रकाशितेयं स्वोपज्ञवृत्तिसहिता विग्रहव्यावर्तनी इतः पूर्वं देव-नागरलिप्यां संस्करणत्रयेण संस्कृता अभूत् ।

तत्र प्रथमं संस्करणं १९३७तमे ख्रिष्टाब्दे पाटलिपुत्रस्थया विहार-उड़ीसा-अनुसन्धानपरिषदा (विहार-उड़ीसा-रिसर्च सोसायटी) प्रकाशितं डॉ० काशी-प्रसाद जायसवाल-महापण्डितराहुल-सांकृत्यायनाभ्यां च सम्पादितमभूत् ।

द्वितीयं संस्करणं १९५६तमे ख्रिस्ताब्दे नवनालन्दा महाविहारस्य प्रथम-शोधपत्रिकायां प्रकाशितं डॉ० सातकारि मुखजिमहाभागैः सम्पादितमांग्ल-भाषयाऽनूदितं चासीत् ।

तृतीयं च संस्करणं दरभङ्गा (विहार)स्थ बौद्ध संस्कृतग्रन्थावली १९६०तमे ख्रिष्टाब्दे प्रकाशितं डा० पी० एल्० वैद्य महोदयेन सम्पादितमभूत् ।

एषु तृतीयं बौद्धसंस्कृतग्रन्थावलौ प्रकाशितं दरभङ्गास्थं संस्करणं प्रायशोऽशुद्धिबहुलमतः संस्कृतमप्यसंस्कृतमिवास्तीति नात्रास्माकं किमपि साहाय्यं व्यधात् । द्वितीयं महापण्डितश्रीराहुलसांकृत्यायनसम्पादितं संस्करणमन्यापेक्षया शुद्धम्, यथाप्रसङ्गं शीर्षकटिप्पण्यादिसंवलितञ्चास्ति । तृतीयं संस्करणं च नालन्दाप्रकाशनाख्यया प्रसिद्धमस्ति । एतदेवाधृत्य डॉ० मुखर्जि-महोदयेनेयं विग्रहव्यावर्तनी आंग्लभाषयाऽनूदिता ।

एतदेव च संस्करणद्वयमाधृत्येदं बौद्धभारतीसंस्करणं राष्ट्रभाषयाऽपि रूपान्तरितम् ।

इत्थमिदं ग्रन्थरत्नं भाषात्रयेण संयोज्येदानीमस्माभिर्विदुषां समक्षमुपस्थाप्यते । अनेन शुक्लकर्मणा सर्वेऽपि बौद्धदर्शनमधिजिगमिषवो मोदमाप्स्यन्तीत्याशास्महे ।

मकरसंक्रान्तिः, २०५० वि०
वाराणसी

}

बौद्धभारतीपरिषदध्यक्षः

स्वोपज्ञवृत्तियुतायाः
वि ग्र ह व्या व र्त्त न्याः

विषयक्रमः

पूर्वपक्षः	४१ ४८
१. भावानां निःस्वभावता न युक्ता	४१-४३
(१) वादिवचनस्य शून्यत्वात्	४१
(२) प्रतिज्ञाहानेः	४२
(३) प्रमाणासिद्धेः	४३
२. भावानां सस्वभावता युक्ता	४४
(१) कुशलादिधर्माणां कुशलादिस्वभावनाभ्युपगमात्	४४
(२) निर्वस्तुकस्य नामाभावात्	४५
३. प्रतिषेधासिद्धेः	४५
(क) धर्मैर्विना स्वभावाप्रतिषेधात्	४५
(ख) सद्भावानभ्युपगमात्	४६
(ग) ग्राहादिषट्कास्वीकारात्	४६
४. प्रतिषेध्यासिद्धेः	४७
सिद्धान्तपक्षः	४८-६४
१. भावानां शून्यता युक्ता (क)	४८
(१) वचनस्य शून्यतास्वीकारेऽपि	४८
शून्यतालक्षणम्	४८
(२) न प्रतिज्ञाहानिः	४९
(३) प्रमाणसिद्धिः	५२
(४) नाप्यकस्मात् प्रमाणसिद्धिः	५७
२. इतोऽपि भावानां शून्यता युक्ता	५८
(१) प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वात्	५८
(२) निर्वस्तुकस्य नामाभावेऽनियमात्	६०
३. प्रतिषेधसिद्धिर्न युक्ता	६१
(क) धर्मविनिर्मुक्तः स्वभावः प्रतिषिद्धः	६१
(ख) असतोऽप्यनभ्युपगमस्य प्रतिषेधात् समः	६१
(ग) प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वान्निर्हेतुकतादोषः	६२
(घ) प्रतिषेध-प्रतिषेध्याभ्युपगमाददोषः	६२

INTRODUCTORY

The term 'absolutist' is to be understood in the present context as a thinker who does not believe in the reality of the phenomenal plurality and consequently denies that truth can be relative and found in judgments which are *ex hypothesi* relative in character. Such an absolutist may be committed to a metaphysical position in relation to which he may seek to evaluate the truth or otherwise of thoughts and assertions, or may maintain a non-committal attitude in ontology. The Vedāntist, for instance, believes in the reality of the Absolute *Brahman* which is a spiritual entity, and is the prius and background of the phenomenal world, although the latter is regarded as a logically unjustifiable appearance. Nāgārjuna, the celebrated exponent of the Mādhyamika philosophy, completely dedicates all his energies to the proof of the unreality of the pluralistic order envisaged by experience and thought. Whether he believes in an ultimate reality behind the appearance is a question on which the opinions of philosophers, exponents or opponents, are found to differ as poles apart. Stcherbatsky and the Japanese exponents of Nāgārjuna assert that he believes in an ultimate reality which is positive and not an unqualified void. Indian philosophers, particularly of the rival schools, have however unanimously declared Nāgārjuna to be the advocate of a negative Absolute. Candrakīrti, the commentator of Nāgārjuna, whose original work in Sanskrit has come down to us, does not seem to leave any loophole to foist a positivistic interpretation upon the concept of *śūnyatā*. It must be left an open question whether the *śūnyatā* which literally means 'Voidity' is capable of being equated with Absolute Being or Non-Being. The difficulty of the logical appraisal

of this intractable concept lies in the consideration that all predication, either positive or negative, must of necessity be repugnant and alien to it. For a stickler in precision of terminology, our description of *śūnyatā* as a metaphysical concept is bound to be a misnomer. Both Nāgārjuna and the Vedāntist are agreed on the point that the ultimate truth, call it *Brahman* or *śūnyatā*, is only accessible to the realization of the mystic and bound to elude conceptual thought.

We shall concern ourselves in the present discourse with the position of the absolutist in logic and not with the metaphysical problem. Whatever be the ontological conclusion, the absolutist does not disguise his unqualified distrust of the logical categories which are employed both in the subjective and syllogistic inference by the orthodox logicians. The logical apparatus of inference must consist of three terms, *viz.*, the subject or the minor term, the probans or the middle term, and the probandum or the major term. Besides, it is the condition *sine qua non* of inferential proof that there must be a major premise which states a necessary and universal relation between the probans and the probandum, and a minor premise showing that the probans belongs to the subject. It is again the universal postulate of all the schools of Indian logic that the premises and the conclusion must be materially true. Mere formal consistency, regardless of material truth, is not accepted as the criterion of logical validity by any school of Indian logic. Even Dignāga and Dharmakīrti who introduced radical reforms in the logical speculations of India do not lend their countenance to any logical argument which is not founded on material truth. It is refreshing to observe that even Nāgārjuna and Śrīharsa, the exponent of the Vedāntic logic, do not seek to justify their anomalous logical position by appeal to formal consistency. Both of them endorse that logic cannot give wide berth to the

question of material truth of its assertions. It is also tacitly admitted that disaffiliation from the objective reality is tantamount to disloyalty to the cardinal canons of logic and such deviation will reduce an argument to an abortive nonsense. Such being the logical background, the absolutist has to observe scrupulously the rules of the logical game in order to be able to prove his position. The question would not have arisen, had the absolutist refrained from entering the arena of debate. He does not observe silence consistently with his metaphysical position, but, on the contrary, elects to establish his position and refute the opponent's contention by means of logically formulated arguments. It makes no difference whether his interest is positive or negative. How can the absolutist who takes up the role of an absolute sceptic in logic advance any argument, either by way of proof or refutation? In either case he must surrender his metaphysical commitment and thus court defeat in advance.

This is in brief the sum and substance of the logician's arguments against the sceptic. Let us examine the reaction of the absolutist to such an omnibus sentence of disfranchisement pronounced against him. This situation created by the orthodox logician against the sceptic assumed a tremendous importance and it was imperative for the absolutists to meet the challenge in order to establish their credentials for a philosophical debate.

this is an intriguing problem of philosophy which is too apparent to require elaborate exposition. The absolutist and the sceptic repudiate the ultimate validity of Logic and the apparatus it employs. But logic is the only means by which one can establish or refute a position. The sceptic claims the prerogative of refuting all assertions of the realist without involvement in the truth and reality of the arguments by which he attempts to achieve

his objective. This position will be put in a clear perspective in the course of our exposition. We do not know of any European thinker or thinkers who have addressed themselves to the problem in the systematic manner in which it has been debated in India. The problem must possess an interest of its own and not fail to intrigue the modern mind. I therefore propose to tackle this problem from the standpoint of the Indian thinkers. The exposition is modern no doubt, being produced by a modern mind. But it is based upon the original presentations of the old philosophers of India.

The subject-matter is approached from the standpoints of the Mādhyaṃika, the Yogācāra and the Vedāntist of the monistic school. We have also given the position of the Naiyāyika realist who offers a stubborn resistance to the absolutist's defence. We have rounded off the discourse by a re-appraisal of the relative positions.

In the first chapter, we have expounded the standpoint of Nāgārjuna as set forth in his work, the *Vigrahavyāvartanī* (Refutation of Opposition). In the second chapter, the standpoint is further expounded in the light of Candrakīrti's elaboration. In the third chapter, we have given the exposition of Śrīharsa's defence of the Mādhyaṃika position. In the fourth chapter, this problem as approached and tackled by the Buddhist and Vedānta school is set forth in abundant detail. The Yogācāra position is not found in any accredited work of the school, known to us. It is Śrīharsa the Vedāntist, who plays the role of a defender of the Mādhyaṃika and Yogācāra positions. In Śrīharsa's time, the logical speculations assumed a formidable aspect which is the natural outcome of vigorous thinking of several centuries. Śrīharsa came after Dhar-

makīrti, Vācaspati Miśra and Udayana. It is quite natural that the dialectics of Śrīharsa exhibit astounding vigour and strength and the evolution in thought is clearly discernible. It is hoped that the growth of logical thought as recorded in this work will not fail to evoke interest among the students of modern logic in India and abroad.

शोधनपत्रम्

मूलसंस्कृतपाठे यः प्रमादोऽभूत् क्वचित् क्वचित् ।
यथाप्रसङ्गं संशोध्य पठनीयो बुधैरिह ॥

पृ०	पं०	अशुद्धः पाठः	शुद्धः पाठः
४१	८	भावनां	भावानां
५०	३	वैषमिकत्व	वैषमिकत्वं
५२	१३	किञ्चिदुपलभेयं	किञ्चिदुपलभेयं
५२	२४	०स्तेषानां	स्तेषां
५४	२२	ह्युत्पद्यमान०	ह्युत्पद्यमान०
५९	१५	सस्वभावा	सस्वभावाः
६१	९	अथ हि	न हि



स्वोपज्ञवृत्तिसंहिता
वि ग्र ह व्या व र्त नी
[भाषात्रयेण सम्पन्ना]

CHAPTER I

THE MĀDHYAMIKA'S LOGICAL POSITION IN THE *VIGRAHAYĀVARTANĪ*

From the available literature it is found that Nāgārjuna, the paragon of the sceptic schools, took up the challenge with his characteristic boldness and courage of conviction and tried to vindicate the title of the sceptic to participate in a logical debate. In defence, he seeks to disprove the allegation of the logician that the use of the logical apparatus entails self-contradiction or inconsistency on the part of the sceptic. Fortunately, the monograph *Vigrahayāvartanī* (Refutation of Opposition), written by Nāgārjuna, which records a regular duel between the two schools, has been discovered by Māhapandita Rāhula Sāṅkṛtyāyana and the text has been edited by him,¹ and recently also by E. H. Johnston and Arnold Kunst.² The text in the latter edition is fairly correct and dependable. We have also consulted the Tibetan version³ wherever doubts were felt. The methodology of debate in the *Vigrahayāvartanī* is in the line of the time-honoured tradition in which the opponent's position is stated in full in the beginning and the answer to the objections is stated seriatim in the order followed by the opponent. We do not propose to give a literal translation of the text, but our paper will faithfully represent the arguments in a language and manner intelligible to the modern mind. Nothing possessed of logical value will be left out in our exposition. But we must avoid the repetitions which, though they might be useful in the past, are now calculated only to lead to inflation of the discourse, if not boredom.

THE LOGICIANS' OBJECTIONS

VERSE I. The fundamental objection of the logician is that the sūnyātavādin maintains that no entity whatsoever can be believed

1. JBORS, XXIV. II.

2. Melanges chinois et bouddhiques, Neuvieme volume : 1948-1951, p. 99-152.

3. Edited and translated by G. Tucci in GO S, XLIX.

to possess intrinsic reality (*svabhāva*, literally 'self-being'). By intrinsic reality', the absolutist of the school of Nāgārjuna, seeks to understand 'the reality which a thing is supposed to possess in its own right and on its own account'. Reality must be integral and self-contained, neither borrowed nor derived from anything external. If a thing is to be real, it must be shown that this reality is a necessary part and parcel of it, and as such can never lapse or be abrogated under any change of condition. This is also the position of Saṅkarācārya who defines that a real is that which has a uniform and unvariant mode of existence.¹ It is a cardinal tenet of Buddhist philosophy that there is no real which is exempted from the law of causality which is universal and relentless in its operation. Such being the case, everything is subject to change and cannot *ex hypothesi* stand as an isolated entity, apart and aloof from its predecessors and successors. Nāgārjuna does not believe in an uncaused phenomenon and the Law of Causality is made by him the foundation of his philosophy of *sūnyatā*. Anything that is subject to the operation of the Causal Law and as such externally determined by an alien entity cannot be supposed to have reality in its own right. The apparent reality or existence² of the phenomenon is, from the very nature of the case, either borrowed or derived and as such cannot be anything but appearance.

The truth of this philosophy that nothing exists in its own right and as such cannot be real does not lie on the surface and can only be established by a prolonged course of ratiocination. As a matter of historical fact, Nāgārjuna advances an unending series of arguments to drive home this philosophical truth. Is Nāgārjuna consistent in this logical enterprise? Apart from the question of self-consistency, can he hope to be successful in achieving his aim? The logician avers that Nāgārjuna essays an impossible feat. If all things are considered to lack in intrinsic reality, how can Nāgārjuna, or for that matter any exponent of absolutism, disprove the reality of anything? He can achieve this by means of an argu-

1. Ekarūpeṇa hy avasthanto yo'rthah sa paramārthah--SBh on BS II. I. II.

2. We follow McTaggart and refuse to draw a line of demarcation between existence and reality.

ment which in the ultimate analysis is found to consist of articulated words. And these words cannot lay claim to self-existence. Words are also products and, like all products, cannot be existent, either severally or collectively, in the causal condition. The sprout is supposed to be generated by the seed and the accessory conditions, such as soil, water, air, season and the like. The sprout cannot be supposed to be existent in the causal conditions severally or jointly and must therefore be set down as destitute of self-being (*śvabhāva*). But the words of the propositions which are uttered to prove the intrinsic unreality of the sprout and the like are also in the same position. They cannot be supposed to be existent in the physical elements or the organs of articulation or the physical effort, which are supposed to be responsible for their emergence. By any amount of permutation and combination of the causes and conditions, they cannot be supposed to derive their being from the former. Nor again can the words be considered independent of the stream of causal conditions. Being products, they must be considered destitute of intrinsic reality and as such void (*īlānya*). A thing which is void is unreal and an unreal appearance cannot have any causal power. Certainly an unreal fire cannot burn, nor can an unreal weapon cut. The words of the sceptic, being equally unreal, cannot be supposed to establish the conclusion that all entities are intrinsically unreal. Things obviously are felt to be real and this reality is sought to be negated by the absolutist. But this negation cannot be successfully achieved by an instrument which is obviously unreal. So the Fundamental position of the absolutist that the reality of all entities stands refuted is incapable of being proved.

VERSE II. Let it be supposed that the absolutist realizes the Flaw in his argument, and sees reason to admit that his argument in the shape of verbal propositions is real and self-existent and as such capable of successfully contradicting the reality of all existents. This will amount to self-surrender on his part. He must recant his former assertion that all entities are devoid of intrinsic reality. The words of the sceptic are included in the subject of the proposition as they are also entities. It will not only be a case of self-surrender but also a case of self-contradiction. The cate-

gorical assertion "All entities are unreal" cannot be true if words are regarded as real.

The admission of reality or unreality of the logical ground would culminate in the following sixfold dialectic (*ṣaṭkoṭiko vadah*).

(i) If all things are unreal, your argument would also be unreal being included in the class of entities. An unreal argument cannot rebut the obvious reality of things of experience. It would follow then that the thesis that all things are unreal would not be established.

(ii) If on the other hand, the thesis is supposed to be logically established, that will *eo ipso* entail the unreality of your argument. And the unreal argument would fail to rebut the reality of things observed.

(iii) If, again, the argument be real and thus supposed to be capable of establishing the unreality of all things (the thesis of the absolutist), it (the argument) will fall outside the genus of existents and there will be no instance to justify such a hypothesis, because every possible instance will be one entity or another. A real that is not existent is not found anywhere. And the argument supposed to be real, will be such a hypothetical fact which has no parallel.

(iv) If, however, the argument be supposed to fall within the genus of existents, then it would also transpire to be unreal. And an unreal argument would not have any logical efficiency.

(v) If, again, the argument be unreal and yet capable of rebutting the reality of all things, then all unreal things would also have causal efficiency, just as the unreal argument is considered to have. Certainly this is not a position which can be endorsed by any rational thinker.

(vi) Suppose again that all existents are unreal and as such incapable of causal efficiency. This will enable the absolutist to evade the charge of the preposterous hypothesis of an unreal having causal efficiency, no doubt. But this will be suicidal, as the argument employed will also be unreal and as such fail to prove the thesis.

To sum up : It is a contradiction in terms to say that a thing is unreal and at the same time is capable of producing an effect. So the absolutist is put between the horns of a dilemma : either he must repudiate his fundamental positin that all existents are unreal or he must admit his incapability of establishing any conclusion, positive or negative.

This is not the ohly charge to which the absolutist exposes himself by his conduct. He is found to make an uncritical discrimination between his *argument* on the one hand and *all other entities* on the other, although no difference can be found. It will be a case of uncritical distinction without difference. He must state the ground of his discrimination [*Visesa-hetu*]. But he does not and cannot offer any explanation for making fish of one and flesh of the other. This is admittedly a grave dereliction of duty on the part of a serious and conscientious philosopher.

VERSE III. The sceptic may offer an analogical argument. Suppose that the boys in a school are making a tremendous noise and this disturbs the normal course of instruction in other classes. The teacher comes and pronounces the command "Do not make noise". It is by making a sound that the teacher conveys his command and this sound prevents the emergence of further sounds. A sound counteracting a sound is the analogue of the negation of the reality of all entities by an unreal argument. So there is no inconsistency or inherent contradiction in the action of the sceptic.

But this is only a specious analogy. The parallelism does not hold good. The command of prohibition is conveyed by a real sound and this real sound prevents the future occurrence of (real) sound. But the language of the sceptic's argument is not real. The (negative) argument is unreal and its content—the reality of all things—is alao unreal. So the analogy is not relevent and as such cannot be adduced by the sceptic in his support.

VERSE IV. The sceptic may the countercharge: 'If may negatl-on of reality of things be logically absurd, your repudiation of this position will be equally absurd. Certainly nobody cares to refute an absurdity. My position is that all things are devoid of reality. You aver that this is an impossible position, If your contentjon

were correct, there would be no necessity for the proof of an impossibility, which is a case of flagrant self-contradiction".

The logician replies: "This defence will cut no ice with any conscientious philosopher. The absurdity alleged against me does not arise at all. If I made the assertion 'All things are unreal', I would be guilty of absurdity. But that is not my assertion but yours. So the charge of absurdity ought to go home to you. I have only discharged the legitimate duty of an advocate of truth by exposing the fallacy in your argument. So that defence acts as a boomerang against you."

VERSE V. Furthermore, if the sceptic appeals to the evidence of the recognized organs of cognition in support of his fundamental contention, that will be perfectly unavailing. How does he know that things exist at all? He cannot say that by means of perception, since perception is an entitative fact (*bhāva*) and as such must be condemned to be unreal. Not only this. The percipient also will be unreal. Thus there will be no reason to suppose that things are perceived by a percipient and, such being the case, the sceptic cannot assert that he sees things regarding which he makes the assertion. When things are not perceived at all one cannot make any assertion regarding them and certainly it is absurd to suppose that a man can deny anything of which he has no knowledge at all.

VERSE VI. Nor can be contended that inference or verbal testimony or analogy will enable him to take cognizance of things. They also stand in the same predicament as perception. And if perception be impossible, far more are inference and the like which are dependent upon perception for their genesis. Consequently things which are sought to be proved by inference and testimony and analogy will also be unreal, being included within the subject of the thesis 'All entities are unreal'. Further, the epistemic subject who is supposed to take cognizance of the contents of the different cognitive organs must also be accounted as unreal, being an entity. The result will be that there will be no cognition of any entity whatsoever and as a consequence reality or unreality cannot be predicated of things which are not known at all. So the central thesis remains unproved.

VERSE VII. Furthermore, the Buddhist scripture and the teachers who are well versed in the different branches of it propound a list of 119 *kuśala-dharmas* (moral excellences which are calculated to promote the spiritual progress of the aspirant).¹ These mental phenomena are asserted to possess the character of goodness. Such is also the case with immoral mentations which degrade a person in the moral plane. None but a non-believer can impugn the reality and moral value of these mental states. But if the thesis of the sceptic were true, it would end in the repudiation of these virtues and vices, and thereby the validity of the scriptural *ipse dixit*. Certainly this cannot be acceptable to any seeker of truth.

VERSE VIII. Besides, the spiritual forces which progressively lead to the attainment of *nirvāṇa*, and also those which lead to enlightenment, and those which are the constituent factors of it, and their opposites have been categorically propounded in the scriptures as real fact. The assertion of the sceptic that all existents are unreal appearance will give the lie direct to these categorical propositions of authoritative scripture—a contingency which cannot be acquiesced in by a lover of truth and aspirant for spiritual perfection.

VERSE IX. Again, if all entities are devoid of reality and thus have no individuality, they would not be capable of being designated by names. But each entity has got a distinct name and designation, and each designation has got a meaning which must be a real fact. The omnibus denial of the sceptic would reduce them to nonsense, which is flatly contradicted by our experience.

VERSE X. If the sceptic feels compelled to qualify his thesis out of deference to the realization of the significance of words and names, and concedes the possibility of self-existence as such (*svabhāva*) and still elects to deny it of the entities known, he must enunciate the thing or things which are credited with self-existence. Well, the latter must be distinct from the entities known. But the sceptic does not care to propound any such entity. It stands to reason to conclude that the hypothesis of a

1. A detailed treatment and exposition of morally good and bad mentations has been by E. H. Johnson in *IHQ*. XIV. 314-333.

self-existent entity outside the category of existents known must be declared to be a nullity or a hoax.

VERSE XI. Furthermore, negation has relevancy only with regard to an existent fact. The proposition, for instance, 'There is no jar in the room' implies the non-existence of a real jar. There can be no negation of an unreal fiction. Only a real can admit of logical negation. So the unqualified negation of all entities and their individual reality involves self-contradiction. Negation, as has been observed, presupposes real existence. The real denial of the reality of things experienced or known would consequently involve their reality and this will be nothing short of unabashed self-contradiction.

The idea of the realist is that since a significant negation necessarily presupposes the reality of the negatum, absolute and universal negation is necessarily vitiated by self-contradiction. If the negation be unreal the reality of things negated remains unaffected. If again this negation be real that will contradict the central thesis "All things are unreal" inasmuch as the negation itself would be an exception. Furthermore, since denial presupposes the reality of the thing denied the reality of all things is *eo ipso* admitted. So the sceptic is confronted with the dilemma whether he admits or denies the reality of denial. The reality or unreality of denial thus fails to impair the reality of things.

This position has been improved in the *Nyāyakusumāñjali*.¹ The crux of the problem broached by the realist centres round the fact whether conceptual reality or empirical reality is necessarily continuous with metaphysical reality or not. The realist advocates the former position, whereas the sceptic or transcendentalist keeps by two orders of reality separate.

VERSE XII. If there be no reality anywhere in anything, what is then the meaning of the negative proposition 'All entities are devoid of reality'? Certainly a fiction cannot be an object of negation. The non-existence of a fiction is evident on the face of it and the statement of it is uncalled for. For instance, nobody feels called

¹ III. 2.

upon to negate coldness in fire, or hotness in water. Why? Because these attributes are non-existent. If there were no reality in existents, the denial of it would be not only irrelevant but positively repugnant to the nature of things.

VERSE XIII. The sceptic may contend that the denial of reality of things known by us is neither irrelevant nor incompatible. The position may be made clear by a concrete illustration. A gullible fool is deluded into the belief that he sees a lake of water in the desert. It will be a notorious illusion as the mirage will be mistaken for water. In such a case, a wise man sees the plight of the dupe and hastens to correct him by asserting the belief in water to be entirely false. It is not denied that there is a persistent belief on the part of unenlightened people in the reality of things perceived by them. But the enlightened philosopher, out of mercy, declares 'All these things are devoid of reality', in order to combat the prevalent illusion. The belief in the reality of things, though almost universal, is a downright error in spite of its persistence.

VERSE XIV. This is apparently a plausible argument. But even if that be so the sceptic cannot deny that there is (i) the belief, (ii) the object of belief, and also (iii) the person who believes. Again (iv) the denial of the false illusion is a fact and (v) the object (viz., the illusion) is also a fact, and (vi) the factuality of the person who denies it is also not capable of repudiation. This very illustration of common error and its correction demonstrate the reality of the sixfold entity. And this gives the lie direct to the sceptic's assertion 'All entities are devoid of essence'.

VERSES XV & XVI. if, to escape this predicament, the sceptic chooses to assert that there is neither the false belief, nor any object of such belief, nor again any believer, then there would be no possibility of negation of such a belief, and as such no object of negation, and far less the person who negates. Then the negation of the reality of all existents would transpire to be a fiction, and with it the object of negation and the person making the negation should be set aside as impossible facts. The logical impossibility of negation as such would leave the reality of things absolutely unaffected.

VERSES XVII & XVIII. Moreover, the universal denial of reality perforce entails the unreality of the condition of proof (*hetu*, the logical ground). If the logical ground by means of which any conclusion can be proved be itself unreal, the conclusion will not follow. So how can there be a logical possibility for the establishment of the proposition 'All entities are unreal' ? The failure of proof would on the other hand imply the truth of the opposite, *viz.*, the reality of all things. The sceptic may seek to escape the plight and assert that things are proved without the help of a logical ground and so the denial of reality will be *eo ipso* established. But the same line of argument is open to the realist also. He can also claim with equal justice or privilege that the reality of things is proved by itself without reference to any logical ground.

VERSE XIX. The affirmation of the reality of the logical ground would give the lie direct to the sceptic's thesis of universal unreality. Moreover, so far as the verdict of experience is concerned, it does not lend the remotest support to the existence of an unreal entity.

VERSE XX. Finally, the absurdity of the absolutist's negation of reality in all entities can be brought into relief if we examine the relative status of negation and negatum. If negation be an antecedent event and the negatum be a subsequent phenomenon, the negation will be impossible. If, on the other hand, the negatum be an antecedent event and negation a posterior phenomenon, that also will not help the absolutist out of his difficulty. If the negatum be a *fait accompli* safely entrenched in its place, a subsequent negation will not affect its reality in the least degree. The previous existence as a historical fact cannot be rendered null and void. To suppose that they are synchronous will only make the confusion worse confounded. Two coexistents cannot stand in the relation of cause and effect. If negation and negatum be coexistent, neither negation will be the condition of the negatum, nor negatum will be the condition of negation, exactly like the two horns of an animal, which are coexistent, being synchronous in origin, but neither the right horn is the condition of the left, nor the left of the right. This shows that the reality of things does not

admit of negation, and hence the thesis of the absolutist is a dogmatic assertion.¹

The Absolutist's Reply

VERSE XXI. The contention of the realist was that he words of he absolufist's argument would be devoid of reality and as such, would not succeed in repudiating the reality of all entities. The absolutist admits the truth of the premise of the realist's argument. He affirms "Your contention is that my words have no reality in the causal conditions and there is no existent outside the sphere of causal operation, and so my words can lay no pretension to reality." We admit the truth of it. I do not claim that the words are

1. The argument of the realist seems to presuppose that negation and negatum stand in the relation of cause and effect and *vice versa*. It is contended that the unreality of things, advocated by the absolutist, would subvert the causal relationship which is put forward as an undisputed truth. It seems difficult to follow how negation and negatum can be related as cause and effect. We offer a tentative explanation of the apparent puzzle. Negation and negatum are relative concepts and as such one cannot be understood without reference to the other. Each is a presupposition of the other. Such being the case, each serves as the determinant of the other. A determinant is however a species of cause. The causal relationship is easily understandable in so far as the understanding of the one requires that of the other. But as understanding is the key to the objective nature of things, the causal relationship need not be merely subjective. Besides, the status of a things as a negatum and that of another as the negation cannot be a subjective superimposition. They must be objective. Otherwise the real character of a thing cannot be amenable to human cognition. If it be conceded that cognition introduces a difference in the character of the real, it will be impossible to distinguish what attribute belongs to the thing in itself and what is superimposed upon it by the human intellect. It is for this reason the Vaiśeṣika believes that numbers from 2 to n, though engendered by an intellectual act of synthesis, are vested as objective attributes in the reals.

real. Certainly they are as unreal as all other things, being subject to the law of causal operation. So your animadversion that my argument will fail to annul the reality of things falls as a damp squib.

VERSE XXII. The law of Dependent Origination (*pralīya-bhāva*) is equivalent to and proof of the intrinsic unreality (*śūnyatā*) of things. A thing which is found to come into existence in dependence upon an antecedent fact must forfeit its claim to intrinsic reality. The realist has failed to understand the logical import of *śūnyatā* and his animadversion proceeds from this basic misunderstanding. Now, *śūnyatā* is nothing else than the fact of this Dependent Origination. Whatever thing is found to derive its existence from an antecedent and thus depends upon the latter for its existence cannot claim intrinsic reality of its own. If things were real in their own right and by their intrinsic nature they could come into being independently of the antecedent causes and conditions. But, as a matter of fact, they are tagged on to the preceding events and as such cannot be conceived to have an intrinsic existence which a real, by the very definition of it, must be believed to possess. As regards my arguments which are nothing but a series of words, they are events in time and as such dependent upon antecedent conditions. They have no intrinsic reality. So yours is a case of wasted labour, so far as you seek to prove the unreality of my words.

The next charge that an unreal thing can have no causal efficiency is absolutely inconsequential. Causal efficiency is rather the criterion of things which have no intrinsic reality of their own. In these matters, we have to be guided by the testimony of experience and not *a priori* reasoning. Consider, for instance, the behaviour of such things as a chariot, a textile, a jar and so on and so forth. They are certainly produced by causes and conditions and yet are found to exercise their causal power in respect of their relevant effects. For instance, the chariot, as a conveyance, is used as carrier of men and things. The jar is used as a container of honey or water or milk. A textile serves to protect the wearer from heat and cold and the onslaught of winds. Certainly, being products, they cannot have intrinsic

reality of their own and are yet found to be productive of definite effects. Such is also the case with my argument. It is also devoid of intrinsic reality, being the product of a set of definite causes of conditions. It produces a result in that it communicates a meaning. So the whole argument of the realist is based upon a misconception that causal efficiency presupposes intrinsic reality. The ground of the charge is rather a pointer to the opposite, truth, *viz.*, that only things which have no intrinsic reality and rigid constitution can act as causes and be the effects of their own causes.

VERSE XXIII. Nāgārjuna now proposes to clinch his conclusion by means of examples which, though they may not be acceptable to the modern mind, were believed to be possible facts in his days.

Well, the negation of reality by an unreal argument is not actually impossible. It is notorious that phantom men and women are created by magicians and thaumaturgists and they behave exactly like real men and women. The cinematography in modern times also succeeds in creating verisimilitude by devices which are not far remote from the magician's tricks. A phantom man prohibits another phantom man from a certain course of conduct. Both the persons—the one who prohibits and the one who is prohibited—are equally unreal. But the factuality of the prohibition and its success are exemplified by the behaviour of such phantom persons. Such is exactly the case with my argument which, though unreal, succeeds in rebutting the prevalent belief in the reality of things. So your accusation that an unreal argument cannot successfully remove a superstitious belief has no cogency. And as regards the sixfold dialectic propounded by you; its hollowness stands exposed by this very argument. It is never the proposition of the absolutist that his argument is not included within the purview of all entities. Nor is it contended that it is not unreal, much less that all things are not unreal.

VERSE XXIV. Well, the argument is not believed to be real *per se*. So it does not involve surrender of my fundamental position. And so the charge of uncritical discrimination cannot hold good. Therefore, there is no occasion for the statement of a special ground of distinction.

The fact of the matter is : My argument, being the product of a chain of causes and conditions, cannot be considered to come into existence by virtue of its own independent nature. It has been observed before that what has not self-existence is unreal. My argument also is equally unreal just like the rest of phenomena. So there is no case of uncritical and irrational discrimination. If we maintained that the argument was intrinsically real, we would expose ourselves to the charge of discriminatory treatment. But this is just the reverse of our position. And therefore all the consequential charges are only the creatures of the imagination of the opponent.

VERSE XXV. The analogy of the command by words prohibiting the creation of noise (that is, of words) is entirely irrelevant and is not employed by us for the purpose. In the example, words serve to prevent the occurrence of other words. But we do not assert that things have any intrinsic nature of their own, or that they have any claim to reality. Were it the case that an unreal argument was employed to rebut the unreality of things, the example could be relevant. But our position is just the opposite of it. The argument is used to prove the unreality of things and not to negate it. So the consequence thrust upon us that the negation of unreality would entail the reality of things is only a perversion of our intention. We emphatically affirm the unreality of things and so the example bears no analogy to our position.

VERSE XXVI. It has been shown that the example would have been relevant had an unreal argument been employed to rebut the unreality of things. The example illustrates the use of a real word for the prevention of a real word. The negator and the negatum are of co-ordinate status. The argument, though unreal, is adduced to rebut the *reality* of things. If an unreal argument were advanced to rebut the *unreality* of things, things would have to be accepted as possessed of intrinsic reality. But this would run counter to our Fundamental position, since we maintain with uniform consistency the intrinsic unreality of things and never subscribe to their reality.

VERSE XXVII. The truth of our doctrine can be elucidated by the following example. The *Tathāgata* or a disciple of him created

a phantom woman in order to annihilate the lingering weakness of a person for the opposite sex. The unregenerated man was deluded into mistaking this phantom woman for a real woman and developed affection for her. In order to purify him of such evil propensities, a phantom man is created. The phantom man is made to behave by a fiat of his will as a wise saint and to enlighten the deluded soul by his instruction. The dupe of the illusion is made to realize the hollowness of his love and thus, by a process of spiritual catharsis, is freed from the sway of lower passions. Though the woman in question is a false appearance and so also the saint, yet the weak aspirant is emancipated from the shackles of lower impulses and passions. This will be the appropriate illustration of our procedure. The argument is like the sermon of the phantom saint and the phantom woman is the prototype of all unreal phenomena. The unreal argument serves to dispel the illusion of reality to which the unregenerated souls fall easy victims. The example of the prohibitive injunction is however devoid of any parallelism.

VERSE XXVIII. If we look closely into the argument of the opponent, it will be found to be vitiated by a fallacy. The example of the sound of warning derives its cogency from the supposition that it has an intrinsic reality of its own. And this is made the logical ground. But the sound also cannot lay claim to intrinsic reality, being the product of a chain of causes and conditions. The assertion that the sound is real and serves to prohibit the future occurrence of real sounds proceeds from a misconception. The reality of sound is only of the empirical order. And we endorse this empirical reality as a concession because of its pragmatic utility. The admission of empirical reality is only a make-believe necessary for the creation of conviction of the ultimate truth. It is a necessary expedient and even the enlightened saint must have recourse to it in order to edify the ignorant seeker of truth. It may be an illusion. But it has a pragmatic value, both intellectual and moral. Though it may not have a logical justification and from the rational standpoint there is no *raison d'être* for the world, it cannot be denied that it is there. The appearance may be irrational. But no amount of logical speculation can cancel its existence. Besides, all intellectual and

moral disciplines derive their as validity from this empirical reality and they also cannot claim a superior order of reality *qua* empirical facts. The appearance of a *Tathāgata* is necessary because there is this imperfect world. And the necessity of salvation from this imperfect world would not be felt by any person unless the imperfect world were an existent fact. What the Mādhyamika philosophy and so also Śaṅkara's Vedānta seek to emphasize is that the world of plurality is not an ultimate truth, though its factuality cannot be denied so long as one is in it. The assertion of the unreality of the world does not therefore spell any danger to the historical, intellectual and moral orders and the disciplines appertaining thereto. These orders have only a provisional validity and as much reality as is felt to be necessary by the realist.

VERSE XXIX. The realist has defended his repudiation of the denial of reality by the plea that it is occasioned by the absolutist's assertion of his thesis and so the charge of self-contradiction and inconsistency lies at his door. "But this is nothing but a perversion of my standpoint", says the absolutist. "If there were any thesis propounded by me, then the charge of self-contradiction could be brought home against me, But as a matter of fact I cannot be supposed to make any real assertion when all things are known to be unreal, being destitute of self-existence and autonomy, which are the criteria of ultimate truth. So you cannot charge me with the assertion of any thesis in which you can pick holes. The whole impeachment proceeds either from an intellectual incapacity or a deliberate dishonesty."

VERSE XXX. The realist repudiates the absolutist that he controverts the things which he cognizes by means of recognized cognitive organs and also unabashedly repudiates these very organs. This is nothing but a case of shameless self-contradiction or a deception.

But this charge is equally unfounded. The absolutist observes in reply—"If I made any pretension to apprehend anything by means of cognitive organs or cared to establish any position or repudiate any contention by appeal to the testimony of these cognitive organs, then I would lay myself open to these charges. But as a matter of truth I do not make any such pretension and so

the charge is wide of the mark. At any rate it leaves me perfectly unconcerned."

VERSE XXXI. "Furthermore, I may be permitted to pose a question to the realist in order to clarify the issue. If you, realist, really believe that all the things that are cognized are proved by means of well recognized cognitive organs such as perception, inference, analogy and testimony, I would like to be enlightened by you as to how you come to believe in the validity of these very cognitive organs. What is the warrant of their validity? What are their credentials? If you cannot adduce any warrant in support of your belief and, on the contrary, feel no compunction to declare that they do not require any proof for their validity you will have to recant your thesis that all things are proved by valid cognitive organs".

VERSE XXXII. If, on the other hand, the validity of the cognitive organs be supposed to be established by other such organs, then it will give rise to a vicious infinite series.

The cognitive organs are supposed to prove the existence of the things cognized by them and if the organs themselves are open to doubt, they will not succeed in the task credited to them. The appeal to other organs will necessitate the postulation of a series of such organs which will have no limit.

Well, what is the reason of such a series being condemned as a logical flaw? The answer is "If the chain of the cognitive organs as vehicles of proof be extended without limit in the infinite past, there would be no primary cognitive organ whose validity can be considered to be established. There being no primal cognitive organ secure in its validity, the succeeding organs, which are supposed to derive their validity from their predecessors, will themselves be assailed by authentic doubt. The consequence will be that no selection can be made, from this infinite chain, of any one, either in the beginning or in the middle or in the end, as being securely established in its validity. In the absence of an initial limit, there will be no end and consequently no middle because these concepts are relative; and the collapse of the first term will entail that of the succeeding links."

VERSE XXXIII. If the cognitive organs *quā* proof are accepted to be valid without recourse to the verdict of other such organs, that will involve the surrender of your fundamental position. Moreover, the propounder of such a thesis will expose himself to the charge of making an unauthorized discrimination. Or, in the alternative, he will be compelled to adduce a reason for this differential treatment.

The fundamental position of the realist is that the reality of things is attested by a cognitive organ bearing upon it. Now the question is legitimately posed "If a cognitive organ validates the reality of anything known by it, what is the source of the validity of the organ itself?" Suppose that no such validating ground can be adduced and, on the contrary, that it is dogmatically asserted that so far as the cognitive organs are concerned, their validity does not require any further proof. Well, this dogmatic assertion will amount to a confession that there may be things which are accepted to be valid without any (organ of) proof. This will invalidate the fundamental standpoint of the realist that all things are proved by some cognitive organ. The organs of proof are also things, and if they are established without the attestation of another cognitive organ, the universal proposition will have to be amended. The realist will be under an obligation to make a reservation for the cognitive organs themselves. And the differential treatment involved in this reservation has to be justified. But no logical ground has been and can be adduced in support.

The realist may strike a pose of injured innocence. Well, so far as the cognitive organs are concerned, they stand in a different position by their very nature. They prove things and prove themselves. This is not a newfangled theory, but has the support of ancient tradition. Here we quote an *ipse dixit* of the school. "Just as fire illumines other things as well as its own self, so the cognitive organs prove the existence of things as well as their own".

VERSE XXXIV. But the example is entirely irrelevant and has no parallelism with the present case. It is not the case that fire illumines its own being. Certainly nobody can claim that fire remained unperceived and unillumined like a jar in darkness. The

fact of the matter is that the realist suffers from a misconception. It is not a fact that fire is self-illuminating. The analogy of fire is entirely out of the question. It is on this analogy that the doctrine of self-validation is propounded by the realist. There might be a presumption of the possibility if the self-illumination of fire were a fact. But it is not. All cases of illumination are simply preceded by an unilluminated state. For example, the jar was covered by darkness and as such remained unperceived. It comes to be subsequently perceived when illuminated by fire. If the fire were previously unilluminated and remained unperceived in darkness and then subsequently became illuminated, it could be held to be illuminated by itself. But this is not the case. No body can adduce any evidence to establish a previous unilluminated condition of fire. So the example is only an instance of misconception and utter irrelevance.

VERSE XXXV. Furthermore, if on the basis of an *ipse dixit*, fire is supposed to illumine itself just in the same manner as it illumines an external object, it should also burn itself as it is seen to burn other things.

This is the idea of Nāgārjuna. A thing cannot bring its causal power to bear upon its own self, though it can do so in respect of an alien object. The subject-object relation involved in the transitive verbs presupposes numerical difference. The subject can never be the object of the same act. Were it not so, fire could burn its own self as it burns others. So the conclusion that a cognitive organ is self-proved does not follow, as the premise of the self-regarding activity of fire is itself a false assumption.

VERSE XXXVI. If fire be supposed to be capable of bringing its act of illumination to bear upon its own self, it could also be supposed with equal plausibility that darkness will also cover its own self. An analogical argument is notorious for its weakness and has very little cogency even when it is true. But it fails as a broken reed where it is based upon a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of a thing. The present is an instance of it.

VERSE XXXVII. Furthermore, there is no darkness either in the being of fire or in its locus. So how can there be an illumination

in respect of fire as its object ? Illumination is nothing but the destruction of darkness.

The idea is this. Illumination has no meaning except with reference to a previous state of darkness. Darkness is a positive entity according to the Buddhist, the Jaina, the Mīmāṃsist and the Vedāntist. Why should a thing remain unilluminated and become illuminated when light is brought to bear upon it ? What is the *modus operandi* of light in the act of illumination ? Certainly, it is nothing but this that the absence of light is concomitant with the presence of darkness whose function is to envelop a thing and make it unamenable to perception. The light makes the object fit to be perceived by removing the obscurity imposed by darkness. If fire chose to illumine its own self, it would have to be conceded that it also destroyed the darkness which impeded its illumination. But this cannot be proved. So this theory of self-illumination has no foundation in truth.

The realist may put up a defence. Well, the absolutist's argument is calculated to confirm the realist's thesis. It is true that there is no darkness in fire, nor in the place where fire exists. This very fact ought to be construed as proof of the thesis that fire illumines its own self as well as an other. Fire annihilates darkness as soon as it is born. The birth of fire and the annihilation of darkness are synchronous events. It stands to reason therefore that there cannot be darkness either in the body of fire or in the locus where it exists. This is due to the fact that fire illumines itself and all other things within its range at the very time when it comes into existence.

In reply to this it may be observed:

VERSE XXVIII. The argument that fire illumines as soon as it is born is preposterous. Certainly, fire does not come into contact with darkness at the moment of its origination.

The position that fire illumines itself and others as soon as it comes into being is an unfounded assumption. To be sure, it cannot be supposed that fire makes an impact upon darkness even at the time of its birth. This assumption will, on the contrary, necessitate the admission of the coexistence of fire and darkness at

least for one moment. But this will be an absurdity which even the realist demurs to endorse. In the absence of synchronism there can be no impingement upon darkness and so there can be no occasion for annihilation of darkness by fire. It follows that no illumination will be possible, because it is nothing but annihilation of darkness.

VERSE XXXIX. Further, if we admitted that fire can make away with darkness without coming in to contact with the latter, you would be compelled to admit as a consequence that fire existing in a corner of this room could also destroy all the darkness that exists in all the worlds.

This is only an elaboration of the previous argument. The argument is a *reductio ad absurdum*. The idea is that the relation of destructive opposition in which fire and darkness are supposed to stand to each other must necessitate the congruence of the two at least for a moment. But this admission will prove that they are not absolutely incongruent. Nāgārjuna banks upon the fact of absolute incongruity of fire and darkness. The fact that they cannot coexist in the same substratum at any time shows that there can be no contact, much less a tussle, between them. But if there be no contact possible, the question of one superseding the other will be a *petitio principii*.

VERSE XL. If you, realist, assert that the organs *qua* cognitions are known by themselves, you will have to admit that they will be known without reference to their relevant objects. For self-cognition is incompatible with dependence on an alien fact.

The idea is this. Organs of cognition are believed to be of the nature of cognition according to the Buddhist and other Indian schemes of epistemology, excepting the later exponents of the Nyāya theory of perception and their followers here and there. That cognitions are known by themselves is the position of Dharmakīrti, prabhākara and the Jaina logicians. This is opposed by the Nyāya School, Nāgārjuna and also Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. The Sāṅkhya and the Vedānta, though they do not believe that cognitions are self-intuited, assert that they never remain unperceived, being revealed by the eternal light of the self with which they are connected from the very beginning.

We must distinguish the theory of self-cognition (*svaprakāśatva*) from the theory of self-validation (*svātah-prāmāṇya*). We reserve the treatment of this logical problem for a subsequent paper.

Nāgārjuna's argument applies against both these theories. He enters a strong caveat against all philosophers who advocate one or the other theory, though not necessarily both. The gravamen of his complaint lies in the inherent impossibility of the same thing being the subject and the object of the same act.

As for the present argument, Nāgārjuna shows with considerable force of logic that the concepts of cognition and cognitum, subject and object are relative, and one cannot be thought of without the other. If cognition as an organ be numerically and functionally different from the cognitum, the dependence of the former upon the latter will deprive it of all claim to be known and proved by itself. Dependence upon a foreign element is incompatible with the self-autonomy of cognition, either as an act or as an organ.

It may be urged : What is the harm if cognitions *qua* organs are supposed to be independent of the objects to be known by them ? In reply to this, Nāgārjuna observes:

VERSE XLI. If cognitions are known or proved without a necessary reference to the objects, as you assert, these cognitions will not be known as having necessary relation to any cognitum.

The idea is : If a cognition be self-contained and self-centred, it will not have any reference to any object. It will then cease to be the cognition of a fact. But cognition which is not the cognition of anything is a chimera.

If the cognitions stand in necessary relation with their objects, you cannot maintain that cognitions are proved irrespective of their objects. In other words, this will entail the abandonment of your thesis of self-cognition or self-validation.

VERSE XLII. Suppose we admit that cognitions are realized with necessary reference to their objects, what will be the harm ? Well, this admission will involve the further admission of the antecedent existence of the cognitions as accomplished facts.

The reason is that nothing can be supposed to have reference to and stand in need of another unless it is already found to be in existence.

To admit that cognitions come into being having necessary reference to and thus standing in need of their relevant objects will amount to the metaphysical fallacy of bringing into existence of what already is in existence. This will be a case of wasted labour of love. It is exactly on a par with the logical fallacy called 'proof of a proved fact' (*siddhasādhana*). When an arguer seeks to prove for the conviction of his opponent any fact which the latter does not dispute, the former is accused of proving a proved fact. It is sheer waste of energy and skill. An argument is necessary only when there is a doubt regarding any fact at issue.

Nāgārjuna uses the expression *siddhasādhana* in such a way as can be supposed to admit of twofold explanation. Cognitions as organs of proof may be supposed to be proved by themselves or by the objects to be known. The first alternative is ruled out of court, and the second alternative is elaborately criticized by Nāgārjuna. If however it be supposed that cognitions come into play in dependence upon their objects, the former must be conceded to have prior existence as accomplished facts. Certainly, when a thing is known to depend upon another, it must be conceded that the depending thing is already existent. None but an existent can be supposed to depend upon or stand in need of another. If this be so, this question of dependence upon another fact, either for coming into existence or for proof of itself, will be entirely redundant. There is no meaning in trying to bring into existence what is already possessed of it, or to make known what is already known.

VERSE XLIII. Furthermore, if cognitions *qua* organs are supposed to be proved by their reference to and consequent dependence upon the objects to be known, the proof of the objects will not be dependent upon the good offices of the organs.

If cognitive organs are made to depend upon their objects either for proof or for existence, the independent existence of the

objects would be presupposed by the act. In that case, the proof of objects will be independent of the services of the cognitive organs. But this is plainly absurd. Certainly, the objects to be proved cannot be supposed to furnish proof of the organs which are requisitioned for the proof of the former.

VERSE XLIV. If the objects to be known or proved are supposed to be known or proved independently of the good offices of the cognitive organs, the search for the latter will be entirely uncalled for. The cognitive organs are requisitioned for the proof of the objects. And if the objects themselves are already known and thus stand independent of any proof, the postulation of the different organs and their application will be absolutely abortive.

VERSE XLV. If, again, it be supposed by you that the cognitive organs are brought into existence and made effectual by the service of the things to be cognized, that will only lead to the entire subversion of the relation of the organs and the cognizables.

If the cognitive organs are supposed to depend upon the cognizables in order to come into existence and function, the charge of inconsequence will be ruled out, no doubt. But it will give rise to a grave disaster in the logical field. The status of organs and cognizables will suffer reversal. The organs will be reduced to the status of cognizables and the cognizables will be raised to the status of organs, because the nature of their services will be entirely revolutionized. The cognizable would have to be reckoned as organ, since it would serve as the instrument of the proof of the recognized organ and the latter would be degraded to the status of the former, because its very existence and functional success would be dependent upon the good offices of the cognizable. This reversal involved in the interchange of position or function is bound to give shock to the logical conscience of all believers in the logical tradition.

VERSE XLVI. Let it be supposed that the proof of the cognizable is the consequence of the proof of the organ, because the former depends on the latter. Be it supposed again that the proof of the organ depends upon that of the cognizable. In that case neither of the two will be susceptible of proof. The reason is this:

VERSE XLVII. The cognizables will be proved by the organs and those very organs will be proved by those very cognizables. If this be the situation, the cognizables will be responsible for the existence of the organs, and if the former again are supposed to be dependent upon latter for their very existence, the former will not be capable of bringing into existence the latter.

If the proof and existence of one be supposed to depend upon that of the other and *vice versa*, neither will be independently existent. In other words, both of them would be non-existent. And thus none can afford to be the proof of the other. The reciprocal dependence of both the relata thus makes both of them non-existent figments.

VERSE XLVIII. To put it the other way about : If the organs be supposed to be proved by the cognizables, and the latter again are to be proved by the former, how can the cognizables, dependent as they are for their existence and functioning upon those very organs which are to be brought in to play by them, be the proof of the organs ?

The fallacy of reciprocal dependence, either in respect of genesis or in respect of cognition, lies in the failure to recognize the antecedent existence of one of the terms independently of the service of the other. It must be recognized that the relation is at bottom one of cause and effect whether one term is believed to be dependent upon the other for its existence or its proof. The condition and the result cannot be self-identical. "Thus if A depended upon B and B in its turn depended upon A for its genesis or subsistence, and A depended in order to be cognized upon the cognition of B, and B again in order to be cognized were found to depend upon the cognition of A, the result would be a case of mutual dependence in respect of genesis, subsistence and cognition respectively."¹

Nāgārjuna seems not to be satisfied by only pointing out the fallacy involved in a circular argument and therefore gives a concrete example which will convince even the most obtuse person of the absurdity involved in such tactics.

1. Dr. Bagchi: *Inductive Reasoning*, p. 157.

६७३९४८४



VERSE XLIX. If one were to say, the son is one which is generated by a father, and that father again is supposed to be generated by that very son, then we challenge the assertor of such a proposition to point out who is the son and who is the father. Who begets whom? The absurdity of such a proposition does not stand in need of further elaboration.

The absurdity of the proposition is writ large upon its face, and it does not require any proof to be driven home, because it is self-transparent. Absurdity can neither be proved nor refuted unless the exposure of it does not constitute refutation enough.

Nāgārjuna claims that the same absurdity is involved in the supposition that a cognizable is proved by an organ and the latter again by the former. The upshot is that none can make out what is the organ of proof and what the cognitum of it. It makes no difference whether the relation between them be one of 'generator and generated' or 'prover and proved' or 'cognizer and cognized'. In the first case, the causal relation will stand between the two terms directly and in the latter two the relation will hold between the cognitions of the same. Whether the organ is dependent upon the cognizable for its being, or the cognition of the former upon that of the latter, and *vice versa*, the fallacy of mutual dependence will be equally present.

VERSE L. We ask the opponent to prove who is the father and who is the son in the case cited above. Our doubt honestly arises since both of them are asserted to be possessed of the characteristics of father and son.

It is extremely difficult to make out who is the father and who is the son in the example cited above. Both of them are possessed of the character of fatherhood and sonship, since each one of them is believed to be the generator and also the generated. The generator is the father and the generated is the son. Each, being generator, is entitled to be considered as father. And each, being generated, is entitled to be considered as son. The doubt is quite legitimate, but does not admit of solution, since there is no characteristic which can distinguish the one from the other.

The parallelism of the same persons being the father and the son of each other is exactly applicable to the issue between the organ and the cognizable. When the same thing is trotted out to be the organ and its cognitum and *vice versa*, the case is exactly parallel. The difficulty of determination of each of them either as the organ or as the cognitum is exactly the same.

VERSE LI. The upshot is that the organs are neither proved nor generated by themselves, nor by one another, nor by other organs, nor again by the cognizables; nor can they be supposed to be proved without the help of any condition.

It cannot be maintained that a perception is generated or made known by itself, that is to say, by that very perception. An inference also cannot be supposed to be conditioned or proved by that very inference; an analogy cannot be supposed to be proved by that very analogy; and a verbal testimony cannot be supposed to be proved by that very verbal testimony. It is not again possible to maintain that each is proved by inference and the rest, or inference by perception and the rest and so on. Nor is it possible to maintain that these organs are proved by another organ of a different kind, simply because there is no evidence of such an organ. And if it were possible, the same difficulty would arise with regard to it. We have also seen that the organs cannot be dependent upon their objects, either for existence or for proof. The situation will not be improved if the cognizables are taken separately or collectively and in different permutation and combination. The last alternative that these organs of proof are independent of any other condition in respect of their origin or function is doomed to failure. It is inconceivable that an event can happen without any condition preceding it.

The conclusion is irresistible that the realist's thesis that there are cognizables which are proved by their organs which are equally existent facts is only a dogmatic and uncritical assertion. So all the objections based upon the postulation of the organs of proof or their cognizables are found on scrutiny to be the unreal figments of the realist's imagination.

VERSE LII. If your contention that the celebrated masters conversant with the content and value of moral acts have enunciated the exact character of each such act be true, then you are under the obligation to demonstrate each such act and its content by way of distinct specification.

For instance, you will have to demonstrate that these are the moral acts and this is their content; this is morally good cognition and this its character. But such differentiation and specification have not been enunciated by the teachers of the tradition. The truth of the matter is that a thing and its character cannot be disentangled because they are ultimate unanalysable facts. So though these acts are also admitted by all followers of tradition, including Nāgārjuna himself, it is not admitted by the latter that they have got intrinsic reality and distinctive character undetermined by a chain of causes and conditions. This is going to be explained in the next verse.

VERSE LIII. If the character 'goodness' of the good acts and states is produced by a previous chain of causes and conditions, then this character will not be intrinsic to those acts and states, but will be an external fact, and as such it cannot be regarded as an integral factor of its being.

The same law will apply to the morally bad (*akuśala*) acts, since they are also dependent for their existence upon a previous causal chain.

VERSE LIV. If these good (and also bad) acts and states are believed to have an intrinsic reality and nature undetermined by a definite chain of causes and conditions, this will end in proving the futility of the observance of moral discipline enjoined for holy life.

If you suppose that good acts do not derive their character of goodness from antecedent conditions and so also the bad acts their character of badness, and indifferent acts their character of indifference, and that these characters are distinct and different from the phenomena in which they are embodied, this will make havoc of the whole scheme of moral life and discipline. This will lead to the repudiation of the doctrine of causality. It is the cardinal

doctrine of Buddhist ethics and ontology that every event comes into existence under the influence of a chain of antecedent conditions. Ethical indeterminism will involve the negation of this Law of Causation which is believed to be universal in its scope. Nothing is believed to be undetermined by an antecedent condition in Buddhist philosophy. An undetermined phenomenon will either be an eternal verity or a fiction, as has been observed by Udayana. But all ethical actions and states are believed to be determined by a definite set of causal conditions. It has, therefore, been declared by the Master "One who comprehends the Law of Causation (*pratityasamutpāda*) understands the religious truth (*Dharma*)."¹ It follows as a corollary from this assertion that moral acts and religious values cannot be causally undetermined. If indeterminism is conceded in the ethical plane, the observance of the rules of holy life will have no consequence.

Not only this. The denial of the law of causality will lead to the abrogation of the four Noble Truths. The origination of suffering is a case of causality. The denial of causality will *ipso facto* lead to the denial of origination of suffering. If there be no origination there can be no suffering. Suffering also is dependent upon a cause for its existence. In the absence of suffering and its origin and the condition thereof, there will be no *raison d'être* of annihilation of suffering. Annihilation of suffering presupposes the actual existence of suffering. And the repudiation of such annihilation will make enlightenment which is the way to this goal absolutely nugatory. Thus the admission of uncaused goodness or its opposite will subvert the whole course of spiritual discipline laid down in the scripture and the whole institution of monastic brotherhood (*saṅgha*), which is one of the pillars of Buddhism as religion, will be reduced to a mockery and fraud.

VERSE LV. If your contention were true, there would be no vice (evil), no virtue (good), nor even the conventional activities (individual and social). All things would have to be believed to be eternal being possessed of an intrinsic reality, since they would not be determined by causes and conditions.

Well, these are the serious consequences of the repudiation of the law of causation. There would be no good action, nor a bad

one. And all the empirical and conventional laws of social and individual conduct would lose their validity. Why so? The answer is that each and all of them are determined by antecedent causes and conditions. The denial of the law of causation which is the *raison d'être* of all things will deprive all these facts of their title to existence. If, on the other hand, they are believed to be possessed of intrinsic and self-sufficient reality undetermined by any cause and condition, they will have to be accepted as eternal verities existing in their own right and suffering no change or lapse. The consequence of this preposterous doctrine will be the utter futility of all moral and spiritual discipline and endeavour. This will also be a case of flagrant contradiction of the universally accepted truths of the Buddhist Faith. The master has declared without reservation and beyond the possibility of doubt that all that exist are impermanent.

VERSE LVI. The same vicious consequence will invalidate the acts which are morally evil or are asserted to be conducive to the emancipation from metempsychosis. And consequently all impermanent things will transpire to be permanent entities. The selfsame logic, which has proved the moral value of the good to be impossible or eternally existent, will also entail the same consequences with regard to evil, indifferent and the liberating acts. And thus everything that is observed to be subject to origination and destruction will have to be regarded as bereft of these characteristics. They will be in your theory eternal and unalterable verities. The result will be the negation of all moral and religious activities. So this cannot be an acceptable interpretation.

As regards the realist's contention that in the absence of the intrinsic reality of things, the whole system of nomenclature will be reduced to nonsense as no name can be attached to an unreal fact, we give the following reply.

VERSE LVII. Well, one who affirms that names are inherently significant and real will be under the obligation to admit that the thing bearing the name is also possessed of intrinsic reality. We are not concerned over it, since we do not assert that a name has any intrinsic reality.

It is you, the realist, who affirm that names have intrinsic reality. The onus of proof of the reality of the thing which bears the name rests upon you. You will have to accept the logical consequence that is entailed by the reality of the name. Certainly, the name must refer to a real entity if it is to be real. But so far as our position stands, we cannot subscribe to this view. The name also is believed by us to be bereft of intrinsic reality. It is thus an unreal appearance. So the whole contention of the realist collapses like a house of cards.

VERSE LVIII. Moreover, if the name be admitted to be an unreal convention, let it be considered whether it can refer to a real or unreal entity. Whether it be referred to a real or an unreal, your thesis will fail to materialize in either case.

An unreal name cannot attach either to a real or an unreal thing. Both these alternatives will lead to the abrogation of the thesis. Certainly, a real cannot have an unreal name. That would imply that the name which is unreal is real—which is a contradiction in terms. If the unreal name be supported to attach to an unreal entity, that would be a downright nonsense. There can be no occasion for naming an unreal fiction. So the whole argument based upon nomenclature topples down.

VERSE LIX. Further, all things have already been proved to be devoid of intrinsic reality. So this censure relates to a position which is not asserted by us.

Well, we have taken elaborate pains to establish the intrinsic unreality of all that exists. The establishment of the thesis *eo ipso* involves the unreality of names. But you misunderstand the whole thing and taking your stand upon the reality of the custom of naming elect to accuse me of the absurdity of attaching real names to unreal things. This is nothing short of perversion of my position. I never affirm the reality of names. So this censure does not assail me in the least. It, on the contrary, implies that you are fighting against a figment of your imagination.

As regards your charge that the admission of intrinsic reality outside the circle of existent things lays an obligation upon me for the demonstration of an entity possessing this reality, the answer is :

VERSE LX. It has been presumed that I made the assertion that reality exists, though not in the existent things. But this is entirely far from the truth, and so the presumption has no basis.

We neither refute the reality of things, nor assert the reality of anything outside the pale of existents. So the entire animadversion upon me is inspired by a perverted belief that I endorse the reality of anything other than the existents, and consequently the onus of proof of such a thing lies on my shoulder. This is of a piece with the previous censures, and requires no answer from us.

As regards the charge that negation presupposes the reality of the negatum and thus the negation of reality of things presupposes the previous affirmation of it on the part of the absolutist, the answer is stated below.

VERSE LXI. If negation is relevant only to an existent fact, the doctrine of *śūnyatā* is established by your denial. You are can did in the denial of the doctrine of the intrinsic unreality of things.

If your position that negation is possible only of a real existent and not of an unreal fiction be true, your denial of the doctrine of intrinsic unreality of things will end in the establishment of the truth of the doctrine. Your denial of intrinsic unreality will have for its presupposition the truth of the negatum. Thus you will be a convert to the credo of the absolutist.

VERSE LXII. You negate the doctrine of *śūnyatā* and at the same time affirm that *śūnyatā* does not exist. By this, your thesis that negation is admissible only in respect of a real negatum is automatically relinquished.

You seek to refute the absolutist's position of the intrinsic unreality of things, which is called *śūnyatā*. And at the same time you assert that *śūnyatā* is an impossibility. This runs counter to your thesis that negation is always possible only of a real existent and not of a non-existent. Your denial of *śūnyatā* should presuppose its reality from your standpoint.

VERSE LXIII. Furthermore, I do not undertake to negative any position, nor do I believe in the reality of any negatum. So when you charge me "you negative it", you indulge in false and futile recrimination.

Were it a fact that I undertook to negative any position or fact, then certainly you would be justified in advancing this charge against me. As regards your contention that the negatum must be a real fact, it will suffice to observe that there is nothing to be negated by me. So the question of reality or unreality of the negatum has no *raison d'être* so far as I am concerned. When it is established that all entities are destitute of intrinsic reality and consequently a real negatum or a real negation are only figments of a muddled intellect, the accusation that I, as an exponent of this philosophy, am guilty of contradicting a real fact is not only unfair but also defamatory. And it is a false defamation at that.

As regards the charge formulated in verse XII that if there be no reality then the argument denying reality of things is without a purpose, for a non-existent fiction does not require any argument to prove its unreality, our answer is :

VERSE LXIV. You contend that the non-existence of a fiction is proved by itself and does not stand in need of a negative proposition to affirm it and so the assertion of this negation does not carry any meaning. To this our reply is that the assertion only makes known that it (an existent) is unreal. Certainly, it (assertion) does not by virtue of its causal efficiency bring about the cessation of reality.

You contend that a non-existent fiction does not require any statement, much less an argument, to prove its unreality. A fiction (say a square circle) stands contradicted by itself. What purpose is then served by your assertion : "All that exists is destitute of reality"? Our answer is : Well, our assertion does not propose to rob things of their reality, thus serving to make unreal what is real. It only serves to make manifest the truth that things are devoid of intrinsic reality, as reality is not capable of being discerned in any of them. This can be brought home by an apt illustration. Suppose that when Devadatta is absent from his home, somebody asserts "Devadatta is at home". A knowledgeable person corrects him by saying "No, he is not at home". This corrective does not actually make Devadatta non-existent at home, but only communicates his factual absence from home. Analogously the assertion "There is no reality in anything" does no

make things unreal, but only communicates the absence of reality which is true of all that is found to exist.

As regards the animadversion delivered in the four consecutive verses No. XIII to XVI, we give the following reply :

VERSE LXV. You have delivered a protracted discourse making the example of the mirage your basis. Listen to our clarification of the issue how that example becomes perfectly appropriate.

VERSE LXVI. If the erroneous belief in the water in the mirage were possessed of an intrinsic reality, it would not be produced by any cause. Whereas this belief is brought into being by a set of definite conditions and causes, it must be an Instance of the doctrine of *sūnyatā*.

If the illusion of water in the mirage were possessed of an intrinsic reality, it would not be produced by a set of causal conditions. But it is brought into existence by a set of definite conditions, *viz.*, the mirage, the misdirected vision and unvigilant mentality and unfounded belief (*ayoniso manaskāra*). Being produced under the stress of a definite set of causal conditions, the phenomenon cannot obviously be credited with intrinsic reality. This has been plainly established in the foregoing discourse.

VERSE LXVII. Furthermore, if this mistaken belief were existent in its own reality and nature, who would be able to combat it ? As regards the remaining charges, they are only consequential and accordingly lie exposed to this very line of criticism. So the censure you pronounce falls short of the target, so far as I am intended to be.

If the perception of water in mirage be possessed of an intrinsic reality of its own, it will not be susceptible to contradiction. To be sure, the nature of things cannot be cancelled and contradicted. For instance, the heat of fire, the fluidity of water, the non-resistance of space are naturally inherent and thus not capable of being cancelled. But this mistaken belief under consideration admits of concellation and rebuttal and so must be believed to be devoid of reality. This line of argument will also apply to the object. the subject and the rest and will prove that they also cannot lay any claim to intrinsic reality. The sixfold dialectic based upon

the assumption of the reality of the belief consequently turns out to be a pleasant illusion. As regards the charge of the unreality of the logical ground, our answer to it is :

VERSE LXVIII. The charge of the unreality of the logical ground stands refuted by this very line of reasoning. The line of argument that has been employed to refute the sixfold dialectic should also be adopted in the case under consideration.

VERSE LXIX. The reason advanced by the realist to prove the impossibility of negation in all the three divisions of time stands refuted in advance, since the position covered is precisely identical. On the contrary, the reason asserting the impossibility of negation in all the three divisions of time will be welcomed and endorsed by the advocate of the universal unreality of things.

The reason advanced by the realist to refute the possibility of negation in the three divisions of time ought to be regarded as refuted in advance. Why so, you may ask? The answer is that you set out to prove that negation of the reality of things by the absolutist is impossible. Granted that the argument is successful, what is the result you achieve by it? Your success would imply that your negation of the absolutists' position is correct. The absolutist negates the reality of things and you negate this negation. The absolutist's negation is impossible according to your argument, and if so how will your negation of this negation be in a different position? If negation as such be logically impossible, your negation of this impossible negation will also have no logic to support it. In other words, in the absence of the negation of reality, which the absolutist seeks to prove, your negation will have no object to negate. That being so, your contention that the absolutist's negation stands negated proves to be a hollow unmeaning proposition.

On the contrary, the reason you employ to prove the unreality and impossibility of negation as a fact will come handy to the absolutist. You will establish the thesis of the absolutist who endorses the unreality of all things including that of negation. Negation and affirmation are equally unreal according to the absolutist and when you prove the unreality of negation, you are

unwillingly playing the role of an advocate of the absolutist's position. You are not conscious the you are destroying your own case.

The assertion that the realist's reason of the impossibility of negation in the three divisions of time stands refuted may admit of an alternative explanation.

The argument has already been disposed of in Verse LXIII in which the absolutist disclaims all responsibility for the consequential presupposition of the negatum.

Suppose despite these decisive arguments, the realist would insist on the reality of negation in the three divisions of time. He may assert that there may be a cause which is antecedent, which is subsequent and which is synchronous. Thus, for instance, the father is the antecedent cause of the son; the pupil is the subsequent cause of the teacher¹; and the lamp is the synchronous cause of illumination. Negation and negatum also stand in causal relation. The impossibility of negation, either as a causal determinant or as a determinate effect, shows that negation of anything, far less of the reality of all things, is not logically tenable.

The absolutist would rejoin "Does the realist believe in the reality of negation?" If the answer be in the affirmative all the three absurdities demonstrated by him will a *fortiori* stare him in the face. If the answer be in the negative, he will fail in his self-appointed task of refuting the position of the absolutist. The absolutist does not disguise his disbelief in the reality of things. And the negation of all entites is his mission. If the realist is to negate this negation, he cannot escape the charges put forward by him. Moreover, if the realist believes in the reality and possibility of negation, he will go back upon his thesis. And this

-
1. The idea seems to be that the status and function of the teacher are relative to those of pupil. A person cannot become a teacher unless he has a pupil to teach. The tutelage of the pupil is thus a determinant condition of the attainment of the status of teacher in spite of the fact that it is a subsequent event in the chronological scale. The priority of the pupil is only logical.

admission on his part will leave open the possibility of the negation of reality of all things to the absolutist.

VERSE LXX. All activities and interests will remain in a secure position for a person, who believes in the ultimate truth of *sūnyatā* as expounded in this work. Nothing will be safe and secure for the man who does not subscribe to *sūnyatā* as the final estimate of truth.

All interests, mundane and extra-mundane, will be perfectly safeguarded to the person who believes in the universal truth of *sūnyatā*. One may enquire how and why all these interests, social intellectual, religious and ethical, will receive their justification and fulfilment from this philosophy? The answer is obvious. The law of causation, on which the whole Buddhist discipline is founded, can find its rational justification from this philosophy alone. If the law of causation is vindicated, the four Noble Truths, which constitute the bedrock of moral and spiritual disciplines, will stand vindicated as verities. The four noble truths will make safe provision for the spiritual and empirical results of monastic life. The latter will ensure the attainment of all excellences, including final emancipation. To such an enlightened person the truth of the triple jewel, *viz.*, the Buddha, the Law and the Monastic Order, will become a matter of transparent and unassailable conviction. The believer in the truth of the law of causation will automatically believe in the truth of *dharma* (moral excellence), the cause of it and the effect of it. He will consequently believe in *adharma* (moral degradation), the cause of it and the effects of it. The believer in *dharma* and *adharma*, and their causes and effects, will naturally believe in the passions and defilements, their causes and effects. To the believer in all these events, the belief in the distinction of higher and lower courses of life, the attainment of these states of existence, the way to these states, the deliverance from them and the means of deliverance therefrom, will come naturally and with unwavering certitude. Even the mundane laws of individual conduct, social behaviour, political affiliations and every rule and regulation for the profitable and useful conduct of the affairs of life will have their metaphysical justification and explanation from this doctrine. In one word, all institutions will derive

their meaning and significance from this law. The whole truth, which we have sedulously endeavoured to expound in this book, has been stated in a nutshell in the verse :

'I offer my obeisance to the Enlightened One who is without a peer, who has declared the *śūnyatā*, Law of Causation and the Middle Path are identical in import.'

Here ends the work of the venerable teacher Nāgārjuna.

स्वोपज्ञवृत्तियुता

विग्रहव्यावर्तनी

[शून्यतायां प्रमाणसिद्धिः]

संस्कृत-भाषा-पुस्तक-मंडल

विश्वनाथ-पुस्तक-मंडल

[श्रीमती-पुस्तक-मंडल]

स्वोपज्ञवृत्तियुता

विग्रहव्यावर्तनी

[शून्यतायां प्रमाणसिद्धिः]

पूर्वपक्षः

१. भावानां निःस्वभावता (शून्यता) न युक्ता

(१) वादिवचनस्य शून्यत्वात्

सर्वेषां भावानां सर्वत्र न विद्यत स्वभावश्चेत् ।

त्वद्वचनमस्वभावं न निवर्तयितुं स्वभावमलम् ॥ १ ॥

यदि सर्वेषां भावानां हेतौ प्रत्ययेषु च हेतुप्रत्ययसामग्र्यां च पृथक् च सर्वत्र स्वभावो न विद्यत इति कृत्वा—‘शून्याः सर्वभावाः’ इति; नहि बीजे हेतुभूतेऽङ्कुरोऽस्ति, न पृथिव्यप्तेजोवाय्वादीनामैकैकस्मिन् प्रत्ययसंज्ञिते, न प्रत्ययेषु समग्रेषु, न हेतुप्रत्ययसामग्र्याम्, न हेतुप्रत्ययविनिर्मुक्तः पृथगेव च । यस्मादत्र सर्वत्र स्वभावो नास्ति तस्मान्निःस्वभावोऽङ्कुरः । यस्मान्निःस्वभावस्तस्माच्छून्यः । यथा चायमङ्कुरो निःस्वभावो निःस्वभावत्वाच्च शून्यः, तथा सर्वभावा अपि निःस्वभावत्वाच्छून्याः ।

अत्र वयं^१ ब्रूमः—यद्येवम्, तवापि वचनम् यदेतत्—‘शून्याः सर्वभावाः’ इति, तदपि शून्यम् । किं कारणम् ? तदपि हेतौ नास्ति महाभूतेषु सम्प्रयुक्तेषु विप्रयुक्तेषु वा, प्रत्ययेषु नास्त्युरःकण्ठौष्ठजिह्वादन्तमूलतालुनासिका-मूर्द्धप्रभृतिषु यत्नेषु^२ उभयसामग्र्यां नास्ति, हेतुप्रत्ययसामग्रीविनिर्मुक्तं पृथगेव च नास्ति । यस्मादत्र सर्वत्र नास्ति, तस्मान्निःस्वभावम् । यस्मान्निःस्वभावं तस्माच्छून्यम् । तस्मादनेन सर्वभावस्वभावव्यावर्तनमशक्यं कर्तुम् । किं कारणम् ? न ह्यसताग्निना शक्यं दग्धुम्, न ह्यसता शस्त्रेण शक्यं छेत्तुम्, न ह्यसतीभिरद्भिः शक्यं क्लेदयितुम्; एवमसता वचनेन न शक्यः सर्वभावस्वभावप्रतिषेधः कर्तुम् ॥ १ ॥

(२) प्रतिज्ञाहानेः

तत्र यदुक्तम्—‘सर्वभावस्वभावः प्रतिषिद्धः’ इति, तन्न ।

अथ सस्वभावमेतद् वाक्यं पूर्वा हता प्रतिज्ञा ते ।

वैषमिकत्वं तस्मिन्, विशेषहेतुश्च वक्तव्यः ॥ २ ॥

अथापि मन्यसे—मा भूदेष दोष इति सस्वभावमेतद्वाक्यम्, सस्वभावत्वा-
च्चाशून्यम्; तस्मादनेन सर्वभावस्वभावः प्रतिषिद्ध इति ?

अत्र ब्रूमः—यद्येवम्, या ते पूर्वा प्रतिज्ञा—‘शून्याः सर्वभावाः’ इति,
हता सा ।

किञ्चान्यत्, सर्वभावान्तर्गतञ्च त्वद्वचनम् । कस्मात् शून्येषु सर्व-
भावेषु त्वद्वचनमशून्यम्, येनाशून्यत्वात् सर्वभावस्वभावः प्रतिषिद्धः ? एवं
षट्कोटिको वादः प्रसक्तः । स पुनः कथमिति ?

१. हन्त चेत् पुनः शून्याः सर्वभावाः, तेन त्वद्वचनं शून्यम्; सर्वभावान्त-
र्गतत्वात् त्वद्वचनस्य । तेन शून्येन प्रतिषेधानुपपत्तिः । तत्र यः प्रतिषेधः—
‘शून्याः सर्वभावाः’ इति, सोऽनुपपन्नः ।

२. उपपन्नश्चेत् पुनः ‘शून्याः सर्वभावाः’ इति प्रतिषेधः, तेन त्वद्वचनम-
प्यशून्यम् । अशून्यत्वादानेन प्रतिषेधोऽनुपपन्नः ।

३. अथ शून्याः सर्वभावास्त्वद्वचनं चाशून्यम्, येन प्रतिषेधः, तेन त्वद्वचनं
सर्वत्रासंगहीतम् ? तत्र दृष्टान्तविरोधः ।

४. सर्वत्र चेत्पुनः संग्रहीतं त्वद्वचनम्, सर्वभावाश्च शून्याः, तेन तदपि
शून्यम् । शून्यत्वादानेन नास्ति प्रतिषेधः ।

५. अथ शून्यम्, अस्ति चानेन प्रतिषेधः—‘शून्याः सर्वभावाः’ इति, तेन
शून्या अपि सर्वभावाः कार्यक्रियासमर्था भवेयुः ! न चैतदिष्टम् ।

६. अथ शून्याः सर्वभावाः न च कार्यक्रियासमर्था भवन्ति, मा भूद्
दृष्टान्तविरोध इति कृत्वा, शून्येन त्वद्वचनेन सर्वभावस्वभावप्रतिषेधो नोप-
पन्न इति ।

किञ्चान्यत्, एवं तदस्तित्वाद् वैषमिकत्वप्रसङ्गः—किञ्चिच्छून्यम्,
किञ्चिदशून्यमिति । तस्मिंश्च वैषमिकत्वे विशेषहेतुर्वक्तव्यो येन किञ्चि-
च्छून्यम्, किञ्चिदशून्यं स्यात् । स च नोपदिष्टो हेतुः । तत्र यदुक्तम्—‘शून्याः
सर्वभावाः’ इति, तन्न ॥ २ ॥

किञ्चान्यत्,

मा शब्दवदित्येतत् स्यात्ते बुद्धिर्न चैतदुपपन्नम् ।

शब्देन ह्यत्र सता भविष्यतो वारणं तस्य ॥ ३ ॥

स्यात्ते बुद्धिः—यथा नाम कश्चिद् ब्रूयात्—मा शब्दं कार्षीरिति स्वयमेव शब्दं कुर्यात्, तेन च शब्देन तस्य शब्दस्य व्यावर्तनं क्रियेत; एवमेव 'शून्याः सर्वभावाः' इति शून्येन वचनेन सर्वभावस्वभावस्य व्यावर्तनं क्रियत इति ?

अत्र वयं ब्रूमः—एतदप्यनुपपन्नम् । किं कारणम् ? सता ह्यत्र शब्देन भविष्यतः शब्दस्य प्रतिषेधः क्रियते । न पुनरिह भवतः सता वचनेन सर्वभावस्वभावप्रतिषेधः क्रियते । तव हि मतेन वचनमप्यसत्, सर्वभावस्वभावोऽप्यसत् । तस्मादयं मा शब्दवदिति विषमोपन्यासः—असन्निति ॥ ३ ॥

किञ्च,

प्रतिषेधप्रतिषेधोऽप्येवमिति मतं भवेत्तदसदेव ।

एवं तव प्रतिज्ञा लक्षणतो दूष्यते, न मम ॥ ४ ॥

स्यात्ते बुद्धिः—प्रतिषेधप्रतिषेधोऽप्यनेनैव कल्पेनानुपपन्नः, तत्र यद्भवान् सर्वभावस्वभावप्रतिषेधवचनं प्रतिषेधयति, तदनुपपन्नमिति ?

अत्र वयं ब्रूमः—एतदप्यसदेव । कस्मात् ? तव हि एतत् प्रतिज्ञालक्षणप्राप्तं न मम । भवान् ब्रवीति—'शून्याः सर्वभावाः' इति, नाहम् । तस्मात्तवैवायं पूर्वकः पक्षो न मम ।

'तत्र यदुक्तम्—प्रतिषेधप्रतिषेधोऽप्येवं सत्यनुपपन्नः' इति, तन्न ॥ ४ ॥

किञ्चान्यत्,

प्रत्यक्षेण हि तावद् यद्युपलभ्य विनिवर्तयति भावान् ।

तन्नास्ति प्रत्यक्षं भावा येनोपलभ्यन्ते ॥ ५ ॥

यदि प्रत्यक्षतः सर्वभावानुपलभ्य भावान्निवर्तयति—'शून्याः सर्वभावाः' इति, तदनुपपन्नम् । कस्मात् ? प्रत्यक्षमपि हि प्रमाणं सर्वभावान्तर्गतत्वात् शून्यम् । यो भावानुपलभते सोऽपि शून्यः । तस्मात् प्रत्यक्षेण प्रमाणेन नोपलम्भभावः, अनुपलब्धस्य च प्रतिषेधानुपपत्तिः । तत्र यदुक्तम्—'शून्याः सर्वभावाः' इति, तदनुपपन्नम् ॥ ५ ॥

(३) प्रमाणासिद्धेः

स्यात्ते बुद्धिः—अनुमानेनागमेनोपमानेन वा सर्वभावानुपलभ्य सर्वभावव्यावर्तनं क्रियत इति ? अत्र ब्रूमः—

अनुमानं प्रत्युक्तं प्रत्यक्षेणागमोपमाने च ।

अनुमानागमसाध्या यैर्था दृष्टान्तसाध्याश्च ॥ ६ ॥

अनुमानोपमानागमाश्च प्रत्यक्षेण प्रमाणेन प्रत्युक्ताः । यथा हि प्रत्यक्षं प्रमाणं शून्यम्, सर्वभावानां शून्यत्वात्; एवमनुमानोपमानागमा अपि शून्याः;

सर्वभावानां शून्यत्वात् । येऽनुमानसाध्या अर्थाः, आगमसाध्याः, उपमानसाध्याश्च, तेऽपि शून्याः; सर्वभावानां शून्यत्वात् । अनुमानोपमानागमैश्च यो भावानुपलभते सोऽपि शून्यः । तस्माद्भावानामुपलम्भाभावोऽनुपलब्धानां च स्वभावप्रतिषेधानुपपत्तिः । तत्र यदुक्तम्—‘शून्याः सर्वभावाः’ इति, ब्रह्म ॥ ६ ॥

२. भावानां सस्वभावता युक्ता

(क) कुशलदिघर्माणां कुशलादिस्वभावताभ्युपगमात्

किञ्चाग्यत्,

कुशलानां धर्माणां धर्माविस्थाविदश्च मन्यन्ते ।

कुशलं जनाः स्वभावं शेषेष्वप्येष विनियोगः ॥ ७ ॥

इह जना धर्माविस्थाविदो मन्यन्ते कुशलानां धर्माणामेकोनविंशत्तम् । तद्वत्—एकदेशो विज्ञानस्य वेदनायाः संज्ञायाश्चेतनायाः स्पर्शस्य मनसिक्का-
रस्य छन्दस्य अधिमोक्षस्य वीर्यस्य स्मृतेः समाधेः प्रज्ञाया उपेक्षायाः प्रयोगस्य सम्प्रयोगस्य प्राप्तेरध्याशयस्य अप्रतिघस्य रतेर्व्यवसायस्योत्सुक्यस्योन्मुग्धेः
उत्साहस्याविघातस्य वशितायाः प्रतिघातस्याविप्रतिसारस्य परिग्रहस्यापरि-
ग्रहस्य...धृतेरव्यवसायस्यानोत्सुक्यस्यानुन्मुग्धेरनुत्साहस्य प्रार्थनायाः प्रणिघे-
मंदस्य विषयाणां विप्रयोगस्य अनैर्याणिकताया उत्पादस्य स्थितेरनित्यतायाः
समन्वागमस्य जरायाः परितापस्यारतेवितर्कस्य प्रीतेः प्रसादस्य...प्रेम्णः
प्रतिकूलस्य प्रदक्षिणग्राहस्य वैशारद्यस्य गौरवस्य चित्रिकारस्य भक्तेरभवक्तेः
शुश्रूषाया आदरस्यानादरस्य प्रश्रब्धेर्हासस्य वाचो विस्पन्दनायाः सिद्धस्या-
प्रसादस्याप्रश्रब्धेः, दाक्षस्य सौरत्यस्य विप्रतिसारस्य शोकस्योपायासायासस्य
...अप्रदक्षिणग्राहस्य संशयस्य संवराणां परिशुद्धेर्ध्यात्मसम्प्रसादस्य भीरुतायाः,
श्रद्धा क्षीराज्ज्वलमवञ्चनमुपशमोऽचापलमप्रमोदो मार्दवं प्रतिसंख्यानं निर्वैरप-
रिदाहावमदोऽलोभोऽद्वेषोऽमोहः सर्वज्ञताप्रतिनिःसर्गो विभवोऽपत्राप्यमपरि-
च्छादवं माननं कारुण्यं मैत्र्यदीनतारणा...अनुपनाहोऽनीर्ष्या चेतसोऽपर्यादानं
क्षान्तिर्व्यवसर्गोऽसौरत्यं परिभोगान्वयः पुण्यमसंज्ञिसमापत्तिनैर्याणिकता-
सर्वज्ञतासंस्कृता धर्माः—इत्येकोनविंशत्तं कुशलानां धर्माणां कुशलः स्वभावः ।

तथाऽकुशलानां धर्माणामकुशलः स्वभावः, निवृताव्याकृतानां निवृता-
व्याकृतः, प्रकृतव्याकृतानां प्रकृताव्याकृतः, कामोक्तानां कामोक्तः, रूपोक्तानां
रूपोक्तः, आरूप्योक्तानामारूप्योक्तः, अनास्रवाणामनास्रवः, दुःखसमुदय-
निरोधमार्गोक्तानां दुःखसमुदयनिरोधमार्गोक्तः, भावनाप्रहातव्यानां भावना-
प्रहातव्यः, अप्रहातव्यानामप्रहातव्यः । यस्मादेवमनेकप्रकारो धर्मस्वभावो

दृष्टस्तस्माद् यदुक्तम्—“निःस्वभावाः सर्वभावा निःस्वभावत्वाच्छून्याः” इति, तन्न ॥ ७ ॥

किञ्चान्यत्,

नैयायिकस्वभावो धर्मा नैयायिकाश्च ये तेषाम् ।

धर्मावस्थोक्तानामेवमनैयायिकादीनाम् ॥ ८ ॥

इह च धर्मावस्थोक्तानां नैयायिकानां धर्माणां नैयायिकः स्वभावः, अन्ये नैयायिकानामनैयायिकः, बोध्यङ्गिकानां बोध्यङ्गिकः, अबोध्यङ्गिकानामबोध्यङ्गिकः, बोधिपक्षिकाणां बोधिपक्षिकः, अबोधिपक्षिकाणामबोधिपक्षिकः । एवमपि शेषाणाम् । तद्यस्मादेवमनेकप्रकारो धर्माणां स्वभावो दृष्टस्तस्माद् यदुक्तम्—“निःस्वभावाः सर्वभावा निःस्वभावत्वाच्छून्याः” इति, तन्न ॥ ८ ॥

(२) निर्वस्तुकस्य नामाभावात्

किञ्चान्यत्,

यदि च न भवेत् स्वभावो धर्माणां निःस्वभाव इत्येव ।

नामापि भवेन्नैव नाम हि निर्वस्तुकं नास्ति ॥ ९ ॥

यदि सर्वधर्माणां स्वभावो न भवेत्तत्रापि निःस्वभावो भवेत् । तत्र ‘निःस्वभावः’ इत्येवं नामापि न भवेत् । कस्मात् ? निर्वस्तुकं नाम हि किञ्चिदपि नास्ति । तस्मान्नामसद्भावात् स्वभावो भावानामस्ति, स्वभावसद्भावाच्चा-शून्याः सर्वभावाः । तस्माद् यदुक्तम्—“निःस्वभावाः सर्वभावा निःस्वभावत्वा-च्छून्याः” इति, तन्न ॥ ९ ॥

३. प्रतिषेधासिद्धेः

(क) धर्मविना स्वभावाप्रतिषेधात्

किञ्चान्यत्,

अथ विद्यते स्वभावः स च धर्माणां न विद्यते तस्मात् ।

धर्मविना स्वभावः स यस्य तद् युषतमुपदेष्टुम् ॥ १० ॥

अथ मन्यसे—‘मा भूदवस्तुकं नाम’ इति कृत्वाऽस्ति स्वभावः, स पुनर्धर्माणां न सम्भवति, एवं धर्मशून्यता निःस्वभावत्वाद् धर्माणां सिद्धा भविष्यति, न च निर्वस्तुकं नामेति ?

अत्र वयं ब्रूमः—एवं यस्मिन् स स्वभावो धर्मविनिर्मुक्तस्यार्थस्य स युक्तमुपदेष्टुमर्थः । स च नोपदिष्टः । तस्माद् या कल्पना—‘अस्ति स्वभावो न स पुनर्धर्माणाम्’ इति, सा हीना ।

(ख) सद्भावानभ्युपगमात्

किञ्चान्यत्,

सत एव प्रतिषेधो नास्ति घटो गेह इत्ययं यस्मात् ।

दृष्टः प्रतिषेधोऽयं सतः स्वभावस्य ते तस्मात् ॥ ११ ॥

इह च सतोऽर्थस्य प्रतिषेधः क्रियते, नासतः । तद्यथा 'नास्ति घटो गेहे' इति सतो घटस्य प्रतिषेधः क्रियते, नासतः । एवमेव 'नास्ति स्वभावो घर्माणाम्' इति सतः स्वभावस्य प्रतिषेधः प्राप्नोति, नासतः । तत्र यदुक्तम्— 'निःस्वभावाः सर्वभावाः' इति, तन्न; प्रतिषेधसम्भवादेव सर्वभावस्वभावोऽप्रतिषिद्धः ॥ ११ ॥

किञ्चान्यत्,

अथ नास्ति स स्वभावः किं नु प्रतिषिध्यते त्वयानेन !

वचनेनर्ते वचनात् प्रतिषेधः सिध्यति ह्यसतः ॥ १२ ॥

अथ 'नास्त्येव स स्वभावः' अनेन वचनेन 'निःस्वभावाः सर्वभावाः' इति किं भवता प्रतिषिध्यते ? असतो हि वचनाद्विना सिद्धः प्रतिषेधः, तद्यथा— अग्नेः शैत्यस्य, अपांमौष्ण्यस्य ॥ १२ ॥

किञ्चान्यत्,

बालानामिव मिथ्या मृगतृष्णायां यथा जलग्राहः ।

एवं मिथ्याग्राहः स्यात्ते प्रतिषेधतो ह्यसतः ॥ १३ ॥

स्यात्ते बुद्धिः—यथा बालानां मृगतृष्णायां मिथ्या जलमिति ग्राहो भवति, ननु निर्जला सा मृगतृष्णेति तत्र पण्डितजातीयेन पुरुषेणोच्यते तस्य ग्राहस्य विनिवर्तनार्थम् । एवं निःस्वभावेषु यः स्वभावे ग्राहः सत्त्वानां तस्य व्यावर्तनार्थम्— 'निःस्वभावाः सर्वभावाः' इत्युच्यत इति ? ॥ १३ ॥

(ग) ग्राहादिषट्कास्वीकारात्

अत्र ब्रूमः—

नन्वेवं सत्यस्ति ग्राहो ग्राह्यं च तद्ग्रहीता च ।

प्रतिषेधः प्रतिषेध्यं प्रतिषेद्धा चेति षट्कं तत् ॥ १४ ॥

यद्येवम्, १. अस्ति तावत्सत्त्वानां ग्राहः, २. अस्ति ग्राह्यम्, ३. सन्ति च तद्ग्रहीतारः; ४. अस्ति प्रतिषेधस्तस्यापि मिथ्याग्राहस्य, ५. अस्ति प्रतिषेध्यं यदिदं मिथ्याग्राहो नाम, ६. सन्ति च प्रतिषेद्धारो युष्मदादयोऽस्य ग्राहस्य— इति सिद्धं षट्कम् । तस्य षट्कस्य सिद्धत्वाद् यदुक्तम्— 'शून्याः सर्वभावाः' इति, तन्न ॥ १४ ॥

अथ नैवास्ति ग्राहो नैव ग्राह्यं न च ग्रहीतारः ।

प्रतिषेधः प्रतिषेध्यं प्रतिषेद्धारो ननु न सन्ति ॥ १५ ॥

अथ मा भूदेष दोष इति कृत्वा नैव ग्राहोऽस्ति नैव ग्राह्यं न च ग्रहीतारः इत्येवं सति ग्राहस्य यः प्रतिषेधः—‘निःस्वभावाः सर्वभावाः’ इति, सोऽपि नास्ति, प्रतिषेध्यमपि नास्ति, प्रतिषेद्धारोऽपि न सन्ति ।

प्रतिषेधः प्रतिषेध्यं प्रतिषेद्धारश्च यद्युत न सन्ति ।

सिद्धा हि सर्वभावास्तेषामेव स्वभावश्च ॥ १६ ॥

यदि च न प्रतिषेधो न प्रतिषेद्धारः, सन्त्यप्रतिषिद्धाः सर्वभावाः, अस्ति च सर्वभावानां स्वभावः ॥ १६ ॥

(घ) निर्हेतुत्वात्

किञ्चान्यत्,

हेतोश्च ते न सिद्धिर्नैःस्वभाव्यात् कुतो हि ते हेतुः ?

निर्हेतुकस्य सिद्धिर्न चोपपन्नास्य तस्यैव ॥ १७ ॥

‘निःस्वभावाः सर्वभावाः’ इत्येतस्मिन्नर्थे ते हेतोरसिद्धिः । किं कारणम् ? निःस्वभावत्वाद्वि सर्वभावानां शून्यत्वात्ततो हेतुः कुतः ! असति हेतौ निर्हेतुकस्यार्थस्य ‘शून्याः सर्वभावाः’ इति कुत एव प्रसिद्धिः ! तत्र यदुक्तम्—‘शून्याः सर्वभावाः’ इति, तन्न ॥ १७ ॥

किञ्चान्यत्,

यदि चाहेतोः सिद्धिः स्वभावविनिवर्तनस्य ते भवति ।

स्वभाव्यस्यास्तित्वं ममापि निर्हेतुकं सिद्धम् ॥ १८ ॥

अथ मन्यसे—निर्हेतुकी (का) सिद्धिर्निःस्वभावत्वस्य भावनामिति ? यथा तव स्वभावविनिवर्तनं निर्हेतुकं सिद्धं तथा ममापि स्वभावसद्भावो निर्हेतुकः सिद्धः ॥ १८ ॥

अथ ‘हेतोरस्तित्वं भावास्वाभाव्यम्’ इत्यनुपपन्नम् ।

लोकेषु निःस्वभावो न हि कश्चन विद्यते भावः ॥ १९ ॥

इह यदि भावानां नैःस्वभाव्यस्य हेतोरस्तित्वं मन्यसे, ‘निःस्वभावाः सर्वभावाः’ इति, तदनुपपन्नम् । किं कारणम् ? न हि लोके निःस्वभावः कश्चिद्भावोऽस्ति ॥ १९ ॥

४. प्रतिषेध्यासिद्धेः

किञ्चान्यत्,

पूर्वं चेत् प्रतिषेधः, पश्चात् प्रतिषेध्यमित्यनुपपन्नम् ।

पश्चाच्चानुपपन्नो युगपच्च यतः स्वभावोऽसन् ॥ २० ॥

इह पूर्वं चेत्प्रतिषेधः पश्चाच्च प्रतिषेध्यमिति, नैस्वभाव्यं नोपपन्नम् । असति हि प्रतिषेध्ये कस्य प्रतिषेधः ? अथ पश्चात्प्रतिषेधः पूर्वं प्रतिषेध्यमिति च नोपपन्नम्; सिद्धे हि प्रतिषेध्ये किं प्रतिषेधः करोति ! अथ युगपत् प्रतिषेध-प्रतिषेध्ये इति ? तथापि न प्रतिषेधः; प्रतिषेध्यस्यार्थस्य कारणम् प्रतिषेध्यो न प्रतिषेधस्य च । यथा युगपदुत्पन्नयोः शशविषाणयोर्नैव दक्षिणं सव्यस्य कारणं सव्यं वा दक्षिणस्य कारणं भवतीति । तत्र यदुक्तम्— 'निःस्वभावाः सर्वभावाः' इति, तन्न ॥ २० ॥

सिद्धान्तपक्षः

१. भावानां शून्यता युक्ता (क)

(१) वचनस्य शून्यतास्वीकारेऽपि

अत्रोच्यते—यत्तावद्भवतोक्तम्

“सर्वेषां भावानां सर्वत्र न विद्यते स्वभावश्चेत् ।

त्वद्वचनमस्वभावं न निवर्तयितुं स्वभावमलम्” ॥ इति ॥ (का. १)

अत्र ब्रूमः—

हेतुप्रत्ययसामग्र्यां च पृथक् चापि मद्ब्रूवो न यदि ।

ननु शून्यत्वं सिद्धं भावानामस्वभावत्वात् ॥ २१ ॥

यदि मद्ब्रूवो हेतौ नास्ति महाभूतेषु सम्प्रयुक्तेषु विप्रयुक्तेषु वा प्रत्ययेषु नास्त्युरःकण्ठौष्ठजिह्वादन्तमूलतालुनासिकामूर्द्धप्रभृतिषु यत्नेषु, नोभयसामग्र्यामस्ति, हेतुप्रत्ययसामग्रीविनिर्मुक्तं पृथगेव च नास्ति, तस्मान्निःस्वभावम्, निःस्वभावत्वाच्छून्यम् । एवं ननु शून्यत्वं सिद्धं निःस्वभावत्वादस्य मदीयवचसः । यथा चैतन्मद्वचनं निःस्वभावत्वाच्छून्यं तथा सर्वभावा अपि निःस्वभावत्वाच्छून्या इति ॥ २१ ॥

शून्यतालक्षणम्—

तत्र यद्वचनोक्तं त्वदीयवचसः शून्यत्वाच्छून्यता सर्वभावानां नोपपद्यते इति, तन्न; किञ्चान्यत्,

यश्च प्रतीत्यभावो भावानां शून्यतेति सा प्रोक्ता ।

यश्च प्रतीत्यभावो भवति हि तस्यास्वभावत्वम् ॥ २२ ॥

शून्यतार्थं च भवान् भावानामनवसाय प्रवृत्त उपालम्भं वक्तुम्—‘त्वद्वचस्य निःस्वभावत्वाद्भावानां स्वभावप्रतिषेधो नोपपद्यते’ इति । इह हि यः

प्रतीत्यभावो भावानां सा शून्यता । कस्मात् ? निःस्वभावत्वात् । ये हि प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्ना भावास्ते न सस्वभावा भवन्ति; स्वभावाभावात् । कस्मात् ? हेतुप्रत्ययसापेक्षत्वात् । यदि हि स्वभावतो भावा भवेयुः, प्रत्याख्यायापि हेतु-प्रत्ययं च भवेयुः । न चैवं भवन्ति; तस्मान्निःस्वभावाः, निःस्वभावत्वाच्छून्या इत्यभिधीयन्ते ।

एवं मदीयमपि वचनं प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वान्निःस्वभावं निःस्वभावत्वा-च्छून्यमित्युपपन्नम् । यथा च प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वात् स्वभावशून्या अपि रथपटघटादयः स्वेषु स्वेषु कार्येषु काष्ठतृणमृत्तिकाहरणमधूदकपयसां धारणे शीतवातातपपरित्राणप्रभृतिषु वर्तन्ते, एवमिदं मदीयवचनं प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्न-त्वान्निःस्वभावमपि निःस्वभावत्वप्रसाधने भावानां वर्तते; तत्र यदुक्तम्— 'निःस्वभावत्वात् त्वदीयवचनस्य शून्यत्वात्तस्य च तेन सर्वभावस्वभाव-प्रतिषेधो नोपपन्नः' इति, तन्न ॥ २२ ॥

किञ्चान्यत्,

निमित्तको निमित्तकं मायापुरुषः स्वमायया सृष्टम् ।

प्रतिषेधयते यद्वत् प्रतिषेधोऽयं तथैव स्यात् ॥ २३ ॥

यथा निमित्तकः पुरुषोऽन्यं निमित्तकं पुरुषं कस्मिंश्चिदर्थे वर्तमानं प्रति-षेधयेत्, मायाकारेण वा सृष्टो मायापुरुषोऽन्यं मायापुरुषं स्वमायया सृष्टं कस्मिंश्चिदर्थे वर्तमानं प्रतिषेधयेत्; तत्र यो निमित्तकः पुरुषः प्रतिषिध्यते सोऽपि शून्यः, यः प्रतिषेधयति सोऽपि शून्यः, यो मायापुरुषः प्रतिषिध्यते सोऽपि शून्यः, यः प्रतिषेधयति सोऽपि शून्यः; एवमेव मद्बचनेन शून्येनापि सर्वभावानां स्वभावप्रतिषेध उपपन्नः ।

षट्कोटिकवादनिरासः

तत्र यद्वचनोक्तम्— 'शून्यत्वात्त्वद्वचनस्य सर्वभावस्वभावप्रतिषेधो नोपपन्नः' इति, तन्न । तत्र यो भवता षट्कोटिको वाद उक्तः सोऽपि तेनैव प्रतिषिद्धः । नैव ह्येवं सति न सर्वभावान्तर्गतं मद्बचनम्, नास्त्यशून्यम्, नापि सर्वभावा अशून्याः ॥ २३ ॥

२. न प्रतिज्ञाहानिः

यत्पुनर्भवतोक्तम्—

“अथ सस्वभावमेतद्वाक्यं पूर्वा हता प्रतिज्ञा ते ।

वैषमिकत्वं तस्मिन् विशेषहेतुश्च वक्तव्यः” ॥ (२ का०) इति ?

अत्रापि ब्रूमः—

न स्वाभाविकमेतद्वाक्यं तस्मान्न वादहानिर्मे ।

नास्ति च वैषमिकत्वं विशेषहेतुश्च न निगद्यः ॥ २४ ॥

न तावन्ममैतद्वचनं प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वात् स्वभावोपपन्नम् । यथा पूर्व-
मुक्तम्—स्वभावानुपपन्नत्वाच्छून्यमिति । यस्माच्चेदमपि मद्वचनं शून्यं शेषा
अपि सर्वभावाः शून्याः, तस्मान्नास्ति वैषमिकत्वम् । यदि हि वयं ब्रूमः—‘इदं
वचनमशून्यं शेषाः सर्वभावाः शून्याः’ इति, ततो वैषमिकत्व स्यात् । न चैत-
देवम्, तस्मान्न वैषमिकत्वम् । यस्माच्च वैषमिकत्वं न सम्भवति ‘इदं वचनम-
शून्यं शेषाः पुनः सर्वभावाः शून्याः’ इति, तस्मादस्माभिर्विशेषहेतुर्न वक्तव्यः—
‘अनेन हेतुनेदं वचनमशून्यं सर्वभावाः पुनः शून्याः’ इति । तत्र यद्भवतो-
क्तम्—‘वादहानिस्ते वैषमिकत्वं च, विशेषहेतुश्च त्वया वक्तव्यः’ इति,
तन्न ॥ २४ ॥

यत्पुनर्भवतोक्तम्—

“मा शब्दवदित्येतत् स्यात्ते बुद्धिर्न चैतदुपपन्नम् ।

शब्देन ह्यत्र सता भविष्यतो वारणं तस्य” ॥ (का० ३) इति ?

अत्र ब्रूमः—

मा शब्दवदिति नायं दृष्टान्तो यस्त्वया समारब्धः ।

शब्देन तच्च शब्दस्य वारणं नैवमेवैतत् ॥ २५ ॥

नाप्ययमस्माकं दृष्टान्तः । यथा कश्चित् ‘मा शब्दं कार्षीः’ इति ब्रुवन् शब्द-
मेव करोति शब्दं च प्रतिषेधयति, तद्वत् तच्छून्यं वचनं न शून्यतां प्रतिषेध-
यति । किं कारणम् ? अत्र हि दृष्टान्ते शब्देन शब्दस्य व्यावर्तनं क्रियते । न
चैतदेवम्; वयं ब्रूमः—‘नैःस्वभावाः सर्वभावा नैःस्वभावत्वाच्छून्याः’
इति ॥ २५ ॥

किं कारणम् ?

नैःस्वाभाव्यानां चेन्नैःस्वाभाव्येन वारणं यदि हि ।

नैःस्वाभाव्यनिवृत्तौ स्वाभाव्यं हि प्रसिद्धं स्यात् ॥ २६ ॥

यथा ‘मा शब्द कार्षीः’ इति शब्देन शब्दस्य व्यावर्तनं क्रियते, एवं यदि
नैःस्वभाव्येन वचनेन नैःस्वाभाव्यानां भावानां व्यावर्तनं क्रियेत ततोऽयं
दृष्टान्त उपपन्नः स्यात् । इह तु नैःस्वाभाव्येन वचनेन भावानां स्वभावप्रति-
षेधः क्रियते । एवं यदि नैःस्वाभाव्येन वचनेन भावानां नैःस्वाभाव्यप्रतिषेधः
क्रियेत, नैःस्वाभाव्यप्रतिषिद्धत्वादेव भावाः सस्वभावा भवेयुः । सस्वभाव-
त्वादशून्याः स्युः । शून्यतां च वयं भावानामाचक्ष्महे, नाशून्यतामित्य-
दृष्टान्त एवायमिति ॥ २६ ॥

अथवा निमित्तकायां यथा स्त्रियां स्त्रीयमित्यसद्ग्राहम्^१ ।

निमित्तकः प्रतिहन्यात् कस्यचिदेवं भवेदेतत् ॥ २७ ॥

अथवा यथा कस्यचित्पुरुषस्य निमित्तकायां स्त्रियां स्वभावशून्यायां परमार्थतः 'स्त्रीयम्' इत्यसद्ग्राहः स्यात्, एवं तस्यां तेनासद्ग्राहेण स राग-मुत्पादयेत् । तथागतेन वा तथागतश्रावकेण वा निमित्तको निमित्तकः स्यात् । तथागताधिष्ठानेन वा तथागतश्रावकाधिष्ठानेन वा स तस्य तमसद्ग्राहं विनिवर्तयेत् । एवमेव निमित्तकोपमेन शून्येन मद्बचनेन निमित्तकस्त्रीसदृशेषु सर्व-भावेषु निःस्वभावेषु योऽयं स्वभावग्राहः स निवर्त्यते । तस्मादयमत्र दृष्टान्तः शून्यताप्रसाधनं प्रत्युपपद्यमानो नेतरः ॥ २७ ॥

अथवा साध्यसमोऽयं हेतुर्न हि विदद्यते ध्वनेः सत्ता ।

संव्यवहारं च वयं नानभ्युपगम्य कथयामः ॥ २८ ॥

मा शब्दवदिति साध्यसम एवायं हेतुः । कस्मात् ? सर्वभावानां नैःस्वाभाव्येनाविशिष्टत्वात् । न हि तस्य ध्वनेः प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वात् स्वभावसत्ता विद्यते; तस्याः स्वभावसत्ताया अविद्यमानत्वात् । यदुक्तम्—'शब्देन ह्यत्र सता भविष्यतो वारणं तस्य' (३ का०) इति, तद् व्याहन्यते ।

अपि च, न वयं व्यवहारसत्यमनभ्युपगम्य व्यवहारसत्यं प्रत्याख्याय कथयामः—'शून्या सर्वभावाः' इति । न हि व्यवहारसत्यमनागम्य शक्या धर्मदेशना कर्तुम् । यथोक्तम्—

“व्यवहारमनाश्रित्य परमार्थो न दृश्यते ।

परमार्थमनागम्य निर्वाणं नाधिगम्यते” ॥ (म०शा० २४-१०) इति,

तस्मान्मद्वचनवच्छून्याः सर्वभावाः, सर्वभावानां च निःस्वभावत्वम्—उभयथोपपद्यमानमिति ॥ २८ ॥

यत्पुनर्भवतोक्तम्—

प्रतिषेधप्रतिषेधोऽप्येवमिति मतं भवेत् तदसदेव ।

एवं तव प्रतिज्ञा लक्षणतो दूष्यते न मम” ॥ (का० ४) इति ?

अत्र ब्रूमः—

यदि काचन प्रतिज्ञा स्यान्मे तत एष मे भवेद् दोषः ।

नास्ति च मम प्रतिज्ञा तस्मान्नैवास्ति मे दोषः ॥ २९ ॥

यदि च काचन मम प्रतिज्ञा स्यात् ततो मम प्रतिज्ञालक्षणप्राप्तत्वात्पूर्वको दोषो यथा त्वयोक्तस्तथा मम स्यात् । न मम काचिदस्ति प्रतिज्ञा । तस्मात्

सर्वाभावेषु शून्येष्वत्यन्तोपशान्तेषु प्रकृतिविधिकतेषु कुतः प्रतिज्ञा ! कुतः प्रतिज्ञालक्षणप्राप्तिः ! कुतश्च प्रतिज्ञालक्षणप्राप्तिकृतो दोषः !

तत्र यद्भवतोक्तम्—‘तव प्रतिज्ञालक्षणप्राप्तत्वात्तवैव दोषः’ इति, तन्न ॥ २९ ॥

३. प्रमाणसिद्धिः

(क) न इतः प्रमाणसिद्धिः

यत्पुनर्भवतोक्तम्—

“प्रत्यक्षेण हि तावद्यद्युपलभ्य विनिवर्तयसि भावान् ।

तन्नास्ति प्रत्यक्षं भावा येनोपलभ्यन्ते” ॥ (५ का०)

“अनुमानं प्रत्युक्तं प्रत्यक्षेणागमोपमाने च ।

अनुमानागमसाध्या येष्या दृष्टान्तसाध्याश्च” ॥ (६ का०) इति ?

अत्र वयं ब्रूमः—

यदि किञ्चिदुपलभ्यं प्रवर्तयेयं निवर्तयेयं वा ।

प्रत्यक्षादिभिरर्थैस्तदभावान्मेऽनुपालम्भः ॥ ३० ॥

यद्यहं किञ्चिदर्थमुपलभ्यं प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानागमैश्चतुर्भिः प्रमाणैश्चतुर्णां वा प्रमाणानामन्यतमेन, अत एव प्रवर्तयेयं वा निवर्तयेयं वा । यतोऽर्थमेवाहं किञ्चिन्नुपलभे । तस्मान्न प्रवर्तयामि, न निवर्तयामि ।

तत्रैवं सति यो भवतोपालम्भ उक्तः—यदि प्रत्यक्षादीनां प्रमाणानामन्यतमेनोपलभ्य भावान्विनिवर्तयसि, ननु भवतोक्तानि तानि प्रमाणानि न सन्ति, तैश्च प्रमाणैरपि गम्भा अर्था न सन्तीति, स मे भवत्येवानुपालम्भः ॥

किञ्चाप्यतः,

यदि च प्रमाणतस्ते तेषां तेषां प्रसिद्धिर्र्थानाम् ।

तेषां पुनः प्रसिद्धिं ब्रूहि कथं ते प्रमाणानाम् ॥ ३१ ॥

यदि च प्रमाणतस्तेषानां तेषामर्थानां प्रमेयाणां प्रसिद्धिं मन्यसे, यथा मानैर्मैयानाम्, तेषामिदानीं प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानागमानां चतुर्णां प्रमाणानां कुतः प्रसिद्धिः ! ॥ ३१ ॥

यदि तावन्निष्प्रमाणानां प्रमाणानां स्यात्प्रसिद्धिः, ‘प्रमाणतोऽर्थानां प्रसिद्धिः’ इति हीयते प्रतिज्ञा । तथापि—

अन्वैर्यदि प्रमाणैः प्रमाणसिद्धिर्भवेत्तदनवस्था ।

यदि पुनर्मन्वसे—प्रमाणैः प्रमेयाणां प्रसिद्धिस्तेषां प्रमाणानामन्यैः प्रसिद्धिः, एषचवस्थाप्रसङ्गः । अनवस्थाप्रसङ्गे को दोषः ?

नादेः सिद्धिस्तत्रास्ति नैव मध्यस्य नान्त्यस्य ॥ ३२ ॥

अस्यानवस्थाप्रसङ्गे आदेः सिद्धिर्नास्ति । किं कारणम् ? तेषामपि हि प्रमाणानामन्यैः प्रमाणैः प्रसिद्धिः, तेषामन्यैरिति नास्त्यादिः । आदेरसद्भावात् कुतो मध्यमः, कुतोऽन्तः ! तस्मात्तेषां प्रमाणानामन्यैः प्रमाणैः प्रसिद्धिरिति यदुक्तं तन्नोपपद्यत इति ॥ ३२ ॥

तेषामथ प्रमाणैर्विना प्रसिद्धिर्विहीयते वादः ।

वैषमिकत्वं तस्मिन् विशेषहेतुश्च वक्तव्यः ? ॥ ३३ ॥

अथ मन्यसे—तेषां प्रमाणानां विना प्रमाणैः प्रसिद्धिः, प्रमेयाणां पुनरर्थानां प्रमाणैः प्रसिद्धिरिति, एवं सति यस्ते वादः—‘प्रमाणैः प्रसिद्धिरर्थानाम्’ इति, स हीयते । वैषमिकत्वं च भवति—केषाञ्चिदर्थानां प्रमाणैः प्रसिद्धिः, केषाञ्चिन्नेति । विशेषहेतुश्च वक्तव्यो येन हेतुना केषाञ्चिदर्थानां प्रमाणैः प्रसिद्धिः, केषाञ्चिन्नेति । स च नोपदिष्टः । तस्मादियमपि कल्पना नोपपन्नेति ? ॥ ३३ ॥

(ख) नाग्निवत् स्वतः

अत्राह—प्रमाणान्येव स्वात्मानं परात्मानं च प्रसाधयन्ति । यथोक्तम्—

“द्योतयति स्वात्मानं यथा हुताशस्तथा परात्मानम् ।

स्वपरात्मानावेवं प्रसाधयन्ति प्रमाणानि” ॥ इति

यथाग्निः स्वात्मानं परात्मानं च प्रकाशयति, तथैव प्रमाणानि प्रसाधयन्ति स्वात्मानं परात्मानञ्चेति ?

अत्रोच्यते—

विषमोपन्यासोऽयं न ह्यात्मानं प्रकाशयत्यग्निः ।

न हि तस्यानुपलब्धिर्दृष्टा तमसीव कुम्भस्य ॥ ३४ ॥

विषम एवोपन्यासः—अग्निवत् प्रमाणानि स्वात्मानं च प्रसाधयन्ति परात्मानञ्च प्रसाधयन्तीति । न ह्यग्निरात्मानं प्रकाशयति । यथा^१ प्रागेवाग्निनाऽप्रकाशितस्तमसि कुम्भो नोपलभ्यते, अथोत्तरकालमुपलभ्यत्वेऽग्निना प्रकाशितः सन्; एवमेव यद्यप्रकाशितः प्रागग्निस्तमसि स्यादुत्तरकालमग्नेः प्रकाशनं स्यात्, अतः स्वात्मानं प्रकाशयेत् । न चैतदेवम् । तस्मादियमपि कल्पना नोपपद्यत इति ॥ ३४ ॥

१. महापण्डितेनेयं गाथा कारिकात्वेन गृहीता ।

२. यदि हि यथा—रा० ।

किञ्चान्यत्,

यदि च स्वात्मानमयं त्वद्वचनेन प्रकाशयत्यग्निः ।

परमिव नन्वात्मानं परिधक्ष्यत्यपि हुताशः ॥ ३५ ॥

यदि च त्वद्वचनेन यथा परात्मानं प्रकाशयत्यग्निरेवमेव स्वात्मानमपि प्रकाशयति, ननु यथा परात्मानं दहत्येवमेव स्वात्मानमपि धक्ष्यति । न चैतदेवम् । तत्र यदुक्तम्—‘परात्मानमिव स्वात्मानमपि प्रकाशयत्यग्निः’ इति, तन्न ॥ ३५ ॥

किञ्चान्यत्,

यदि च स्वपरात्मानौ त्वद्वचनेन प्रकाशयत्यग्निः ।

प्रच्छादयिष्यति तमः स्वपरात्मानौ हुताश इव ॥ ३६ ॥

यदि च भवतो मतेन स्वपरात्मानौ प्रकाशयत्यग्निः, नन्विदानीं तत्प्रति-
पक्षभूतं तमोऽपि स्वपरात्मानौ छादयेत् । न चैतद् दृष्टम् । तत्र यदुक्तम्—
‘स्वपरात्मानौ प्रकाशयत्यग्निः’ (३४ का०) इति, तन्न ॥ ३६ ॥

किञ्चान्यत्,

नास्ति तमश्च ज्वलने यत्र च तिष्ठति परात्मनि ज्वलनः ।

कुरुते कथं प्रकाशं स हि प्रकाशोऽन्धकारवधः ॥ ३७ ॥

इह चाग्नौ नास्ति तमः, नापि च यत्राग्निस्तत्रास्ति तमः । प्रकाशश्च
नाम तमसः प्रतिघातः । यस्माच्चाग्नौ नास्ति तमो नापि च यत्राग्निस्त-
त्रास्ति तमः, तत्र कस्य तमसः प्रतिघातमग्निः करोति यस्य प्रतिघातादग्निः
स्वपरात्मानौ प्रकाशयतीति ! ॥ ३७ ॥

अत्राह—ननु यस्मादेवं नाग्नौ तमोऽस्ति, नापि यत्राग्निस्तत्र तमोऽस्ति,
तस्मादेव स्वपरात्मानौ न प्रकाशयत्यग्निः; कुतः ? तेन ह्युत्पद्यमानेनैवाग्निना
तमसः प्रतिघातः । तस्मान्नाग्नौ तमोऽस्ति, नापि यत्राग्निस्तत्र तमोऽस्ति,
यस्मादुत्पद्यमान एवोभयं प्रकाशयत्यग्निः—स्वात्मानं परात्मानं चेति ?

अत्रोच्यते—

उत्पद्यमान एव प्रकाशयत्यग्निरित्यसद्वादः ।

उत्पद्यमान एव प्राप्नोति तमो न हि हुताशः ॥ ३८ ॥

अयमग्निरुत्पद्यमान एव प्रकाशयति स्वात्मानं परात्मानं च इति नाय-
मुपपद्यते वादः । कस्मात् ? न ह्युत्पद्यमान एवाग्निस्तमः प्राप्नोति, अप्राप्त-
त्वान्नैवोपहन्ति, तमसश्चानुपघातान्नास्ति प्रकाशः ॥ ३८ ॥

किञ्चान्यत्,

अप्राप्तोऽपि ज्वलनो यदि वा पुनरन्धकारमुपहन्त्यात् ।
सर्वेषु लोकधातुषु तमोऽयमिह संस्थितो हन्यात् ॥ ३६ ॥

अथापि मन्यसे—अप्राप्तोऽप्यग्निरन्धकारमुपहन्तीति ? नन्विदानीमिह संस्थितोऽग्निः सर्वलोकधातुस्थमुपहनिष्यति तमस्तुल्यायामप्राप्तौ । न चैतदेवं दृष्टम् । तस्मादप्राप्यैवाग्निरन्धकारमुपहन्तीति यदिष्टं तन्न ॥ ३९ ॥

(ग) न प्रमेयतः प्रमाणसिद्धिः

किञ्चान्यत्,

यदि स्वतश्च प्रमाणसिद्धिरनपेक्ष्य तव प्रमेयाणि ।
भवति प्रमाणसिद्धिर्न परापेक्षा स्वतः^१ सिद्धिः ॥ ४० ॥

यदि चाग्निवत् स्वतः प्रमाणसिद्धिरिति मन्यसे, अनपेक्ष्यापि प्रमेयानर्थान् प्रमाणानां प्रसिद्धिर्भविष्यति । किं कारणम् ? न हि स्वतः सिद्धिः परमपेक्षते ! अथापेक्षते, न स्वतः सिद्धिः ! ॥ ४० ॥

अत्राह—यदि नापेक्षन्ते प्रमेयानर्थान् प्रमाणानि, को दोषो भविष्यतीति ?

अत्रोच्यते—

अनपेक्ष्य हि प्रमेयानर्थान् यदि ते प्रमाणसिद्धिरिति^२ ।
न भवन्ति कस्यचिदेवमिमानि तानि^३ प्रमाणानि ॥ ४१ ॥

यदि प्रमेयानर्थाननपेक्ष्य प्रसिद्धिर्भवति प्रमाणानामिति, एवं तानीमानि प्रमाणानि न कस्यचित् प्रमाणानि भवन्ति । एवं दोषः ।

अथ कस्यचिद्भवन्ति प्रमाणानि, नैवेदानीमनपेक्ष्य^४ प्रमेयानर्थान् प्रमाणानि भवन्ति ॥ ४१ ॥

अथ मतमपेक्ष्य सिद्धिस्तेषामित्यत्र भवति को दोषः ।

सिद्धस्य साधनं स्यान्नासिद्धोऽपेक्षते ह्यन्यत् ॥ ४२ ॥

अथापि मतम्—अपेक्ष्य प्रमेयानर्थान् प्रमाणानां सिद्धिर्भवतीति, एवं सिद्धस्य प्रमाणचतुष्टयस्य साधनं भवति । किं कारणम् ? न ह्यसिद्धस्यार्थस्यापेक्षणं भवति । न ह्यसिद्धो देवदत्तः कञ्चिदर्थमपेक्षते । न च सिद्धस्य साधनमिष्टम्, कृतस्य कारणानुपपत्तेरिति ॥ ४२ ॥

१. हि—रा० ।

३. रा० पुस्तके नास्ति ।

२. ०सिद्धिः भवति—रा० ।

४. तान्—इत्यधिकं पाठं वाञ्छति रा० ।

किञ्चान्यत्,

सिध्यन्ति हि प्रमेयाण्यपेक्ष्य यदि सर्वथा प्रमाणानि ।

भवति प्रमेयसिद्धिर्नापेक्ष्यैव^१ प्रमाणानि ॥ ४३ ॥

यदि प्रमेयाण्यपेक्ष्य प्रमाणानि सिध्यन्ति, नेदानीं प्रमाणान्यपेक्ष्य प्रमेयाणि सिध्यन्ति । किं कारणम् ? न हि साध्यं साधनं साधयति, साधनानि च किल प्रमेयाणां प्रमाणानि ॥ ४३ ॥

किञ्चान्यत्,

यदि च प्रमेयसिद्धिर्नापेक्ष्यैव^१ भवति प्रमाणानि ।

किं ते प्रमाणसिद्ध्या तानि यदर्थं प्रसिद्धं तत् ॥ ४४ ॥

यदि च मन्यसे—अनपेक्ष्यैव प्रमाणानि प्रमेयाणां प्रसिद्धिर्भवतीति, किमिदानीं ते प्रमाणसिद्ध्या पर्यन्विष्ट्या । किं कारणम् ? यदर्थं हि तानि प्रमाणानि पर्यन्विष्येरन् ते प्रमेया अर्था विनापि प्रमाणैः सिद्धाः । तत्र किं प्रमाणैः कृत्यम् ! ॥ ४४ ॥

अथ तु प्रमाणसिद्धिर्भवत्यपेक्ष्यैव ते प्रमेयाणि ।

व्यत्यय एवं सति ते ध्रुवं प्रमाणप्रमेयाणाम् ॥ ४५ ॥

अथापि मन्यसे—अपेक्ष्यैव प्रमेयानर्थान् प्रमाणानि भवन्तीति, मा भूत् पूर्वोक्तदोष इति कृत्वा, एवं ते सति व्यत्ययः प्रमाणप्रमेयाणां भवति । प्रमाणानि ते प्रमेयाणि भवन्ति, प्रमेयैः साधितत्वात् । प्रमेयाणि च प्रमाणानि भवन्ति, प्रमाणानां साधकत्वात् ॥ ४५ ॥

अथ ते प्रमाणसिद्ध्या प्रमेयसिद्धिः प्रमेयसिद्ध्या च ।

भवति प्रमाणसिद्धिर्नास्त्युभयस्यापि ते सिद्धिः ॥ ४६ ॥

अथ मन्यसे—प्रमाणसिद्ध्या प्रमेयसिद्धिर्भवति प्रमाणापेक्षत्वाद्, प्रमेयसिद्ध्या च प्रमाणसिद्धिर्भवति प्रमेयापेक्षत्वादिति, एवं ते सत्युभयस्यापि सिद्धिर्न भवति । किं कारणम् ? ॥ ४६ ॥

सिध्यन्ति हि प्रमाणैर्यदि प्रमेयाणि तानि तैरेव ।

साध्यानि च प्रमेयैस्तानि कथं साधयिष्यन्ति ॥ ४७ ॥

यदि हि प्रमाणैः प्रमेयाणि सिध्यन्ति, तानि च प्रमाणानि तैरेव प्रमेयैः साधयितव्यानि, तन्वसिद्धेषु प्रमेयेषु कारणस्यासिद्धत्वादसिद्धानि कथं साधयिष्यन्ति प्रमेयाणि ! ॥ ४७ ॥

सिध्यन्ति च प्रमेयैर्यदि प्रमाणानि तानि तैरेव ।

साध्यानि च प्रमाणैस्तानि कथं साधयिष्यन्ति ॥ ४८ ॥

यदि च प्रमेयैः प्रमाणानि सिध्यन्ति, तानि च प्रमेयाणि तैरेव प्रमाणैः साधयितव्यानि ? नन्वसिद्धेषु प्रमाणेषु कारणस्यासिद्धत्वादसिद्धानि कथं साधयिष्यन्ति प्रमाणानि ! ॥ ४८ ॥

पित्रा यद्युत्पाद्यः पुत्रो यदि तेन चैव पुत्रेण ।

उत्पाद्यः स यदि पिता वद तत्रोत्पादयति कः कम् ! ॥ ४९ ॥

यथापि नाम कश्चिद् ब्रूयात्—‘पित्रा पुत्र उत्पादनीयः, स च पिता तेनैव पुत्रेणोत्पादनीयः’ इति, तत्रेदानीं ब्रूहि—केन क उत्पादयितव्य इति ! तथैव खलु भवान् ब्रवीति—‘प्रमाणैः प्रमेयाणि साधयितव्यानि, तान्येव च पुनः प्रमाणानि तैरेव प्रमेयैः’ इति, तत्रेदानीं ते कतमैः कतमानि साधयितव्यानि ! ॥

कश्च पिता कः पुत्रस्तत्र त्वं ब्रूहि तावुभावपि च ।

पितापुत्रलक्षणधरौ यतो भवति नोऽत्र संदेहः ॥ ५० ॥

तयोश्च पूर्वोपदिष्टयोः पितापुत्रयोः वद—कतरः पुत्रः कतरः पिता ? उभावपि तावुत्पादकत्वात् पितृलक्षणधरौ, उत्पाद्यत्वाच्च पुत्रलक्षणधरौ । अत्र नः संदेहो भवति—कतरस्तत्र पिता कतरः पुत्र इति ? एवमेव यान्येतानि भवतः प्रमाणप्रमेयाणि, तत्र कतराणि प्रमाणानि, कतराणि प्रमेयाणि ? उभयान्यपि ह्येतानि साधकत्वात् प्रमाणानि, साध्यत्वात् प्रमेयाणि । अत्र नः संदेहो भवति—कतराण्यत्र प्रमाणानि, कतराणि प्रमेयाणीति ? ॥ ५० ॥

(घ) नाप्यकस्मात् प्रमाणसिद्धिः

नैव स्वतः प्रसिद्धिर्न परस्परतः परप्रमाणैर्वा ।

न भवति न च प्रमेयैर्न चाप्यकस्मात् प्रमाणानाम् ॥ ५१ ॥

न स्वतः प्रसिद्धिः प्रत्यक्षस्य तेनैव प्रत्यक्षेण, अनुमानस्य तेनैवानुमानेन, उपमानस्य तेनैवोपमानेन, आगमस्य तेनैवागमेन । नापि परस्परतः—प्रत्यक्षस्यानुमानोपमानागमैः, अनुमानस्य प्रत्यक्षोपमानागमैः, उपमानस्य प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमैः, आगमस्य प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानैः, नापि प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानागमानामन्यैः प्रत्यक्षानुमानोपमानागमैर्यथास्वम् ।

नापि प्रमेयैः समस्तव्यस्तैः स्वविषयपरविषयसंगृहीतैः । नाप्यकस्मात्, नापि समुच्चयेनैतेषां कारणानां पूर्वोद्दिष्टानां विशतित्रशच्चत्वारिशतषड्विशते (?) र्वा^२ ।

तत्र यदुक्तम्—‘प्रमाणाधिगम्यत्वात् प्रमेयाणां भावानां सन्ति च ते प्रमेया भावास्तानि च प्रमाणानि यैस्ते प्रमाणैः प्रमेयाभावाः समधिगताः’ इति, तन्न ॥

२. इतोऽपि भावानां शून्यता युक्ता (ख)

(१) प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वात्

यत्पुर्नभवतोक्तम्—

कुशलानां धर्माणां धर्मावस्थाविदश्च मन्यन्ते ।

कुशलं जनाः स्वभावं शेषेष्वप्येष विनियोगः ॥ (७ का०) इति ?

अत्र ब्रूमः—

कुशलानां धर्माणां धर्मावस्थाविदो ब्रूवन्ति यदि ।

कुशलं स्वभावमेवं प्रविभागेनाभिधेयः स्यात् ॥ ५२ ॥

कुशलानां धर्माणां धर्मावस्थाविदः कुशलं स्वभावं मन्यन्ते । स च भवता प्रविभागेनोपदेष्टव्यः स्यात्—अयं स कुशलः स्वभावः, इमे ते कुशला धर्माः, इदं तत्कुशलं विज्ञानम्, अयं स कुशलविज्ञानस्वभावः । एवं सर्वेषाम् । न चैतदेवं दृष्टम् । तस्माद्यदुक्तम्—‘यथास्वमुपदिष्टः स्वभावो धर्माणाम्’ इति, तन्न ॥ ५२ ॥

किञ्चान्यत्,

यदि च प्रतीत्य कुशलः स्वभाव उत्पद्यते स कुशलानाम् ।

धर्माणां परभावः स्वभाव एवं कथं भवति ! ॥ ५३ ॥

यदि च कुशलानां धर्माणां स्वभावो हेतुप्रत्ययसामग्रीं प्रतीत्योत्पद्यते, स परभावादुत्पन्नः कुशलानां धर्माणां कथं स्वभावो भवति ! एवमेवाकुशलप्रभृतीनाम् । तत्र यदुक्तम्—‘कुशलानां धर्माणां कुशलः स्वभावोऽप्युपदिष्टः, एवमकुशलादीनां चाकुशलादिः’ इति, तन्न ॥ ५३ ॥

किञ्चान्यत्,

अथ न प्रतीत्य किञ्चित् स्वभाव उत्पद्यते स कुशलानाम् ।

धर्माणामेवं स्याद् वासो न ब्रह्मचर्यस्य ॥ ५४ ॥

अथ मन्यसे—न किञ्चित्प्रतीत्य कुशलानां धर्माणां कुशलः स्वभाव उत्पद्यते, एवमकुशलानां धर्माणामकुशलः, अव्याकृतानामव्याकृत इति ? एवं सत्यब्रह्मचर्यवासो भवति । किं कारणम् ? प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादस्य ह्येवं सति प्रत्याख्यानं भवति, प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादस्य प्रत्याख्यानात् प्रतीत्यसमुत्पाददर्शनप्रत्याख्यानं भवति । न ह्यविद्यमानस्य प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादस्य दर्शनमुपपद्यमानं भवति ।

असति प्रतीत्यसमुत्पाददर्शने धर्मदर्शनं न भवति । उक्तं हि भगवता—“यो हि, भिक्षवः, प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादं पश्यति स धर्मं पश्यति” () इति । धर्मदर्शनाभावाद् ब्रह्मचर्यवासाभावः ।

अथवा—प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादप्रत्याख्यानात् दुःखसमुदयप्रत्याख्यानं भवति । प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादो हि दुःखस्य समुदयः । दुःखसमुदयस्य प्रत्याख्यानाद् दुःख-प्रत्याख्यानं भवति । असति हि समुदये तत्कुतो दुःखं समुदेष्यति ! दुःखप्रत्या-ख्यानात् समुदयप्रत्याख्यानाच्च दुःखनिरोधस्य प्रत्याख्यानं भवति^१ । असति हि दुःखसमुदये कस्य प्रहणान्निरोधो भविष्यति ! (दुःखनिरोधप्रत्याख्याना-न्मार्गस्य प्रत्याख्यानं भवति) । असति हि दुःखनिरोधे कस्य प्राप्तये मार्गो भविष्यति दुःखनिरोधगामी ! एवं चतुर्णामार्यसत्यानां भावः । तेषामभा-वाच्छ्रामण्यफलाभावः सम्प्राप्तः । सत्यदर्शनाच्छ्रामण्यफलानि हि समधि-गम्यन्ते । श्रामण्यफलानां भावादब्रह्मचर्यवास इति ॥ ५४ ॥

किञ्चान्यत्,

नाधर्मो धर्मो वा संव्यवहारश्च लौकिका न स्युः ।

नित्याश्च सस्वभावा स्युर्नित्यत्वादहेतुमतः ॥ ५५ ॥

एव सति प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादं प्रत्याचक्षाणस्य भवतः को दोषः प्रसज्यते ? धर्मो न भवति, अधर्मो न भवति, संव्यवहाराश्च लौकिका न भवन्ति । किं कारणम् ? प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नं ह्येतत्सर्वमस्ति, प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादे कुतो भविष्यति ! अपि च सस्वभावोऽप्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नो निर्हेतुको नित्यः स्यात् । किं कारणम् ? निर्हेतुका हि भावा नित्याः । स एव चाब्रह्मचर्यवासः प्रसज्यते, स्वसिद्धान्त-विरोधश्च । किं कारणम् ? अनित्या हि भगवता सर्वसंस्कारा निर्दिष्टाः । ते सस्वभावनित्यत्वान्नित्या हि भवन्ति ॥ ५५ ॥

एष चाकुशलेष्वव्याकृतेषु^२ नैर्याणिकादिषु च दोषः ।

तस्मात् सर्वं संस्कृतमसंस्कृतं ते भवत्येव ॥ ५६ ॥

यश्चैष कुशलेषु निर्दिष्टः कल्पः स एवाकुशलेषु, स एवाव्याकृतेषु, स एव नैर्याणिकप्रभृतिषु । तस्मात्ते सर्वमिदं संस्कृतमसंस्कृतं सम्पद्यते । किं कारणम् ? हेतौ ह्यसत्युत्पादस्थितिभङ्गा न भवन्ति । उत्पादस्थितिभङ्गेष्व-सत्सु संस्कृतलक्षणाभावात् सर्वं संस्कृतमसंस्कृतं सम्पद्यते । तत्र यदुक्तम्—‘कुशलादीनां भावानां स्वभावसद्भावादशून्याः सर्वभावाः’ इति, तन्न ॥ ५६ ॥

(२) निर्वस्तुकस्य नामाभावेऽनियमात्

यत्पुनर्भवतोक्तम्—

यदि च न भवेत् स्वभावो धर्माणां निःस्वभाव इत्येव ।

नामापि भवेन्नैवं नाम हि निर्वस्तुकं नास्ति ॥ (९ का०) इति ?

अत्र ब्रूमः—

यः सद्भूतं नामात्र ब्रूयात् सस्वभाव इत्येवम् ।

भवता प्रतिवक्तव्यो नाम ब्रूमश्च न वयं सत् ॥ ५७ ॥

यो नामात्र सद्भूतं ब्रूयात् सस्वभाव इति, स भवता प्रतिवक्तव्यः स्यात्—
यस्य सद्भूतं नाम स्वभावस्य, तस्मात्तेनापि स्वभावेन सद्भूतेन भवितव्यम् ।
न ह्यसद्भूतस्य स्वभावस्य सद्भूतं नाम भवतीति । न पुनर्वयं नाम सद्भूतं
ब्रूमः । तदपि हि भावस्वभावस्याभावान्नाम निःस्वभावम्, तस्माच्छून्यम्,
शून्यत्वादसद्भूतम् । तत्र यद् भवतोक्तम्—‘नामसद्भावान् सद्भूतः स्वभावः’
इति, तन्न ॥ ५७ ॥

किञ्चान्यत्,

नामासदिति च यदिदं तर्किकं नु सतो भवत्युताप्यसतः ।

यदि हि सतो यद्यसतो द्विधापि ते हीयते वादः ॥ ५८ ॥

यच्चैतन्नामासदिति, तर्किकं सतोऽसतो वा ? यदि हि सतस्तन्नाम, यद्य-
सतः—उभयथापि प्रतिज्ञा हीयते । तत्र यदि तावत्सतो नामासदिति प्रतिज्ञा
हीयते, न हीदानीं तदसदिदानीं सत् । अथासतोऽसदिति नाम, असद्भूतस्य
नाम न भवति । तस्माद्या प्रतिज्ञा—‘नाम्नः सद्भूतः स्वभावः’ इति, सा
हीना ॥ ५८ ॥

किञ्चान्यत्,

सर्वेषां भावानां शून्यत्वं चोपपादितं पूर्वम् ।

स उपालम्भस्तस्माद् भवत्ययं चाप्रतिज्ञायाः ॥ ५९ ॥

इह चास्माभिः पूर्वमेव सर्वेषां भावानां विस्तरतः शून्यत्वमुपपादितम् ।
तत्र प्राङ्नाम्नोऽपि शून्यत्वमुक्तम् । स भवानशून्यत्वं परिगृह्य परिवृत्तो
वक्तुम्—यदि भावानां स्वभावो न स्यादस्वभाव इति नामापीदं न स्यादिति,
तस्मादप्रतिज्ञोपालम्भोऽयं भवतः सम्पद्यते । न हि वयं नाम सद्भूतमिति
ब्रूमः ॥ ५९ ॥

३. प्रतिषेधसिद्धिर्न युक्ता

(क) धर्मविनिर्मुक्तः स्वभावः प्रतिषिद्धः

यत्पुनर्भवतोक्तम्

अथ विद्यते स्वभावः स च धर्माणां न विद्यते तस्मात् ।

धर्मविना स्वभावः यस्य तद्युक्तमुपदेष्टुम् ॥ (का० १०) इति ?

अत्र ब्रूमः—

अथ विद्यते स्वभावः स च धर्माणां न विद्यत इतीदम् ।

आशङ्कितं यदुक्तं भवत्यनाशङ्कितं तच्च ॥ ६० ॥

अथ हि वयं धर्माणां स्वभावं प्रतिषेधायामः, धर्मविनिर्मुक्तस्य वा कस्य-
चिदर्थस्य स्वभावमभ्युपगच्छामः । नन्वेवं सति य उपालम्भो भवतः—‘यदि
धर्मा निःस्वभावाः, कस्य खल्विदानीमन्यस्यार्थस्य धर्मविनिर्मुक्तस्य स्व-
भावो भवति, स युक्तमुपदेष्टुम्’ इति, दूरापकृष्टमेवैतद्भवति, उपलम्भो न
भवति ॥ ६० ॥

(ख) असतोऽप्यनभ्युपगमस्य प्रतिषेधात् समः

यत्पुनर्भवतोक्तम्—

सत एव प्रतिषेधो नास्ति घटो गेह इत्ययं यस्मात् ।

दृष्टः प्रतिषेधोऽयं सतः स्वभावस्य ते तस्मात् ॥ (का० ११) इति ?

अत्र ब्रूमः—

सत एव प्रतिषेधो यदि शून्यत्वं ननु प्रसिद्धमिदम् ।

प्रतिषेधयते हि भवान् भावानां निःस्वभावत्वम् ॥ ६१ ॥

यदि सत एव प्रतिषेधो भवति नासतः, भवांश्च सर्वभावानां निःस्व-
भावत्वं प्रतिषेधयति, ननु प्रसिद्धं सर्वभावानां निःस्वभावत्वम् । त्वद्वचनेन
प्रतिषेधसद्भावात्, निःस्वभावत्वस्य च सर्वभावानां प्रतिषिद्धत्वात् प्रसिद्धा
शून्यता ॥ ६१ ॥

प्रतिषेधयसेऽथ त्वं शून्यत्वं तच्च नास्ति शून्यत्वम् ।

प्रतिषेधः सत इति ते नन्वेव विहीयते वादः ॥ ६२ ॥

अथ प्रतिषेधयसि त्वं सर्वभावानां निःस्वभावानां शून्यत्वम्, नास्ति तच्च
शून्यत्वम्, या तर्हि ते प्रतिज्ञा—‘सतः प्रतिषेधो भवति नासतः’ इति, सा
हीना ॥ ६२ ॥

किञ्चान्यत्,

प्रतिषेधयामि नाहं किञ्चित् प्रतिषेध्यमस्ति न च किञ्चित् ।

तस्मात् प्रतिषेधयसीत्यधिलय एष त्वया क्रियते ॥ ६३ ॥

यद्यहं किञ्चित्प्रतिषेधयामि ततस्तदपि त्वया युक्तमेव वक्तुं स्यात् । न चैवाहं किञ्चित् प्रतिषेधयामि, यस्मान्न किञ्चित्प्रतिषेधव्यमस्ति । तस्माच्छून्येषु सर्वभावेष्वविद्यमाने प्रतिषेध्ये प्रतिषेधे च प्रतिषेधयसीत्येष त्वया प्रस्तुतः सोऽधिलयः क्रियत इति ॥ ६३ ॥

यत्पुनर्भवतोक्तम्--

अथ नास्ति स स्वभावः किं नु प्रतिषिध्यते त्वयानेन ।

वचनेनर्ते वचनात्प्रतिषेधः सिध्यति ह्यसतः ॥ (का० १२) इति ?

अत्र ब्रूमः--

यच्चाहर्ते वचनादसतः प्रतिषेधवचनासिद्धिरिति ।

अत्र ज्ञापयते वागसदिति तन्न तच्च न प्रति निहन्ति ॥ ६४ ॥

यच्च भवान् ब्रवीति—ऋतेऽपि वचनादसतः प्रतिषेधः प्रसिद्धः, तत्र किं 'निःस्वभावाः सर्वभावाः' इत्येतत्त्वद्वचनं करोतीति ? अत्र ब्रूमः--'निःस्वभावाः सर्वभावाः' इत्येतत्त्वलु वचनं न निःस्वभावानेव सर्वभावान् करोति; किन्तु 'असति स्वभावे भावा निःस्वभावाः' इति ज्ञापयति । तद्यथा कश्चिद् ब्रूयादविद्यमानगृहे देवदत्ते—'अस्ति गृहे देवदत्तः' इति, तत्रैनं कश्चित्प्रतिब्रूयात्—नास्तीति । न तद्वचनं देवदत्तस्यासद्भावं करोति, किन्तु ज्ञापयति केवलमसम्भवं गृहे देवदत्तस्य । तद्वन्नास्ति स्वभावो भावानामित्येतद्वचनं न भावानां निःस्वभावत्वं करोति, किन्तु सर्वभावेषु स्वभावस्याभावं ज्ञापयति ।

तत्र यद्भवतोक्तम् 'किमसति स्वभावे नास्ति स्वभाव इत्येतद्वचनं करोति, ऋतेऽपि वचनात् प्रसिद्धः स्वभावस्याभावः' इति, तन्न युक्तम् ॥ ६४ ॥

(ग) प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नत्वान्न निर्हेतुकतादोषः

अन्यच्च—

बालानामिव मिथ्या मृगतृष्णायां यथा जलग्राहः ।

एवं मिथ्याग्राहः स्यात्ते प्रतिषेधतो ह्यसतः ॥ (१३-१६ का०)

इत्यादयो या पुनश्चतस्रो गाथा भवतोक्ताः ? अत्र ब्रूमः--

मृगतृष्णादृष्टान्ते यः पुनरुक्तस्त्वया महोश्चर्चः ।

तत्रापि निर्णयं शृणु यथा स दृष्टान्त उपपन्नः ॥ ६५ ॥

य एष त्वया मृगतृष्णादृष्टान्ते महोश्चर्च उक्तस्तत्रापि यो निर्णयः स श्रूयतां यथोपपन्न एष दृष्टान्तो भवति ॥ ६५ ॥

स यदि स्वभावतः स्याद् ग्राहो न स्यात्प्रतीत्य समुद्भूतः ।

यश्च प्रतीत्य भवति ग्राहो ननु शून्यता सैव ॥ ६६ ॥

यदि मृगतृष्णायां स यथा जलग्राहः स्वभावतः स्यान्न स्यात्प्रतीत्यसमु-
त्पन्नः, यतो मृगतृष्णां च प्रतीत्य विपरीतं च दर्शनं प्रतीत्याद्योनिशोमन-
स्कारं च प्रतीत्य स्यादुद्भूतोऽतः प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नः । यतश्च प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नोऽतः
स्वभावतः शून्य एव । यथा पूर्वमुक्तं तथा ॥ ६६ ॥

किञ्चान्यत्,

यदि च स्वभावतः स्याद् ग्राहः कस्तं निवर्तयेद् ग्राहम् ।

शेषेष्वप्येष विधिस्तस्मादेषोऽनुपालम्भः ॥ ६७ ॥

यदि च मृगतृष्णायां जलग्राहः स्वभावतः स्यात्, क एव तं विनिवर्तयेत् !
न हि स्वभावः शक्यो विनिवर्तयितुम्; यथाग्नेरुष्णत्वमपां द्रवत्वमाकाशस्य
निरावरणत्वम् । दृष्टं चास्य विनिवर्तनम् । तस्माच्छून्यस्वभावो ग्राहः । यथा
चैतदेवम्, शेषेष्वपि धर्मेष्वेष क्रमः प्रत्यवगन्तव्यो ग्राह्यप्रभृतिषु पञ्चसु ।
तत्र यद्भवतोक्तम्--'षट्कभावादशून्याः सर्वभावाः' इति, तन्न ॥ ६७ ॥

यत्पुनर्भवतोक्तम्--

'हेतोश्च ते न सिद्धिर्नैस्वाभाव्यात् कुतो हि ते हेतुः ।

निर्हेतुकस्य सिद्धिर्न चोपपन्नास्य तेऽर्थस्य' ॥ (१७-१९ का०) इति ?

अत्र ब्रूमः--

अथ ते हेत्वभावः प्रत्युक्तः पूर्वमेव स समत्वात् ।

मृगतृष्णादृष्टान्तव्यावृत्तिविधौ य उक्तः प्राक् ॥ ६८ ॥

एतेनै चेदानीं चर्चेन पूर्वोक्तेन हेत्वभावोऽपि प्रत्युक्तोऽवगन्तव्यः । य एव
हि चर्चः पूर्वस्मिन् हेतावुक्तः षट्कप्रतिषेधस्य स एवेहापि चर्चयितव्यः । (१४-
१५ का०) ॥ ६८ ॥

(४) प्रतिषेध-प्रतिषेधाभ्युपगमाददोषः

यत्पुनर्भवतोक्तम्--

पूर्वं चेत् प्रतिषेधः पश्चात् प्रतिषेध्यमित्यनुपपन्नम् ।

पश्चाच्चानुपपन्नो युगपच्च यतः स्वभावः सन् ॥ इति (२० का०)

अत्र ब्रूमः--

यस्त्रैकाल्ये हेतुः प्रत्युक्तः पूर्वमेव स समत्वात् ।

त्रैकाल्यप्रतिहेतुश्च शून्यतावादिनां प्राप्तः ॥ ६९ ॥

य एष हेतुस्त्रैकाल्ये प्रतिषेधवाची स उक्तोत्तरः प्रत्यवगन्तव्यः । कस्मात् ? साध्यसमत्वात् । तथा हि त्वद्वचनेन प्रतिषेधस्त्रैकाल्येऽनुपपन्न-
प्रतिषेधवत्स प्रतिषेध्योऽपि । तस्मात् प्रतिषेधप्रतिषेध्येऽसति यद्भवान्
मन्यते—प्रतिषेधः प्रतिषिद्ध इति, तन्न । यस्त्रिकालप्रतिषेधवाची हेतुः, एष
एव शून्यतावादिनां प्राप्तः; सर्वभावस्वभावप्रतिषेधकत्वात् न भवतः ॥ ६९ ॥

अथवा कथमेतदुक्तोत्तरम् ?

प्रतिषेधयामि नाहं किञ्चित् प्रतिषेध्यमस्ति न च किञ्चित् ।

तस्मात् प्रतिषेधयसीत्यधिलय एष त्वया क्रियते ॥ (का० ६३)

प्रभवति च शून्यतेयं यस्य प्रभवन्ति तस्य सर्वार्थाः ।

प्रभवति न तस्य किञ्चित् प्रभवति शून्यता यस्य ॥ ७० ॥

इति प्रत्युक्तम् । अथ मन्यसे—त्रिष्वपि कालेषु प्रतिषेधः सिद्धः, दृष्टः पूर्व-
कालीनोऽपि हेतुः, उत्तरकालीनोऽपि, युगपत्कालीनोऽपि हेतुः; तत्र पूर्वकालीनो
हेतुर्यथा पिता पुत्रस्य, पश्चात्कालीनो यथा शिष्य आचार्यस्य, युगपत्कालीनो
यथा प्रदीपः प्रकाशस्येति ? अत्र ब्रूमः—न चैतदेवम्; उक्ता ह्येतस्मिन् क्रमे
त्रयः पूर्वदोषाः । अपि च यद्येवम्, प्रतिषेधसद्भावस्त्वयाम्युपगम्यते प्रतिज्ञा-
हानिश्च ते भवति । एतेन क्रमेण स्वभावप्रतिषेधोऽपि सिद्धः ॥ ७० ॥

भवति चात्र—

यः शून्यतां प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादं मध्यमां प्रतिपदं च ।

एकार्थं निजगाद प्रणमामि तमप्रतिमसम्बुद्धम् ॥ ७१ ॥

यस्य शून्यतेयं प्रभवति तस्य सर्वार्था लौकिकलोकोत्तराः प्रभवन्ति । किं
कारणम् ? यस्य हि शून्यता प्रभवति तस्य प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादः प्रभवति ।
यस्य प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादः प्रभवति तस्य चत्वार्यार्यसत्यानि प्रभवन्ति । यस्य
चत्वार्यार्यसत्यानि प्रभवन्ति तस्य श्रामण्यफलानि प्रभवन्ति, सर्वविशेषा-
धिगमाः प्रभवन्ति । यस्य सर्वविशेषाधिगमाः प्रभवन्ति तस्य त्रीणि रत्नानि—
बुद्धधर्मसङ्घाः, प्रभवन्ति । यस्य प्रतीत्यसमुत्पादः प्रभवति तस्य धर्मो धर्म-
हेतुर्धर्मफलं च प्रभवन्ति, तस्याधर्मोऽधर्महेतुर्धर्मफलं च प्रभवन्ति । यस्य
धर्माधर्मो धर्माधर्महेतुर्धर्माधर्मफले च प्रभवन्ति, तस्य क्लेशः क्लेशसमुदयः
क्लेशवस्तूनि च प्रभवन्ति । यस्यैतत्सर्वं प्रभवति पूर्वोक्तं तस्य सुगतिदुगति-
व्यवस्था, सुगतिदुर्गतिगमनम्, सुगतिदुर्गतिगामी मार्गः, सुगतिदुर्गतिव्यति-
क्रमणम्, सुगतिदुर्गतिव्यतिक्रमोपायः, सर्वसंव्यवहाराश्च लौकिका व्यवस्था-
पिताः स्वयमधिगन्तव्याः । अनया दिशा किञ्चिच्छक्यं वचनेनोपदेष्टुमिति ॥

✱ इति कृतिरियमाचार्यनागार्जुनपादानाम् ✱

विग्रहव्यावर्तनी

(हिन्दीरूपान्तर)

पूर्वपक्ष

[भावस्वभाववाद]

आप शून्यवादियों की मान्यता है कि सभी भावों (धर्मों) के हेतु, प्रत्यय और प्रत्यय-सामग्री में स्वभाव पृथक्-पृथक् या समवेत रूप से कथमपि वर्तमान नहीं है। इससे यह बात सिद्ध हो जाती है कि 'सभी भाव शून्य हैं'। जैसे कारणभूत बीज में अंकुर नहीं है, न प्रत्ययसंज्ञित पृथ्वी-जल-तेज-वायु आदि प्रत्येक में, न समग्र प्रत्ययों में, न हेतु-प्रत्ययसामग्री में (एक साथ), और न वह हेतु-प्रत्यय से विनिर्मुक्त (रहित) या पृथक् है। यों, यहाँ सभी तरह से स्वभाव नहीं है। अतः यह मानना पड़ेगा कि यह बीजदृष्टान्त निःस्वभाव है और इस निःस्वभावता के कारण ही वह 'शून्य' कहलाता है। इस तरह, जैसे अंकुर निःस्वभाव है और निःस्वभाव होने से शून्य है, वैसे ही सब भाव भी निःस्वभाव होने से शून्य हैं।

यहाँ हम भावस्वभाववादियों का यह कहना है कि—यदि आप का उपयुक्त सिद्धान्त मान लिया जाय तो आप का 'सभी भाव शून्य हैं'—यह वचन भी शून्य (निरर्थक) हो जायगा; क्योंकि वह (भवदुक्त वचन) भी न हेतु में वर्तमान है, न सम्प्रयुक्त (संश्लिष्ट) या विप्रयुक्त (विश्लिष्ट) महाभूतों (पृथ्वी आदि प्रत्ययों) में, न उरस् कण्ठ ओष्ठ जिह्वा दन्तमूल तालु नासिका या मूर्धन् आदि यत्न-स्थानों में, या न उभय सामग्री (प्रत्यय एवं यत्न) में वर्तमान है, न उसे हेतु और प्रत्ययों से विनिर्मुक्त ही कह सकते हैं। अतः आप अपने उक्त वचन के तर्क-बल से तो सभी भावों की स्वभावव्यावृत्ति नहीं कर पायेंगे, क्योंकि लोक में हम देखते हैं कि विना अग्नि के कुछ जलाया नहीं जा सकता, और शस्त्र के अभाव में किसी को काटा नहीं जा सकता, या जल के अभाव में आप किसी वस्तु में आर्द्रता नहीं ला सकते; इसी तरह साधक वचन के अभाव में सभी भावों का प्रतिषेध कैसे किया जा सकता है ! अतः आप का यह कथन कि आपने सभी भावों का प्रतिषेध कर दिया, सिद्ध नहीं होता ॥ १ ॥

प्रतिज्ञाहानि—यदि आप यह कहें—“हमारा यह वचन तो सर्वभावस्वभावसम्पन्न ही है, अतः इसके द्वारा अन्यत्र सर्वत्र भाव-स्वभावों की निवृत्ति की जा सकती है”; तो इस पर हमारा यह कहना है कि इस वाक्य द्वारा सर्वभाव-स्वभावों की निवृत्ति मानने पर आप की उस प्रतिज्ञा का क्या होगा जो कि अभी आप के द्वारा की गयी

है कि “सभी भाव शून्य है”; क्योंकि सब भावों में तो आप का यह वचन भी आ गया, जब कि आप इसे भावस्वभाव से सम्पन्न मानते हैं, शून्य नहीं ।

षट्कोटिकवाद—फिर, इस सिद्धान्त के मानने पर, आप इन छह प्रकार की आपत्तियों से भी घिर जाँयेंगे, जैसे—

१. यदि सभी भाव शून्य हैं तो भवदुक्त यह भाव भी सर्वभावान्तर्गत होने से शून्य माना जायगा, तब उस शून्य से किसका प्रतिषेध होगा ?

२. यदि भवदुक्त वाक्य से सभी भाव शून्य सिद्ध हो जाँय तो आप का यह शून्यतासाधक वाक्य भी शून्य हो जायगा, तब उस शून्य से किसका प्रतिषेध होगा ?

३. और यह मान लिया जाय कि अन्य सब भाव तो शून्य हैं, परन्तु भवदुक्त वाक्य अशून्य है तो जिसके द्वारा प्रतिषेध होगा उससे वह आप का वाक्य सर्वत्र असंगृहीत ही रहेगा, अतः वहाँ दृष्टान्तविरोध भी प्रसक्त होगा ?

४. अथ च, यदि यह भवदुक्त वाक्य सर्वत्र संगृहीत हो जाय और उससे सभी अवशिष्ट भाव शून्य हो जाँय तो आपका उक्त वाक्य भी शून्य माना जायगा, तब वह स्वयं शून्य होने पर, किसका प्रतिषेध करेगा ?

५. और फिर आपके वाक्य को शून्य मानकर उससे सब भावों में शून्यता मानी जाय तो भी वे व्यवहार में स्वकार्यसाधक तो रह ही जाँयेंगे और यह बात लोक में अभीष्ट है नहीं ।

६. और यदि यह माना जाय कि “सभी भाव शून्य हैं, परन्तु दृष्टान्त में विरोध न आ जाय अतः उनमें स्व-स्वकार्यसाधकता भी न मानी जाय” तो आप के उस शून्य वचन से सभी भावों का प्रतिषेध कहाँ उत्पन्न हुआ ? क्योंकि इस मत को मान लेने पर यह विषमता (भेद) आने लगेगी कि कुछ भाव तो शून्य होंगे और कुछ अशून्य । फिर आप को उस विषमता का हेतु बताना पड़ेगा जिसके कारण, कुछ भाव तो शून्य रह गये और कुछ अशून्य । ऐसा हेतु बताया नहीं गया, अतः आप का यह कहना कि “सभी भाव शून्य हैं” यह सिद्ध नहीं हुआ ॥ २ ॥

शब्द का दृष्टान्त—और यदि आप कहें कि लोक में जैसे कोई ‘शब्द न करो’—यह निषेधवाक्य कहता हुआ दूसरों को शब्द करने से रोकता है, वहाँ जैसे शब्द के द्वारा भावी शब्द का निषेध किया गया, वैसे ही हमारे सर्वभावशून्यताबोधक शून्यवचन से सभी भावस्वभावों का व्यावर्तन किया जा रहा है ?”

इसपर हमारा यह कहना है कि आपका यह तर्क भी उपपन्न नहीं होगा, क्योंकि उक्त दृष्टान्त में तो वर्तमान सत् शब्द से भविष्यत्कालिक शब्द का निषेध किया जा रहा है, इसके विपरीत यहाँ आप सत् वचन से सर्वभावस्वभाव का प्रतिषेध नहीं कर

रहे, अपितु आप के मत में तो आप का उक्त वचन और सर्वभावस्वभाव दोनों असत् हैं, तब यहाँ उक्त शब्दवाले दृष्टान्त से समता (सादृश्य) कैसे आयेगी ? ॥ ३ ॥

निषेध का निषेध—और यदि आप यह कहें—“निषेध का निषेध भी इसी कल्पना (तर्क=युक्ति) से उपपन्न (सिद्ध) हो जायगा” तब वहाँ आप जो सर्व-भावस्वभावों के निषेध-वचन का निषेध कर रहे हो—यह बात कैसे बनेगी ? यहाँ हमारा यह कहना है कि यह बात भी अकिञ्चित्कर ही है; क्योंकि आप ही यह प्रतिज्ञा कर रहे हैं, हम तो कर नहीं रहे । बात (पक्ष) आपने उठायी है, हमने नहीं । अतः आपका यह कथन भी उचित नहीं कि निषेध का निषेध भी इसी कल्पना से सिद्ध हो जायगा ॥ ४ ॥

प्रत्यक्षप्रमाण से असिद्धि—और फिर यदि आप प्रत्यक्ष प्रमाण द्वारा सब भावों को उपलब्ध करके भी उनका ‘सभी भाव शून्य हैं’—इस वचन द्वारा निषेध करते हैं तो यह बात तर्क पर नहीं चढ़ती; क्यों कि भवत्सम्मत सिद्धान्त मान लेने पर, प्रत्यक्ष प्रमाण के भी सर्वभावान्तर्गत होने से, उसे भी शून्य माना जायगा । और जो भाव सत् हैं वे भी आप के मत में यदि शून्य हैं तो प्रत्यक्ष प्रमाण द्वारा किसकी उपलब्धि होगी ? और अनुपलब्ध का निषेध क्या होगा ? अतः आप का ‘सभी भाव शून्य है’—यह वचन अनुचित है ॥ ५ ॥

प्रमाणान्तर से भी असिद्धि—और यदि आप कहें कि “प्रत्यक्ष प्रमाण से न सही, अनुमान, आगम या उपमान प्रमाण के बल पर सर्व भावों की उपलब्धि देख कर हम उनकी व्यावृत्ति कर रहे हैं”, तो आप का यह कथन भी उचित नहीं; क्यों कि जिन युक्तियों से आप ने प्रत्यक्षा प्रमाण का खण्डन कर उसे ‘शून्य’ सिद्ध कर दिया, उन्हीं युक्तियों के सहारे अनुमान, आगम एवं उपमान प्रमाण भी शून्य सिद्ध हो जायेंगे; कारण, ये भी तो सर्वभावों के अन्तर्गत ही हैं । यों, इन तीनों प्रमाणों से साध्य अर्थ (भाव) भी, सर्वभावान्तर्गत होने से, शून्य ही सिद्ध होंगे । अथ च, इन अर्थों को उपलब्ध करने वाला भी आपके मत में शून्य है, अतः भावोपलब्धि और अनुपलब्ध-प्रतिषेध—दोनों ही बातें आप के मत में सिद्ध न हो पायेंगी । यों भी, आपका “सभी भाव शून्य हैं”—यह वचन अनर्थक ही है ॥ ६ ॥

भावों की सस्वभावता का औचित्य—अतः हमारे मत में भावों की सस्वभावता ही युक्त है, क्यों कि—

१. आप के धर्मावस्थाविद् (आभिधार्मिक) विद्वज्जन भी मानते हैं कि “११६ कुशल धर्म हैं और उनका स्वभाव है” । अतः आपका यह कहना उचित नहीं कि “सभी भाव निःस्वभाव (शून्य) होते हैं” ॥ ७ ॥

२. इसी तरह—“नैर्गणिक (मुक्ति की तरफ ले जाने वाले) धर्म है, उनका

नैर्याणिक स्वभाव भी है, अनैर्याणिक धर्म भी हैं, उनका अनैर्याणिक धर्मस्वभाव भी है” । जब ऐसा स्वभाव आपके मतानुयायी भी मानते हैं तो आपका यह कथन कैसे उचित हो सकता है कि “सभी धर्म निःस्वभाव (शून्य) हैं” ॥ ८ ॥

३. एक बात और, यदि भावों (धर्मों) का स्वभाव न होता और ये निःस्वभाव ही होते तो इनको उन उन नामों से कैसे आहूत किया जाता ! क्योंकि नाम तो निर्वस्तुक (निर्धर्मक) होता नहीं ॥ ९ ॥

४. प्रतिषेधासिद्धि—और यदि आप यह कहें—“नाम अवस्तुक नहीं होते, अतः हम उनका स्वभाव मान लेते हैं, परन्तु वह धर्मों में सम्भव नहीं, इस तरह उनकी यह धर्मशून्यता धर्मों की निःस्वभावता सिद्ध कर देगी । यों, आपकी बात भी रह जायगी कि धर्म निर्वस्तुक नहीं होते” । यहाँ हमें यह कहना है कि आप यहाँ धर्मों के बिना जिस स्वभाव को मान रहे हैं वह किस अर्थ (= भाव = धर्म) का है ?—यह आप को बताना होगा । क्योंकि वह बताया नहीं गया अतः आप की यह कल्पना कि ‘स्वभाव है, परन्तु वह धर्मों का नहीं’, वह हीन (बेतुकी) है, क्योंकि धर्मों के बिना स्वभाव का प्रतिषेध नहीं हो सकता ॥ १० ॥

५. सत् का ही निषेध होता है, असत् का नहीं—एक बात और ! लोक में सत् (विद्यमान) अर्थ का ही निषेध किया जाता है, असत् का नहीं । जैसे—“घर में घड़ा नहीं है”—इस वाक्य से कभी विद्यमान (सत्) घट का ही निषेध हो रहा है, असत् का नहीं; इसी तरह “धर्मों का स्वभाव नहीं है” इस वाक्य से भी कभी विद्यमान स्वभाव का ही निषेध माना जायगा, असत् का नहीं । अतः आप का यह वचन कि “सभी भाव निःस्वभाव हैं”—यह (प्रतिज्ञावाक्य) नहीं बनेगा; क्योंकि प्रतिषेध सम्भव होने से सभी भावों का स्वभाव सिद्ध हो जाता है ॥ ११ ॥

६. और फिर, आप के मत में जब वह स्वभाव है ही नहीं तो आप “सभी भाव निःस्वभाव हैं”—इस वचन से किसका प्रतिषेध कर रहे हैं ? जो वस्तु है ही नहीं उसका प्रतिषेध तो उसके विषय में कुछ कहे बिना भी प्रतिषिद्ध है । जैसे—अग्नि में शैत्य स्वभाव का अभाव या जल में उष्णता स्वभाव का अभाव बिना कुछ कहे ही प्रतिषिद्ध है ॥ १२ ॥

७. और यदि आप यह समझते हों कि जैसे किसी पण्डित द्वारा किसी मूर्ख को मृगतृष्णा (मृगमरीचिका) में जल की सत्ता की ज्ञाननिवृत्ति हेतु कुछ उपदेश किया जाता है, इसी तरह आप का यह वचन भी निःस्वभाव धर्मों में स्वभावव्यावृत्ति के लिये है ? ॥ १३ ॥

इस पर हमारा यह कहना है कि आपके इस उपदेश के लिये भी तो पहले ये छह बातें (षट्क) होनी चाहियें—१. सत्त्वों का वैसा मिथ्याग्राह, २. मिथ्या ग्राह्य

(विषय), और ३. मिथ्या ग्रहण करने वाला; तथा ४. मिथ्याग्राह का प्रतिषेध, ५. उस प्रतिषेध का विषय (मिथ्याग्राह्य), और ६. मिथ्या ग्रहीता ॥ जब ये छह बातें होंगी तो आपका—“सभी भाव शून्य हैं”—यह वचन कैसे सत्य सिद्ध होगा ? ॥ १४ ॥

८. और यदि आप यह कहें कि आप (शून्यतावादी) का उक्त वचन हमारे द्वारा प्रतिपादित षट्क की प्रतिषेधसिद्धिमात्र के लिये है ? ॥ १५ ॥

तो आपका यह कथन भी उचित नहीं, क्योंकि जब प्रतिषेध, प्रतिषेध्य और प्रतिषेधग्रहीता—तीनों ही नहीं हैं तो सर्वभाव का स्वभाव स्वतः सिद्ध हो जायगा ॥ १६ ॥

९. निर्हेतुकता—एक बात और भी हमारे मत को सिद्ध करती है। वह यह कि आप के “सभी भाव निःस्वभाव हैं” इस (अनुमान) वचन में हेतु कहाँ है ? क्योंकि जब आपके मत में लोक के सभी (यावत्) पदार्थ निःस्वभाव हैं तो उनसे हेतु कहाँ पृथक् रह जायगा कि उसे आप हेतु-रूप में उपस्थापित कर सकें। फिर बिना हेतु के बताये, आप अपनी यह—“सभी भाव निःस्वभाव हैं” वाली बात कैसे सिद्ध कर सकेंगे; क्योंकि प्रतिज्ञामात्र से तो कोई बात सिद्ध नहीं होती ॥ १७ ॥

१०. अब आप यदि यह कहें कि आपका भावों की निःस्वभावता वाला सिद्धान्त अहेतुकतया ही सिद्ध है तो फिर हमारा सर्वभावों की स्वभावता वाला सिद्धान्त भी अहेतुकतया ही क्यों न सिद्ध मान लिया जाय ! ॥ १८ ॥

और यदि आप अनुमानप्रमाण में हेतु का रहना आवश्यक समझते हों तो, बिना हेतु के बताये, “सभी भाव शून्य हैं”—अपना यह वचन आप कैसे सिद्ध कर पायेंगे; क्योंकि लोक में ऐसा कोई भाव है ही नहीं जो निःस्वभाव हो ! ॥ १९ ॥

प्रतिषेध्य की असिद्धि—फिर आप क्या मानते हैं कि—

(क) पहले प्रतिषेध उत्पन्न हुआ, बाद में प्रतिषेध ? ऐसा मानने से आपको क्या मिलेगा ! क्योंकि जब प्रतिषेध्य होगा ही नहीं तो आप प्रतिषेध किसका करोगे ?

(ख) और फिर पहले प्रतिषेध्य एवं बाद में प्रतिषेध की उत्पत्ति मानोगे तो जब एक बार प्रतिषेध्य सिद्ध हो ही गया तो फिर आप प्रतिषेध किसका करोगे ?

(ग) या फिर दोनों की युगपद् उत्पत्ति मानोगे तो भी आप अपनी बात सिद्ध नहीं कर सकेंगे; क्योंकि दोनों शशविषाणों की युगपदुत्पत्ति मान लेने पर, न वाम शशविषाण दक्षिण शशविषाण की उत्पत्ति में कारण होता है, न दक्षिण शशविषाण वाम की उत्पत्ति में। अतः आपका “सब कुछ शून्य है”—यह सिद्धान्त कथमपि सिद्ध नहीं हो सकता ? ॥ २० ॥

सिद्धान्तपक्ष

शून्यवादियों का उत्तर

अब आचार्य (शून्यवादी) भावस्वभाववादी के पूर्वपक्ष (शङ्का) का क्रमशः उत्तर देते हैं—“सभी भाव शून्य हैं” इस वचन के स्वीकार कर लेने पर भी भावों की

निःस्वभावता युक्त ही है। हाँ, आपने इसके विरोध में जो यह कहा था कि 'यदि सभी भावों का स्वभाव नहीं मानोगे तो आप का यह वचन भी निःस्वभाव होते हुए अन्य भावों के स्वभाव का निवर्तक कैसे बनेगा ? (का= १)

इसके उत्तर में हमारा यह कहना है—हमारा वचन भी 'सभी भावों के हेतु या हेतु प्रत्ययसामग्री में पृथक् या समवेत रूप से स्वभाव विद्यमान नहीं है'—इस वचन से निःस्वभाव ही सिद्ध हो गया और ऐसा होने से इसे भी शून्य मानना पड़ेगा। यों, निश्चय ही, जैसे हमारा यह वचन निःस्वभाव होने से शून्य है, वैसे ही अन्य भाव भी निःस्वभाव होने से शून्य हैं ॥ २१ ॥

[प्रसङ्गवश आचार्य 'शून्यता' का वास्तविक अर्थ बता रहे हैं—] आप जो यह कह रहे हैं कि 'हमारा वचन, स्वयं शून्य होने से, अन्य भावों की शून्यता सिद्ध करने में समर्थ नहीं है', यह बात नहीं है; क्योंकि आप अस्मत्प्रयुक्त 'शून्यता' शब्द का वास्तविक अर्थ नहीं समझ रहे हैं। हम 'शून्यता' शब्द लोकसम्मत अर्थ (= किसी से रहित होना) में प्रयुक्त नहीं कर रहे। अपितु हमारा मन्तव्य यह है कि भावों का प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्न (परस्पर सापेक्ष) भाव ही 'शून्यता' है। ऐसी शून्यता के के माध्यम से ही हम सभी भावों की निःस्वभावता मानते हैं। अब आप भी यह बात समझ सकते हैं कि जो भाव प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्न (परस्पर सापेक्ष) हैं वे स्वभाव हो ही नहीं सकते; क्योंकि उनके हेतु-प्रत्ययसापेक्ष होने से उनमें स्वभाव है ही नहीं। यदि भाव वस्तुतः सस्वभाव होते तो हेतुप्रत्यय की अपेक्षा के बिना भी उनकी सत्ता होती। ऐसी बात है नहीं, अतः निःस्वभाव होने से उन्हें शून्य ही मानना पड़ेगा।

इसी तरह अस्मदुक्त वह वचन भी प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्न होने के कारण शून्य है। अब रही बात लोकव्यवहार की, तो जैसे रथ-घट-पटादि पदार्थ स्वभावशून्य होते हुए भी अपने-अपने काष्ठ-तृण-मृत्तिका आहरणादि, दूध जल मधु का धारण या शीत वात आतप से शरीर-रक्षा आदि कार्यों में प्रवृत्त होते हैं; उसी तरह हमारा वह प्रतिज्ञा-वचन, प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्न होने के कारण निःस्वभाव होने से, शून्य होने पर भी भावों की निःस्वभावता सिद्ध कर ही सकता है। अतः आपकी युक्ति से हमारे पक्ष का खण्डन नहीं होता ॥ २२ ॥

मायापुरुष का दृष्टान्त— एक बात और ! जैसे कोई ऐन्द्रजालिक (जादूगर) अपने इन्द्रजाल (जादू) के प्रभाव से एक मायापुरुष (कृत्रिम मूर्ति) बनावे और और वह मूर्ति (स्वयं कृत्रिम होने पर भी) उस ऐन्द्रजालिक के संकेतविशेष से अन्य लौकिक पुरुषों को विधि-निषेध में प्रवृत्त कराती है तो जैसे वह मायापुरुष, स्वयं कृत्रिम होने पर भी, अन्य की विधि निषेध-प्रवृत्ति में समर्थ है, उसी तरह हमारा यह प्रतिज्ञावाक्य, स्वयं शून्य होते हुए भी, अन्य भावों की शून्यता सिद्ध कर सकता

है । अतः उक्त वाक्य के प्रति आपका विरोध अयुक्तियुक्त ही है । अथ च-इसी युक्ति के आपके पूर्वोक्त षट्कोटिक वाद का भी निराकरण किया जा सकता है ॥ २३ ॥

प्रतिज्ञा-हानि दोष भी नहीं—आपका यह कहना भी नहीं बनता कि—“यदि सभी भावों को स्वभावशून्य मान लिया जाय तो उक्त प्रतिज्ञावाक्य, सभी भावों के अन्तर्गत आ जाने से स्वयं शून्य होने के कारण, दूसरो में शून्यता क्या सिद्ध कर पायगा ! यदि किसी कारण (हेतु) से कर ही दे तो वह विशेष हेतु आप को पृथक् से बताना पड़ेगा, अन्यथा आपको कथन में विषमता आजायगी” (का. २)

क्योंकि हमारा यह प्रतिज्ञावाक्य तो, प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्न होने के कारण, हमारा सस्वभाव है ही नहीं । अतः यदि हम यह कहते हैं—“हमारा यह वचन भी शून्य है और शेष सर्वभाव भी शून्य है , तो इसमें विषमता का प्रश्न ही कहाँ उठता है ! हाँ, यदि हम कहते कि “हमारा प्रतिज्ञावाक्य तो सस्वभाव है, अवशिष्ट सभी भाव शून्य है”, तब हमारे कथन में विषमता का आरोप हो सकता था ! ऐसा तो हमने कहा नहीं, अतः हमारे कथन में न तो कोई विषमता आती है और न एतदर्थ कोई पृथक् हेतु देने की आवश्यकता प्रतीत होती है ॥ २४ ॥

शब्द के दृष्टान्त का निषेध—और ‘शब्द न करिये’ (का० ३) वाला दृष्टान्त भी हमारे विरुद्ध नहीं है, क्योंकि उक्त दृष्टान्त में किसी शब्द (संत्) के द्वारा अन्य शब्द (संत्) का प्रतिषेध किया गया है, जबकि हमारा कथन है कि “सभी भाव निःस्वभाव हैं, निःस्वभाव होने से शून्य हैं ।” इसमें आपका शब्दवाला दृष्टान्त कैसे सङ्गत होगा ! ॥ २५ ॥

क्योंकि यदि नैःस्वभाव्य हेतु से नैःस्वभाव्यसम्पन्न का प्रतिषेध किया जाता तब तो आपका दृष्टान्त हम पर उपपन्न होता । पर हम तो भावों की शून्यता प्रतिपादित कर रहे हैं, न कि अशून्यता । तब आप का यह तर्क हमारे विरुद्ध कैसे जायगा ! ॥ २६ ॥

अथवा—जैसे कोई पुरुष अपने में, इन्द्रजाल द्वारा निर्मित किसी कृत्रिम स्त्री-मूर्ति में वास्तविक स्त्री होने का भ्रम उत्पन्न कर ले, उस भ्रम के उत्पन्न होने पर उस कृत्रिम स्त्री में उसका राग हो जाय; तब उसके उस राग को दृष्टान्त के लिये तथागत या उन्हीं जैसा उनका कोई योग्य शिष्य उस मूर्ति के विपरीत इन्द्रजाल उत्पन्न कर दे, उससे उसका वह उस मूर्ति के प्रति राग निवृत्त हो जाय, इसी तरह उस कृत्रिम स्त्री-मूर्ति के तुल्य मेरे शून्यताप्रतिपादक वचन से सभी भावों में कृत्रिम सस्वभावता निवृत्त हो जाती है । अतः यह दृष्टान्त शून्यतासाधक के प्रति ही उत्पन्न हो सकता है, अन्य के प्रति नहीं ॥ २७ ॥

अथवा—आपका यह ‘शब्द न करिये’ वाला हेतु साध्यसम है; क्योंकि अन्य भावों की तरह, उसके प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्न होने से, ध्वनि की सत्ता वस्तुतः है ही नहीं ।

अतः आपका यह कथन कि 'शब्द के सत् होने पर ही उसके द्वारा किसी का वारण सम्भव है' खण्डित हो जाता है ।

फिर दूसरी बात यह भी है कि हम व्यवहार का आलम्बन लेकर यह कह रहे हैं कि 'सभी भाव शून्य है' । विना व्यवहारसत्य का सहारा लिये, धर्मदेशना हो ही नहीं सकती, न ही निर्वाण की अधिगति हो सकती है । अतः मेरे वचन की तरह सभी भाव शून्य हैं, और सभी भावों की शून्यता—ये दोनों ही बातें उपपन्न हो जाती है ॥ २८ ॥

और आप जो यह कह रहे थे कि प्रतिषेध का प्रतिषेध भी आप के असत् वचन द्वारा नहीं हो सकता ! अतः आप की प्रतिज्ञाहानि है । वहाँ हमारा यह कहना है कि हमारी कोई प्रतिज्ञा होती तो हमें प्रतिज्ञाहानि-दोष लगता । हमारी कोई प्रतिज्ञा है ही नहीं, तो हमारे प्रति प्रतिज्ञाहानि का उपालम्भ कैसा ! ॥ २९ ॥

प्रमाणासिद्धि—पीछे (का० ५, ६) आपने यह भी कहा था कि "प्रत्यक्षादि प्रमाणों से किसी एक के सहारे आप भावों की सत्तानिवृत्ति कह रहे हैं, परन्तु आपका सिद्धान्त मान लेने पर प्रमाण ही सिद्ध नहीं होते, तब उन्हें लेकर किस अर्थ (प्रमेय) की शून्यता सिद्ध करेंगे", इस पर हमारा यह कहना है कि यदि हम किसी अर्थ की चारों प्रमाणों से या उनमें से किसी एक से, उपलब्ध कर रहे हों उस तरफ प्रवृत्त हो रहे हों, या उससे निवृत्त हो रहे हो, तब तो आपका कहना उचित हो सकता है; परन्तु हम तो उन प्रमाणों द्वारा किसी अर्थ की सत्ता उपलब्ध ही नहीं कर पा रहे हैं । तब हमारे प्रति आप का यह उपर्युक्त उपालम्भ कैसा ! ॥ ३० ॥

फिर एक प्रश्न और उठता है कि—जब प्रमाणों से किसी अर्थ (प्रमेय) की सत्तासिद्धि मानोगे तो उन चारों प्रमाणों की सत्ता कैसे सिद्ध करोगे ? ॥ ३१ ॥

यदि यह कहो कि विना किसी अन्य प्रमाण के प्रमाणों की सत्ता है तो आप प्रतिज्ञा से न्युत हो जाँयगे कि 'प्रमाणों से ही सब प्रमेयों की सत्ता सिद्ध होती है' । और यदि यह मानो कि अन्य प्रमाणों से इन प्रमाणों की सिद्धि होती है तो आपके पक्ष में अनवस्थादोष उपस्थित होने लगेगा ।

अनवस्था दोष उपस्थित होने पर यह हानि होगी कि आदि मध्य और अन्त्य प्रमाणों में से किसी की भी सिद्धि नहीं हो पायगी ॥ ३२ ॥

यदि आप यह कहो कि "उन प्रमाणों की तो विना अन्य प्रमाणों के ही सिद्धि हो जाती है, और प्रमेयों की सिद्धि इन प्रमाणों से होती है", तो आपका वह वाद (सिद्धान्त) खण्डित हो जायगा कि 'अर्थों की सिद्धि प्रमाणों से ही होती है' । और आपकी उक्त बात मानने पर विषमता भी आने लगेगी कि कुछ अर्थों की सिद्धि प्रमाणों से होगी और कुछ की नहीं । और तब इस विषमता के लिये कुछ हेतु देना

पड़ेगा कि इस हेतु से कुछ अर्थों की सिद्धि प्रमाणों से होती है, और कुछ की नहीं। ऐसा हेतु आपने बताया नहीं, अतः आप की यह कल्पना भी उचित नहीं ॥ ३३ ॥

अग्नि के दृष्टान्त से भी स्वतः सिद्धि नहीं—भावस्वभाववादी यहाँ इसी बात को दूसरी तरह से उठाते हैं कि प्रमाण, अग्नि की तरह, स्वयं (अपने आप) को और दूसरों (प्रमेयों) को सिद्ध (प्रकाशित) करते हैं। इस पर शून्यतावादियों का कहना है—

आपका यह कथन वैषम्य दोष ग्रस्त है कि अग्नि की तरह प्रमाण स्वयं को और दूसरे प्रमेयों को प्रकाशित करते हैं, क्योंकि अग्नि से अप्रकाशित घट अन्धकार में नहीं दिखायी देता, और बाद में अग्नि से प्रकाशित होने पर वह दिखायी देने लगता है। यदि अग्नि स्वतः प्रकाशित होने की सामर्थ्य रखती तो अन्धकार में उसे पहले भी प्रकाशित रहना चाहिये था, ऐसा होता है नहीं। अतः आपकी अग्निदृष्टान्त की कल्पना भी निरर्थक ही है ॥ ३४ ॥

अथ च, यदि भावस्वभाववादी बात मान ली जाय तो अग्नि जैसे दूसरों को जलाती है वैसे ही अपने आपको जलाने लगेगी। अतः आपका सिद्धान्त उपपन्न नहीं होता ॥ ३५ ॥

यदि आपकी बात को मान ही ले कि अग्नि स्वयं को व दूसरों को प्रकाशित करती है तो अग्नि का प्रतिपक्ष अन्धकार भी स्वयं को तथा दूसरों को अपने आप आच्छादित करने लगेगा ॥ ३६ ॥

सबसे बड़ी बात यह है कि न तो अग्नि में अन्धकार है, न जहाँ अग्नि है वहाँ अन्धकार है। वस्तुतः अन्धकार के नाश को प्रकाश कहते हैं। जब अग्नि में अन्धकार नहीं है और न जहाँ अग्नि है वहाँ अन्धकार है तो वह अग्नि किसका प्रतिघात करती है कि जिसके प्रतिघात से वह स्वयं को तथा दूसरे घट-पटादिक को प्रकाशित करती है ? ॥ ३७ ॥

इस पर भावस्वभाववादी कहते हैं—हम नहीं मानते कि अग्नि में तम है, न जहाँ अग्नि है वहाँ तम है, अपितु उत्पद्यमान अग्नि द्वारा तम का प्रतिघात होता है। अतः यह मानने की आवश्यकता नहीं है कि अग्नि में तम है या जहाँ अग्नि है वहाँ तम है। इसलिये यह माना जा सकता है कि उत्पद्यमान अग्नि ही स्व और पर को प्रकाशित करती है ?

इसका शून्यवादी उत्तर देते हैं—आपका यह कथन भी उचित नहीं कि उत्पद्यमान अग्नि ही स्व या पर को प्रकाशित करती है; क्योंकि यह आवश्यक नहीं कि उत्पद्यमान अग्नि भी तम को दूर कर ही दे। यदि वह उसके पास तक न पहुँचा दी जाय। पास न पहुँचने से तम का उपघात नहीं हो पाता। तम का उपघात न होने से प्रकाश नहीं होता ॥ ३८ ॥

एक बात यह भी है कि यदि आप यह मानते हैं कि अग्नि अप्राप्त (विना अन्धकार के पास पहुँचे) ही अन्धकार का नाश करती है तब तो हमारे सम्मुख वाली अग्नि को समग्र संसार के अन्धकार का नाश कर देना चाहिये। परन्तु ऐसा देखा नहीं गया है, अतः आपका उक्त कथन भी समीचीन नहीं ॥ ३६ ॥

प्रमेयों से प्रमाणसिद्धि नहीं—यदि आप अग्नि की तरह प्रमाणों की स्वतः सिद्धि मानते हो तो प्रमेयों की अपेक्षा के बिना भी प्रमाणसिद्धि हो जायगी, कारण कि स्वतःसिद्धि पर की अपेक्षा नहीं किया करती ! यदि उसे कोई अपेक्षा है तो स्वतः सिद्धि कैसी ! ॥ ४० ॥

यदि यह कहो कि प्रमाण यदि प्रमेय अर्थों की अपेक्षा न करें तो क्या दोष हो जायगा ? इस पर हमारा यह कहना है कि यदि प्रमेय अर्थों की अपेक्षा किये बिना ही प्रमाणसिद्धि मानोगे तो वे प्रमाण किसी के लिये 'प्रमाण' नहीं भी होंगे—यही दोष होगा। और जिनको प्रमेय के बिना भी जब प्रमाणसिद्धि हो जायगी तब तुम्हारी वह प्रतिज्ञा कहाँ रह जायगी कि प्रमेय की अपेक्षा के बिना प्रमाणसिद्धि नहीं हुआ करती ॥ ४१ ॥

यदि हम यह मान लें कि प्रमाणों को समझने के लिये उन्हें आवश्यक रूप से उनके विषयों (प्रमेयों) के सन्दर्भ में ही समझना होगा, तो इसमें क्या हानि है ? ऐसा मानने पर प्रमाणों को पहले से ही सत्तावान् मानना होगा। कारण यह है कि जो सत्तावान् नहीं है उसे किसी अन्य की अपेक्षा नहीं हो सकती।

इस मान्यता से कि प्रमाण तत्सम्बन्धी विषयों के सन्दर्भ में ही अस्तित्व में आते हैं एवं इस प्रकार उनकी अपेक्षा करते हैं, 'अस्तित्ववान् को अस्तित्व में लाने का तत्त्वमीमांसीय दोष उपस्थित होता है, जो कि वस्तुतः 'सिद्धसाधन' नामक दोष ही है। जब कोई तार्किक अपने प्रतिपक्षी को विश्वास दिलाने के लिये किसी ऐसे तथ्य को सिद्ध करना चाहता है जिस पर दूसरे को कोई विवाद ही नहीं है तो प्रथम (वादी) पर सिद्ध तथ्य को सिद्ध करने का दोष लगता है। यह शक्ति एवं तर्क कुशलता का अपव्ययमात्र है।

यहाँ आचार्य द्वारा प्रयुक्त 'सिद्धसाधन' पद की द्विविध व्याख्या सम्भव है। सिद्धि के साधनों के रूप में प्रमाणों की सिद्धि १. स्वतः (उन्हीं के बल पर) या २. प्रमेयों द्वारा मानी जा सकती है। आचार्य ने प्रथम विकल्प को विचारयोग्य नहीं माना एवं द्वितीय की विस्तृत समीक्षा की है। यदि यह मान लिया जाय कि प्रमाण अपने विषयों की अपेक्षा से उत्पन्न होते हैं, तो प्रमाणों को निष्पन्न तथ्यों के रूप में पहले से ही विद्यमान स्वीकार करना होगा। निश्चित रूप से, जब कोई वस्तु अन्य पर निर्भर जानी जाती है, तब यह स्वीकार करना आवश्यक होता है कि निर्भर रहने वाली वस्तु पहले से सत्ताप्राप्त है। केवल सत्तावान् वस्तु ही किसी

पर आश्रित हो सकती है या किसी की अपेक्षा कर सकती है। यदि ऐसा है, तो अन्य तथ्य पर निर्भर होने का प्रश्न, चाहे वह अस्तित्व में आने के लिये हो या उसके प्रमाण के लिये हो, पूर्णतया निरर्थक हो जाता है ॥ ४२ ॥

पुनः, यदि यह मानें कि प्रमाण प्रमेयों की अपेक्षा से सिद्ध होते हैं, तो प्रमेयों की सिद्धि प्रमाणों पर निर्भर नहीं रह जायेगी।

यदि प्रमाण अपनी सिद्धि के लिये या अपने अस्तित्व के लिये प्रमेयों पर निर्भर माने जाँय तो प्रमेयों का स्वतन्त्र अस्तित्व पहले से है—यह मानना होगा। इस स्थितिमें प्रमेयों की सिद्धि प्रमाणों के बिना ही हो जायेगी। किन्तु यह सर्वथा असङ्गत है, अतः निश्चित है कि जिन विषयों की सिद्धि की जानी है, उन्हें उन प्रमाणों की सिद्धि करने वाला नहीं माना जा सकता, जो कि स्वयं ही प्रथम (प्रमेयों) की सिद्धि के लिये अपेक्षित है ॥ ४३ ॥

यदि ज्ञेय या साध्य (विषय) को प्रमाणों की अपेक्षा के बिना ही ज्ञात या सिद्ध मान लिया जाय, तो द्वितीय (प्रमाण) का अन्वेषण पूर्णतया अनावश्यक हो जायेगा। विषयों की सिद्धि के लिये ही तो प्रमाणों की अपेक्षा होती है। एवं यदि विषय स्वयं ही पहले से ज्ञात हैं एवं इस प्रकार किसी भी प्रमाण से स्वतन्त्र हैं, तो विभिन्न प्रमाणों एवं उनके प्रयोग की धारणा पूर्णतया व्यर्थ है ॥ ४४ ॥

पुनः, यदि आप यह माने कि प्रमाण प्रमेयों के द्वारा अस्तित्व में आते हैं एवं कार्य करते हैं, तो (इस मान्यता से) प्रमाण एवं प्रमेय के बीच जो सम्बन्ध है उसका व्यत्यय (उलट-पुलट) हो जायेगा।

यदि अस्तित्व में आने एवं कार्य करने के लिये प्रमाण प्रमेयों पर निर्भर माने जाँय, तब असङ्गति नामक आपत्ति का तो निराकरण हो जायेगा—इसमें सन्देह नहीं है। तथापि, तार्किक क्षेत्र में गम्भीर समस्या उठ खड़ी होगी। प्रमाणों एवं प्रमेयों की स्थिति उलटी-पुलटी हो जायेगी। प्रमाणों का प्रमेय के रूप में अवमूल्यन हो जायेगी एवं प्रमेय प्रमाणों की स्थिति में ऊँचे उठ जायेंगे। कारण यह कि उनके कार्यों में ही पूरी तरह से परिवर्तन आ जायेगा। प्रमेय को प्रमाण की स्थिति प्राप्त होने पर यह प्रमाण की सिद्धि के साधन (अर्थात् प्रमाण का प्रमाण) के रूप में अवमूल्यन हो जायेगा, क्योंकि इसका अस्तित्व एवं सक्रियता प्रमेयों के ऊपर निर्भर होगी। स्थिति या कार्य के परस्पर परिवर्तन से जो व्यत्यय होगा उससे उन सभी की तार्किक चेतना पर आघात पहुँचेगा, जो कि तार्किकपरम्परा पर आधृत हैं ॥ ४५ ॥

यदि आप यह मानते हैं कि प्रमाण की सिद्धि से प्रमेय की सिद्धि होती है, क्योंकि प्रमेय प्रमाण की अपेक्षा करता है, एवं प्रमेय की सिद्धि से प्रमाण की सिद्धि होती है; क्योंकि प्रमाण प्रमेय की अपेक्षा करता है; तो (वस्तुतः) दोनों की ही सिद्धि नहीं हो पायेगी ॥ ४६ ॥

क्यों कि (आपके मतानुसार) प्रमाणों द्वारा प्रमेय सिद्ध होते हैं एवं वे ही प्रमाण उन्हीं प्रमेयों के द्वारा सिद्ध किये जाते हैं । यदि ऐसा है तो प्रमेय प्रमाणों के अस्तित्व के लिये उत्तरदायी होंगे, एवं यदि प्रमेय को पुनः अपने अस्तित्व के लिये प्रमाण पर निर्भर माना जाय, तो प्रमेय प्रमाण को अस्तित्व प्रदान करने में समर्थ नहीं होगा ।

यदि एक की सिद्धि एवं अस्तित्व दूसरे पर निर्भर हो एवं दूसरे की पहले पर तो दोनों में से किसी का भी स्वतन्त्र अस्तित्व नहीं होगा । दूसरे शब्दों में, दोनों ही अस्तित्वहीन होंगे । इस प्रकार पहला दूसरे की सिद्धि नहीं कर पायेगा । यों, दोनों सापेक्षों की पारस्परिक निर्भरता दोनों को ही अस्तित्वहीन, एवं काल्पनिक बना देती हैं ॥ ४७ ॥

दूसरी विधि से : यदि प्रमेयों के द्वारा प्रमाण सिद्ध होते हैं एवं वे ही प्रमेय उन्हीं प्रमाणों के द्वारा सिद्ध होने योग्य हैं, तो कैसे वे प्रमेय प्रमाणों की सिद्धि कर सकेंगे, जो कि अपने अस्तित्व एवं कार्य के लिये उन प्रमेयों पर निर्भर हैं, जो उनके द्वारा सिद्ध किये जाते हैं ?

जहाँ हम किसी एक पद के बारे में यह समझने में असमर्थ होते हैं कि वह उत्पात्ति या ज्ञान के सन्दर्भ में दूसरे पद से स्वतन्त्र रूप में किस प्रकार अस्तित्ववान् है, वहाँ 'अन्योन्याश्रय दोष' होता है । ज्ञातव्य है कि इसके मूल में कार्य-कारण सम्बन्ध है, जिससे कि कोई एक पद अपने अस्तित्व या सिद्धि के लिये दूसरे पर निर्भर माना जाता है । कारण एवं कार्य कभी एक नहीं हो सकते ॥ ४८ ॥

[प्रतीत होता है कि नागार्जुन चक्रक तर्क में निहित दोष के संकेतमात्र से सन्तुष्ट नहीं हैं, अतः वे एक ऐसा ठोस उदाहरण देते हैं जो कि इस प्रकार के वैचारिक वाद में निहित असंगति के बारे में मन्द से मन्द बुद्धि वाले को भी विश्वास दिला सकता है]

यदि कोई कहे कि पुत्र वह है जो कि पिता द्वारा उत्पन्न होता है एवं पुनः पिता उसी पुत्र द्वारा उत्पन्न मान लिया जाय तो हम ऐसे कथन के वक्ता के प्रति यह आपत्ति कर सकते हैं कौन पुत्र है एवं कौन पिता ? कौन किसे उत्पन्न करता है ? ऐसे कथन की असङ्गति के बारे में अधिक कहने की आवश्यकता नहीं है । कारण कि यह असङ्गति तत्काल स्पष्टरूप से प्रत्येक व्यक्ति को प्रतीत होती है ।

आचार्य नागार्जुन का दावा है कि यही असङ्गति इस मान्यता में भी निहित है कि प्रमेय की सिद्धि प्रमाण से एवं प्रमाण की सिद्धि प्रमेय से होती है । मुख्य विचारणीय प्रश्न यह है कि ऐसी स्थिति में यह कोई नहीं समझ सकता कि सिद्धि का साधन (प्रभाव) कौन है एवं इसके द्वारा साध्य कौन है ? इससे कोई अन्तर नहीं पड़ता कि उनके बीच का सम्बन्ध 'उत्पादक एवं उत्पन्न' का है, 'साधक एवं साध्य'

का है या 'ज्ञाता एवं ज्ञेय' का है। प्रथम स्थिति में तो दोनों पदों के बीच कार्य-कारण सम्बन्ध सीधे-सीधे उपस्थित है एवं बाद के दोनों में यह सम्बन्ध उन्हीं के बोधों के बीच रहता है। चाहे प्रमाण प्रमेय पर अपने अस्तित्व के लिये निर्भर हो या प्रथम का ज्ञान द्वितीय पर, अथवा इसका उलटा हो, परस्परश्रय दोष सभी स्थितियों में रहेगा ॥ ४६ ॥

हम प्रतिपक्षी से कहते हैं कि वह सिद्ध करे कि उपर्युक्त उदाहरण में कौन पिता है एवं कौन पुत्र ? हमें सन्देह होना स्वाभाविक है; क्योंकि दोनों को ही पिता को एवं पुत्र के लक्षणों से युक्त बतलाया गया है।

उपरोक्त उदाहरण में यह समझना अत्यधिक कठिन है कि कौन पिता है एवं कौन पुत्र है। दोनों पितृत्व एवं युत्रत्व के लक्षणों से युक्त हैं, क्योंकि दोनों को उत्पादक भी माना गया है एवं उत्पन्न पुत्र। परन्तु उत्पादन करने के कारण, दोनों ही पिता माने जाने चाहिये। एवं दोनों को ही उत्पन्न होने के कारण पुत्र माना जाना चाहिये। पर सन्देह पूर्णतः उचित ही है, तथापि इससे कोई समाधान नहीं मिलता। कारण कि कोई भी लक्षण ऐसा नहीं जो एक से दूसरे को विविकृत कर सके।

उन्हीं दोनों व्यक्तियों के परस्पर पिता भी एवं पुत्र भी होने का यह जो समानान्तरवाद है, वह प्रमाण एवं प्रमेय के बारे में भी वैसे ही उत्पन्न होता है। जब एक ही वस्तु को प्रमाण एवं उसका प्रमेय मानते हैं एवं एक ही वस्तु को प्रमेय एवं उसका प्रमाण, तो यह स्थिति पूर्णतः समानान्तर होती है। उनको प्रमाण के रूप या प्रमेय के रूप में निर्धारित करने की समस्या ठीक वैसी ही है।

भावों (धर्मों) की सस्वभावता इसलिये भी नहीं मानी जा सकती; क्योंकि सभी भाव प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्न हैं। पीछे आपने जो यह कहा कि "आभिधर्मिकों ने कुशल धर्मों का स्वभाव माना है" (७ का०), उस पर हमारा यह कहना है कि आभिधर्मिक कुशल धर्मों का यदि स्वभाव मानते होते तो वे उनका विभागशः निरूपण भी करते कि 'यह कुशल धर्मों का स्वभाव है', 'यह कुशल धर्म है', 'यह कुशल-विज्ञान है', 'यह कुशल-विज्ञान का स्वभाव है', इसी तरह वे सर्वत्र विभाजन करते। ऐसा उनके द्वारा किया गया हो-ऐसा प्रमाण तो नहीं मिलता, आपका यह कहना कि 'आभिधर्मिकों ने धर्मों का स्वभाव निरूपित किया है', कथन सिद्ध नहीं होता ॥ ५०-५२ ॥

वस्तुसत्य यह है कि कुशल धर्मों का जो भी स्वभाव प्रतीत होता है वह हेतु-प्रत्ययसामग्री की अपेक्षा करके ही प्रतीत होता है। यों, परकीय भाव से उत्पन्न स्वभाव कुशल धर्मों का कैसे माना जा सकता है ! अकुशल धर्मों के स्वभाव के विषय में भी यही समझना चाहिये। अतः आप का धर्मों का स्वभावबोधक कथन प्रमाणित नहीं होता ॥ ५३ ॥

और फिर आप यदि यह मानें कि कुशल धर्मों का कुशल स्वभाव, अकुशल धर्मों का अकुशल स्वभाव एवं अव्याकृत धर्मों का अव्याकृत स्वभाव किसी हेतुप्रत्यय-सामग्री की अपेक्षा करके नहीं, अपितु स्वतः उत्पन्न होता है; तब तो हमारे प्रतीत्य-समुत्पाद सिद्धान्त का ही विलोप हो जायगा और इस सिद्धान्त के विलुप्त होने पर आभिधार्मिक किसके सहारे धर्म-साधना करेगा ! कारण कि प्रतीत्यसमुत्पाद सिद्धान्त न मानने पर (सौगत) दर्शन का आधार ही क्या रह जायगा ! तब धर्मसाक्षात्कार भी किसके सहारे होगा ! जबकि भगवान् ने अपने श्रीमुख से ही प्रतिपादित किया था कि “भिक्षुओ ! जो प्रतीत्यसमुत्पाद को जानता है वही धर्म को जान सकता है” । यों प्रतीत्यसमुत्पाददर्शन माने बिना धर्मसाधना निराधार ही रह जायगी ॥ ५४ ॥

एक बात और, प्रतीत्यसमुत्पाद का प्रत्याख्यान करने पर न धर्म ही सिद्ध कर पाओगे, न अधर्म ही, और न कोई लौकिक व्यवहार ही सिद्ध कर पाओगे; क्योंकि लौकिक व्यवहार तो प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्न हैं । दूसरी बात यह है कि सभी भावों को सस्वभाव और निर्हेतुक मानोगे तो वे नित्य सिद्ध होने लगेंगे । तो भी वह पूर्वोक्त धर्मसाधना की निरर्थकता वाला दोष उनके गले पड़ जायगा और ‘अनित्य’ ‘अनात्म’ वाला आभिधार्मिक का सिद्धान्त ही विखण्डित हो जायगा । भगवान् ने तो सभी संस्कारों को अनित्य अनात्म माना है ॥ ५५ ॥

इसी तरह अकुशल, अव्याकृत और मुक्ति की ओर ले जाने वाले धर्मों के विषय में भी समझना चाहिये । अतः कुशलादि धर्मों की स्वभावता मानने वाली तुम्हारी बात सिद्ध नहीं होती ॥ ५६ ॥

और आपने जो धर्मों की सस्वभावता में दूसरी युक्ति (९वीं का०) दी थी कि निर्वस्तुक (निधर्मक) का नाम (संज्ञा) नहीं होता अतः धर्मों का स्वभाव पड़ेगा । उसके विषय में हमारा कहना है कि जो यह कहता है—‘सत् सस्वभाव ही होगा’ उसको यह उत्तर देना चाहिये—यदि सत् स्वभाव की ही संज्ञा होती है तो उस स्वभाव को सत् मानना पड़ेगा; क्योंकि असत् स्वभाव की संज्ञा सत् कैसे होगी ! हम संज्ञा को तो सत् मानते नहीं । अतः भावस्वभाव के असत् होने से नाम भी असत् है अतः वह भी शून्य है । यों आपका उक्त वचन असङ्गत है ॥ ५७ ॥

और आप का यह कहना भी असङ्गत है कि ‘नाम का स्वभाव सत् होता है’ । क्योंकि यह नाम, जो कि असत् है, वह सत् का है ? या असत् का ? दोनों ही पक्षों में आप का उक्त प्रतिज्ञावचन युक्तियुक्त नहीं है । वहाँ यदि सत् (स्वभाव) असत् का नाम है वह असत् अब सत् कैसे हो जायगा । और यदि ‘असत् का असत् नाम है’—ऐसा मानते हो तो हम पूछते हैं कि जो असत् है उसका नाम क्या और

कैसे होगा । अतः आपका यह (असत् नाम का स्वभाव सत् है) कथन अयुक्ति-युक्त है ॥ ५८ ॥

और फिर हम तो सभी भावों की शून्यता पहले ही युक्तिपूर्वक सिद्ध कर चुके हैं, वहीं हमने नाम की शून्यता भी सिद्ध कर दी है । फिर भी आप अशून्यता की सम्भावना मानकर ही हमको प्रतिज्ञाभङ्ग का उपालम्भ दे रहे हैं कि भावों का स्वभाव न मानोगे तो इनका कोई नाम भी नहीं होगा । हम तो नाम को सत् मानते ही नहीं तो हम पर प्रतिज्ञाभङ्ग का दोष कैसा ? ॥ ५९ ॥

और जो आपने यह कहा कि—“यदि स्वभाव सत्तावान् होते हुए भी किसी धर्म का नहीं है तो आपको यह बताना पड़ेगा कि वह स्वभाव आखिर रहता कहाँ है ?” (का-१०)—इस पर हमारा यह उत्तर है कि न तो हम धर्मों के स्वभाव का प्रतिषेध कर रहे हैं, न धर्मविनिर्मुक्त किसी अर्थ का स्वभावबोधन करते हैं । ऐसी स्थिति में आपका उपयुक्त उपालम्भ हम पर कैसे बनेगा ! ॥ ६० ॥

आपने पीछे (११वीं कारिका में) जो प्रश्न उठाया था कि किसी समय सत् (वर्तमान) का ही प्रतिषेध होता है, असत् का नहीं; क्योंकि जो असत् है उसका प्रतिषेध क्या होगा ? इसपर हमारा यह कहना है कि असत् का भी प्रतिषेध तो हो ही सकता है । अतः हमारी भावों की निःस्वभावता वाले सिद्धान्त का खण्डन कैसे होगा ॥ ६१ ॥

फिर आप हमारी इस शून्यता का खण्डन करते हो और शून्यता को असत् ही मानते हो, इससे तो आपकी ही इस प्रतिज्ञा का खण्डन होगा कि सत् का ही प्रतिषेध किया जा सकता है, असत् का नहीं ॥ ६२ ॥

हमारी दृष्टि में तो सभी भावों का निःस्वभाव होने से न कोई प्रतिषेध है, और न कोई प्रतिषेध्य, परन्तु आप सस्वभावतावादी होकर भी असत् का प्रतिषेध कर रहे हैं—यह तो आप हमारे सिद्धान्त को मान्यता देकर उसका गौरव ही बढ़ा रहे हैं ॥ ६३ ॥

प्रमाणसिद्धि अकस्मात् नहीं होती—आपने पीछे (१२ का०) हम पर आरोप लगाया था कि “जब स्वभाव है ही नहीं, तो फिर उसके प्रतिषेध का लाभ ? क्योंकि असत् का प्रतिषेध तो किसी वचन के बिना भी सिद्ध हो ही जाता है” । इस पर हमारा कहना है कि हमारा ‘सभी भाव निःस्वभाव है’ यह वचन भावों का निःस्वभावता का ज्ञापन नहीं करता, अपितु यह बतलाता है कि भावों का स्वभाव न होने के कारण वे निःस्वभाव है । जैसे लोक में देवदत्त के घर में न रहने पर उसके लिए कह दिया जाता है कि वह नहीं है, परन्तु वहाँ वास्तविकता यह कि

वहाँ वक्ता का तात्पर्य देवदत्त के गृहाभाव मात्र से है। अतः आपका यह कहना उचित नहीं कि वचन के बिना भी असत् का प्रतिषेध हो सकता है ॥ ६४ ॥

निर्हेतुकता दोष भी नहीं—पीछे (१३ से १६ का० तक) आपने हमारे वचन पर, मृगतृष्णा का दृष्टान्त देकर निर्हेतुकता दोष लगाया था, उस पर हमारा निर्णय भी आप सुन लीजिये ॥ ६५ ॥

वहाँ मृगतृष्णा में जलबुद्धि प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्नमात्र है, स्वभावतः नहीं; क्योंकि वहाँ मृगतृष्णा, विपरीत दर्शन एवं अयोनिशः मनस्कार की अपेक्षा करके जलबुद्धि होती है। क्योंकि वह जलबुद्धि प्रतीत्यसमुत्पन्न है, अतः वह शून्य ही है ॥ ६६ ॥

यदि वह जलबुद्धि स्वभावतः होती तो उसका निवर्तन करने का कौन साहस करता ! अन्य घमों की स्वभावता के विषय में भी यही युक्ति समझनी चाहिये। अतः आपका हमारे प्रति निर्हेतुकता वाला उपालम्भ मिथ्या ही है ॥ ६७ ॥

ग्राहादिषट्क का दोष भी नहीं—आपके द्वारा पीछे प्रतिपादित ग्राहादिषट्क के विषय में भी हमारा वही उत्तर समझना चाहिये जो हमने अभी मृगतृष्णा दृष्टान्त की व्यावृत्ति के लिये दिया है ॥ ६८ ॥

त्रैकाल्यप्रतिषेध हेतु—रह गयी बात त्रैकाल्यप्रतिषेध हेतु की उसका उत्तर तो हमने आपके तर्क को साध्यसम कह कर निराकृत कर ही दिया है। वस्तुतः, सर्व-भावस्वभावप्रतिषेधक होने से, यह शून्यतावादियों का ही हो सकता है ॥ ६९ ॥

प्रतीत्यसमुत्पाद (शून्यता) सिद्धान्त मानने पर ही जिज्ञासु सभी अर्थों की वास्तविकता जान पाता है। जो तत्त्वजिज्ञासु प्रतीत्यसमुत्पाद को स्वीकार नहीं करता, वह तत्त्व-चिन्तन में क्या उपलब्धि कर पायगा ! ॥ ७० ॥

शून्यता का माहात्म्य—जिस तत्त्वदर्शी की समझ में यह शून्यता आ जाय। उसे सभी लौकिक, लोकोत्तर भावों की वास्तविकता समझ में आ जाती है। तात्पर्य यह है कि जिसने इस शून्यता को जान लिया है, उसे मानना चाहिये कि वह प्रतीत्य-समुत्पाद को ठीक से समझ चुका है। जिसने प्रतीत्यसमुत्पाद समझ लिया है उसे आर्यसत्यचतुष्टय भी सम्यक्तया समझ में आ गया है। जिसने आर्यसत्यचतुष्टय को अधिगत कर लिया है उसे श्रामण्यफल अधिगत हुआ ही समझना चाहिये। ऐसी स्थिति में उसे सुगति एवं दुर्गति की व्यवस्था, गमन, मार्ग, व्यतिक्रमण, अतिक्रमोपाय एवं सभी लौकिक सांख्यवहारिक भाव हस्तामलकवत् ही हुए समझने चाहिये। इसी उपाय से वह दूसरे जिज्ञासुओं को भी सम्यग्मार्ग-प्राप्ति के उपाय का बोधन करा सकता है ॥ ७१ ॥

Acc. 29868
31474



